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Data Privacy

Privacy Policy Statement

1. INTRODUCTION
This Privacy Policy describes how Dorsey & Whitney LLP ("Dorsey", "we," "us" or "our") collect, use, and share your personal data when you use the Dorsey website (www.Dorsey.com) and other online services ("Services" or "Digital Services").

The purpose of this Policy is to inform you about our privacy practices and to ensure that you understand the purposes for which we collect and process your personal data. The following is a brief summary of the manner and purposes for which we process your personal data.

2. APPLICATION
This Policy relates to your personal data, i.e. data about you, an individual, from which you can be identified.

This Policy does not apply to any data insofar as it is held, processed, disclosed or published in a form which cannot be linked to a living individual (such as anonymised or aggregated data which cannot directly or indirectly be used to identify you or to obtain information about you) ("Anonymised and Aggregated Data"). We may generate or extract Anonymised and Aggregated Data out of any databases containing your personal data and we may make use of any such Anonymised and Aggregated Data for our purposes as we see fit.

3. CHANGES TO THE PRIVACY POLICY 
Please review the Privacy Policy each time you use the Service. We may update this Policy from time to time, and the updated version of this Policy will be effective upon posting on the Dorsey Services. Please check this page to review the most up-to-date version of this Policy. 

4. RESPONSIBILITY FOR DATA CONTROL AND PROCESSING
Dorsey is the entity which is responsible for the control and processing of personal data that we collect from you when you use the Services.  If you have any questions or concerns about Dorsey’s use of your personal data, please contact our Data Privacy Team at dataprivacy@dorsey.com.

5. COUNTRY OF PROCESSING
We operate the Services from the United States of America (USA) and our data collection and processing activities take place predominantly in the USA. Accordingly, data collected from users when using our Services is collected in the USA. We store and otherwise process data (including personal data) through third party cloud service providers and other IT service providers which may be located or which may operate in other countries.

6. HOW WE COLLECT AND USE YOUR PERSONAL DATA 

(a) Information That You Provide Directly or Authorize Someone Else to Give Us. Dorsey collects personal information about you, such as your contact details, when voluntarily submitted by you. For example, if you choose to complete and submit one of the forms located on our Web site to register for conferences or register to receive information. We may ask you to provide certain information including, but not limited to your name, postal address, email address, telephone number, company name, password, third-party social networking service username and password, birthday, and other data. We retain messages you send through the Service, and any other data you provide to us. We use this data for our business purposes related to our practice of law, and as further detailed below.

(b) Information that we collect automatically. If you browse through the Dorsey.com website or download information, our servers will automatically collect certain information from you. This information includes the: (a) name of the domain and host from which you access the Internet; (b) browser software you use and your operating system; and (c) Internet address of the website and IP address from which you linked directly to this website. We will use information that we automatically collect to manage and improve our website to make it as useful as possible for visitors like you. We do not seek to match data collected automatically with data that you give us voluntarily as referred to above and we do not seek to track specific users or profile their activities on the website.

(c) Analytics information. We collect, measure and analyze traffic and usage trends on the Services, and we use third-party analytics tools to help us. This allows us to understand, among other things, how the Services are being used and ways to improve the Services. Such third-party analytics tools use cookies and persistent device identifiers to collect and store information including, but not limited to time of visit, pages visited, time spent on each page, IP address, unique device ID, advertising tags and type of operating system used.

(d) Cookies. When you use the Service, we sometimes send one or more cookies (small text files containing a string of alphanumeric characters) to your computer that uniquely identify your browser and enhance your navigation on the Service. A cookie may also convey information to us about how you use the Service (e.g., the pages you view, the links you click and other actions you take), and allow us or our third-party analytics tools we use to track your usage of the Services. There are at least two different types of cookies: persistent and session cookies. A persistent cookie remains on your hard drive after you close your browser. Persistent cookies may be used by your browser on subsequent use of the Service. Persistent cookies can be removed by following your web browser's directions for removal of cookies. A session cookie is temporary and disappears after you close your browser. You can reset your web browser to refuse all cookies or to notify you when a cookie is being sent. However, some features of the Service may not function properly if cookies are disabled.

(e) Log File. Log file information is automatically reported by your browser each time you access a web page. When you access or use the Dorsey.com website, our servers may automatically record certain log file information, including but not limited to your web request, Internet Protocol address, browser type, referring/exit pages and URLs, number of clicks and how you interact with links on the Service, domain names, landing pages, and pages viewed.

(f) Clear GIFs/Web Beacons. Clear GIFs (also known as web beacons) allow for the tracking of a user's response to an email or usage of a website in a manner that does not reveal personally identifiable information. We may use clear GIFs or similar technologies to assess responses to emails and usage of the Service. For example, we may use clear GIFs to track when emails are opened and which links are clicked by recipients. You can disable certain abilities of clear GIFs to capture information by blocking cookies.

