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Steve Waterman represents banks and financial institutions in bankruptcy reorganizations, commercial foreclosures, and insolvency proceedings so they can recover collateral, resolve problem loans, and protect their interests when borrowers fail.

When lenders face distressed borrowers, contested collateral, or complex insolvency proceedings, Steve brings decades of courtroom and workout experience to protect their position. Steve's practice centers on representing financial institutions in Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations, receivership proceedings, out-of-court workouts, and commercial foreclosure litigation across a wide range of collateral types — from real estate and agricultural assets to aircraft, rolling stock, and specialized business assets. He litigates Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) disputes, loan deficiency actions, and fraudulent transfer claims, and regularly presents expert valuation evidence in contested proceedings.

Steve has litigated on behalf of banks, trustees, receivers, franchisors, and creditor committees in federal, state, and tribal courts, including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits and the courts of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. His out-of-court workout experience spans numerous industries, including agriculture and cooperatives, giving lenders a practical alternative to litigation when circumstances allow.

Beyond traditional bank lending, Steve advises on insolvency issues arising in specialized sectors, including food and agribusiness, energy, real estate development, and franchise systems. He has counseled clients on Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan forgiveness implications for lenders, tribal sovereign immunity in bankruptcy, and the evolving landscape of banking emerging industries.

Chambers USA has recognized Steve in the area of bankruptcy and restructuring. He is consistently listed in Best Lawyers in America® for Litigation – Bankruptcy and Mountain States Super Lawyers®.

Steve served as co-chair of the Firmwide Bankruptcy and Financial Restructuring practice group. He also served as co-chair of the Admissions Committee of the Utah State Bar from 1996 to 2020 and as Chair (Administrative Law Judge) of the Utah Procurement Appeals Board from 2001 to 2012.

Select Experience

Appellate Decisions

  • SA Group Properties, Inc. v. Highland Marketplace LC, et al., 2017 UT App 160 (Utah Court of Appeals, August 24, 2017): litigated real estate loan deficiency judgment and presented expert valuation evidence on behalf of lender.
  • Zions First National Bank v. Taylor, Adv. Pro. No. 12-2186, Bankr. No. 12-21044 (Bankr. D. Utah, March 26, 2015): obtained unpublished ruling on non-dischargeability of debt arising from debtor's false representations to bank.
  • In re Olympus Construction, L.C., 215 P.3d 129, 2009 UT 29 (Utah Supreme Court, May 19, 2009): litigated interpretation of dissolution statute in receivership proceeding.
  • Log Furniture, Inc. v. Call, 180 Fed. Appx. 785 (10th Cir. May 11, 2006): argued trustee control of assets of bankruptcy estate before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Education

  • University of Utah, S. J. Quinney College of Law (J.D.)
    • William H. Leary Scholar
  • Brigham Young University (B.S. Business Management-Finance)

Bar Admissions

  • Utah
  • Wyoming

Accolades

  • Best Lawyers in America® for Litigation - Bankruptcy, 2006-2026
  • Mountain States Super Lawyers®, 2007-2026
  • Contributed more than 50 Diversity hours, 2023
  • Utah Business Magazine, Utah’s Legal Elite, Bankruptcy & Workout, 2018-2020
  • Best Lawyers®, Salt Lake City Lawyer of the Year in Litigation - Bankruptcy, 2016
  • Utah State Bar, Distinguished Service Award, 2012
  • Rated AV Preeminent® by Martindale-Hubbell®

Charitable & Civic Involvement

  • Former Trustee, Pepperwood Homeowners’ Association

Court Admissions

  • U.S. Supreme Court
  • U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Tenth Circuits
  • Courts of the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes
  • U.S. District Courts for the District of Utah, District of Colorado, District of Wyoming, Northern and Central Districts of Illinois, District of Nebraska

Professional Affiliations

  • Member, Risk Management Association
  • Member, American Bankruptcy Institute
  • Member, Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Advisors
  • Member, Turnaround Management Association
  • Member, Federal Bar Association
  • Member, Utah Bankruptcy Lawyer's Forum (Trustee, 1994-1997, President, 1994 - 1995)
  • Member, Admissions Committee, Utah State Bar (1996 - present, Chair or Co-Chair 1997 - 2020); Outstanding Committee of the year award 2000 and 2008
  • Chair (Administrative Law Judge), Utah Procurement Appeals Board (2001 - 2012)

Languages

  • French

Select Presentations

  • Preparing Expert Valuation Reports, VALCON 2017 (March 2017)
  • Documentation Issues/Proper Structuring of Transactions to Strengthen Position in Bankruptcy,  ABI Rocky Mountain Conference (January 2017)
  • PHH v. CFPB — Constitutionality of the CFPB and the Decision’s Practical Impact on Banks and Stoners, Skiers and Bankers—The Sliding Slope of Banking the Marijuana Industry, Utah Banker’s Association Compliance Conference (November 2016)
  • Proper Structuring on the Front End to Mitigate Fraudulent Transfer Risk, VALCON 2016 (March 2016)