(g) Device Identifiers. When you access or use the Service using a mobile device, we may access, collect, monitor and/or remotely store one or more "device identifiers," such as a universally unique identifier. Device identifiers are small data files or similar data structures stored on or associated with your device that uniquely identify your device. A device identifier may consist of data stored in connection with the device hardware, operating system or other software, or data sent to the device by us. A device identifier may convey information to us about how you browse and use the Service. A device identifier may remain persistently on your device to enhance your navigation on the Service. Some features of the Service may not function properly if use or availability of device identifiers is impaired or disabled.

(h) Location Data. When you access or use the Service using a mobile device, we may access, collect, monitor and/or remotely store "location data," which may include GPS coordinates (e.g. latitude and/or longitude) or similar information regarding the location of your device. Location data may convey to us information about how you browse and use the Service. Some features of the Service, particularly location-based services, may not function properly if use or availability of location data is impaired or disabled.

(i) Professional Communications. Insofar as permitted under applicable law, we may use the information we collect or receive to communicate directly with you in relation to the Services or related services we offer. Subject to your consent to receiving such communications (where legally required), we may use the information to communicate with you in relation to other services that we offer.  For example, we may use the information to send you emails containing newsletters, updates on developments in the law or other information that may interest you.

(j) Use of Certain Service-Type information. We may use information from cookies, log files, device identifiers, location data, clear GIFs and other tools to: (i) remember information so that you will not have to re-enter it during your visit or the next time you use the Service; (ii) provide custom, personalized content or information to you or others; (iii) monitor the effectiveness of the Service; (iv) monitor aggregate metrics, such as total number of visitors, traffic and demographic patterns; (v) diagnose or fix technology problems; (vi) provide advertising to your browser or device; and (vii) conduct research or surveys.

(k) Use of information with Your Consent. We may use your information for any other purpose for which you provide consent.

7. AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING
We do not envisage that any decisions will be taken about you based solely on automated decision-making that will have a significant impact on you. However, we will update this policy if this position changes.

8. THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH WE USE YOUR PERSONAL DATA
The purposes for which we collect and store your personal data are the following:

(a) To enable us to operate the Services and to enable you to use them efficiently;

(b) Insofar as permitted under applicable law, to communicate with you in relation to our services and legal practice;

(c) To personalize, test, monitor, improve and upgrade the Services;

(d) To assist law enforcement and respond to subpoenas;

(e) To meet our legal obligations and the regulatory requirements to which we are subject, for loss prevention purposes and to protect and enforce our rights and meet our obligations to third parties; and

(f) For our internal business purposes, such as compiling and analyzing usage information for general operational, statistical and business purposes.

9. YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES
It is important that the personal data we hold about you is accurate and current. If you provided us with any details of personal data, please keep us informed if such details change.

10. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR PROCESSING YOUR DATA
The processing of your information is lawful on the basis of the following:

(a) Where relevant, your express consent (if your consent is requested or if you provide personal data to us voluntarily or in response to our request);

(b) Compliance with legal obligations to which we are subject, including to comply with legal process; or

(c) Our legitimate interests in (among other things) providing and administering the Services, conducting commercial research, improving and maintaining the Services, personalising and tailoring content made available to you through the Services,  protecting the security or integrity of our databases, protecting our business or reputation, taking precautions against legal liability, dealing with our assets in the event of a business change, protecting and defending our rights or property, required institutional risk control, or for resolving disputes, investigating and attending to inquiries or complaints with respect to your use of the Service.

11. HOW WE MAY SHARE YOUR INFORMATION
(a) Business Associates and Service Providers. We may share information about you with third-party business associates and service providers that perform services on our behalf in connection with the Digital Services, such as independent contractors who host and maintain our website and email services.  Where your information is shared with such third parties, we ensure that the third party service provider will deal with your information only on our behalf and on our written instructions and solely for the benefit of our business (and not for its own benefit).

(b) Business Change. If we become involved in a merger, consolidation, acquisition, sale of assets, joint venture, securities offering, bankruptcy, reorganization, liquidation, dissolution or other transaction, or if the ownership of all or substantially all of our business otherwise changes, we may share or transfer your information to successor party or parties in connection with such transaction or change in ownership or legal structure.

(c) Necessary Disclosure. Regardless of the choices you make regarding your information and to the extent permitted or required by applicable law, we may disclose information about you to third parties to: (i) enforce or apply the Terms of Use or any applicable end user license agreement; (ii) comply with laws, subpoenas, warrants, court orders, legal processes or requests of government or law enforcement officials; (iii) protect our rights, reputation, safety or property, or that of our users or others; (iv) protect against legal liability; (v) establish or exercise our rights to defend against legal claims; or (vi) investigate, prevent or take action regarding known or suspected illegal activities; fraud; our rights, reputation, safety or property, or those of our users or others; violation of the Terms of Use, our policies or agreements; or as otherwise required by law.

(d) Sharing information. We may share certain service-type information, including information obtained through tools such as cookies, log files, device identifiers, location data and clear GIFs (such as anonymous usage data, referring/exit pages and URLs, platform types, number of clicks, etc.) with our third-party business associates who may use such information for the purposes described in the section titled "How We Collect and Use information."