Insights

Client Alert

Bankruptcy Automatic Stay: Tribal Sovereign Immunity Abrogated

June 16, 2022

First Circuit - Coughlin v. Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians The issue was whether tribal sovereign immunity protected the tribal lender from the automatic stay.  On May 6, 2022, the First Circuit held that tribal sovereign immunity was abrogated by section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Coughlin v. Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 33 F.4th 600 (1st Cir. 2022) [hereinafter Coughlin].   Congress may abrogate tribal sovereign immunity provided it is “unequivocally express[ed]”.  The question was whether section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code “unequivocally expressed” the intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.  Section 106 expressly abrogates the sovereign immunity of governmental units, as to various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including the automatic stay.  The sub-issue for the Court was whether tribes are within the Bankruptcy Code definition of governmental unit.   The First Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit in ruling that the term governmental unit covers essentially all forms of government, including tribes. Although tribes are not specifically listed within section 101(27) of the Bankruptcy Code, the First Circuit held that tribes are within the catchall of “other foreign or domestic government” in that section.  Thus, the tribal lender was not immune from the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay against collections and was liable for damages due to the violation thereof. The dissent in Coughlin, like the Sixth Circuit previously, argues for a higher standard of clarity in determining whether Congress intended to abrogate sovereign immunity in a statute. The dissent argues that domestic governments are only those that can trace their origins to the U.S. Constitution, which tribes cannot.  In other words, simply concluding “domestic government” could be read to encompass Indian tribes is not enough—Congress must name Indian tribes directly or at least very clearly indicate an intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.  After Coughlin there is no question that tribes are subject to the automatic stay that bars collection activity once debtors file for bankruptcy.  The decision of the First Circuit in Coughlin complements other decisions holding that tribes are within the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of governmental unit. Consequentially, applying the definition to section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code means tribes are not eligible for bankruptcy relief.  See, Steven T. Waterman, Tribal Troubles – Without Bankruptcy Relief, 24 AM. BANKRUPTCY INST. J. 44 (2010). The Court’s decision is available here. We expect to supplement this e-Update in case a petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court is granted, which is possible given the circuit split on the issue. 

Client Alert

SBA Clarifies PPP Loans and Bankruptcy

April 8, 2021

Since the first round of Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans, there has been confusion regarding eligibility for businesses or owners associated with bankruptcy.  This resulted in substantial litigation between debtors in possession in chapter 11 reorganization cases and SBA (or lenders).  SBA in every case argued (and in the clear preponderance of cases prevailed) that any applicant (or one with a 20% owner) in a chapter 11 bankruptcy was not eligible for a PPP loan.  Congress did not help in PPP round 2 as it “clarified” the law by stating that the SBA “may” permit debtors in possession in reorganization cases to obtain PPP loans.  SBA chose NOT to permit chapter 11 businesses in reorganization.  Thank you Congress for a total failure in resolving the problem.  After all, which businesses are in greatest need for assistance? Thus, the bankruptcy confusion continued in PPP round 2.  The PPP application requires that each applicant and any owner of 20% or more of the applicant certify that it is NOT “presently involved in any bankruptcy” in order to be eligible.  Could there be a more amorphously phrased question?  Unsurprisingly, this has created consternation by lenders in interpreting what “presently involved in any bankruptcy” means and creating greater stress among applicants or owners that have been “involved” in bankruptcy cases. On April 6, 2021, SBA finally provided some guidance by issuing FAQ 67.  SBA states that three conditions terminate involvement in a bankruptcy case.  First, if an individual was involved in a chapter 7 bankruptcy, then that individual is no longer “involved” in the bankruptcy once a discharge order is entered.  Second, if the applicant (or 20% owner) has been a debtor in a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13, then the applicant is no longer “presently involved in any bankruptcy” once a plan confirmation order has been entered.  Third, under any bankruptcy chapter, once an order dismissing the case is entered, then the bankruptcy involvement ends.  In each of the three circumstances, the order must be entered before the filing of the PPP application. Although the release of FAQ 67 provides guidance, the theoretical underpinnings are suspect and leaves other questions unanswered.  The guidance appears focused on the grant of a discharge.  Once a discharge is granted in a chapter 7 then the individual is no longer “involved” under the SBA Guidance but that individual’s bankruptcy case remains open and the individual’s ownership interest in the applicant remains property of the bankruptcy estate – subject to sale by the trustee or abandonment.  This could create a disruption of the applicant’s business.  SBA provides no guidance of this issue.  For example, an individual owning 80% of a business files a chapter 7 and the discharge order is entered (in many cases about 120-150 days after filing).  At that point the individual is no longer “involved” in the bankruptcy and the business may apply for the PPP loan.  Then, after receipt of PPP loan proceeds, the chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee takes control of or sells the business.  It seems this is not likely what SBA had in mind. The Bankruptcy Code governs the effect of a confirmed chapter 11 plan re-vesting property in the debtor and providing a discharge of debt (with certain limitations).  At plan confirmation the applicant is no longer “involved” in a bankruptcy, and the applicant may apply for and be granted a PPP loan.  However, all plan payments have not yet been completed or even commenced – and may extend for years in the future.  This is a great benefit for a chapter 11 debtor which can now anticipate the future receipt of PPP loan proceeds as part of a plan.  In chapters 12 and 13 a discharge does not occur until completion of all payments under the plan.  But the debtor may apply for and obtain the PPP upon confirmation and then use the proceeds.  All of this raises the question of why applicants in need of PPP loans and presumably relying on them to fund their bankruptcy plans are required to wait for confirmation to apply for such a loan.  Indeed, the only tangible result is unnecessary delay which may spell the demise of businesses that cannot make it to the confirmation finish line, thereby undercutting the very purpose of PPP loans.

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.