(e) Aggregated data. As mentioned above, we may also aggregate or otherwise strip information of all personally identifying characteristics and may share that aggregated, anonymized data with third parties or publish it.  This data does not personally identify you and helps us to measure the success of the Services and its features and to improve your experience.  We reserve the right to make use of any such aggregated data as we see fit.

12. HOW WE PROTECT YOUR INFORMATION
We take certain physical, technological and administrative measures to protect the information you provide through the Services against loss, theft, and unauthorized access, use, disclosure or modification. However, we cannot ensure or warrant the security of any information you transmit to us or guarantee that information on the Services may not be accessed, disclosed, altered or destroyed. Messages and emails sent to or from the Services may not be secure. You should use caution whenever submitting information online and take special care in deciding what information you send to us via email.
We cannot guarantee that transmissions of your personal data will be fully secure and that third parties will never be able to defeat our security measures or the security measures of our partners.  WE ASSUME NO LIABILITY FOR DISCLOSURE OF YOUR INFORMATION DUE TO TRANSMISSION ERRORS, THIRD-PARTY ACCESS OR CAUSES BEYOND OUR CONTROL.

13. YOUR CHOICES ABOUT YOUR INFORMATION

(a) Controlling Your Settings. You can limit your browser or mobile device from providing certain information by adjusting the settings in the browser, operating system or device. Please consult the documentation for the applicable browser, operating system or device for the controls available to you. You can also stop receiving promotional emails from us by following the unsubscribe instructions in those emails. Note that unsubscribe is not available for certain emails concerning your relationship or dealings with us.

(b) Do Not Track. At this time, we do not recognize "do not track" signals sent from web browsers.  In some cases, your browser may offer a “Do Not Track” option, which allows you to signal to operators of websites, mobile applications, and services (including behavioral advertising services) that you do not wish such operators to track certain of your online activities over time and/or across different websites and mobile applications and services. Disabling tracking mechanisms may disable certain features of the Service. To disable tracking, please consult the documentation for your browser, operating system or mobile device. For some devices, it may not be possible to disable tracking mechanisms. You may also disable tracking by certain third-party services by opting out:

14. HOW LONG WE KEEP YOUR INFORMATION 
We will only retain your personal data for as long as necessary to fulfil the purposes we collected it for, including for the purposes of satisfying any legal, accounting, or reporting requirements.

To determine the appropriate retention period for personal data, we consider the amount, nature, and sensitivity of the personal data, the potential risk of harm from unauthorised use or disclosure of your personal data, the purposes for which we process your personal data and whether we can achieve those purposes through other means, and the applicable legal requirements.

15. CHILDREN'S PRIVACY
The Service is not directed to children and is intended for use by adults only. We do not knowingly collect information from individuals under 16 years of age. If you are under the age of 16, please do not submit any information through the Service.

16. THIRD-PARTY SITES AND SERVICES
The Service may reference or provide links to other websites, applications, or resources. If you access any website, application, or resources provided by a third party, our Privacy Policy will not apply. Your interactions with such websites, applications, and resources are subject to the privacy policies of the third parties that operate them. Please review those policies carefully to understand how those parties will treat your information.

17. EU PRIVACY RIGHTS
Users based in the European Economic Area have the following legal rights in respect of their personal data:

(a) The right to require Dorsey to confirm whether or not their information is being processed, the purpose of any such processing, the recipients of any information that has been disclosed, the period for which their information is to be stored and whether any automated decision-making processes are used in relation to their information;

(b) The right to require Dorsey to rectify inaccurate information without undue delay;

(c) Where Dorsey has relied on the ‘consent’ basis for processing that information (see paragraph 9(a) above), the right to withdraw their consent at any time. This right to withdraw consent does not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal;

(d) The right to request the erasure of their information. In general, a data subject may be entitled to  require the erasure of their personal data records where:

  • (i) the information is no longer necessary in relation to the purpose for which it was collected, such as where a user chooses to terminate his or her use of the Service; 
  • (ii) where the processing of the information is based on the user’s consent (and the other circumstances described in the ‘Legal Basis for Processing Your information’ and ‘How We May Share Your information’ sections above no longer apply), if the user withdraws his or her consent; or 
  • (iii) where the personal data is processed by Dorsey solely on the basis of our ‘legitimate interest’ referred to in paragraph 10(d) (and the other legal basis set out in paragraph 10 do not apply), if the user objects to the processing of his or her personal data and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing (such as, for example, where the processing of the data is required to meet statutory obligations or for the defence of legal claims). 

Where Dorsey has disclosed the information of a user in the European Economic Area to a third party and the user requests the erasure or rectification of the data, Dorsey will take all reasonable steps to inform the third party of such request;

(e) The right to require Dorsey to restrict its processing of a user’s personal data in certain circumstances, such as where the accuracy of that data is disputed or an objection has been raised. In such circumstances, Dorsey will only process that information with the express consent of the user, or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons of important public interest;

(f) Where data is processed on the basis of data subject consent or for in fulfilment of a contractual obligation, the user’s right to receive his or her personal data from Dorsey in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format;

(g) The right to object to the processing of personal data where:

  • (i) Dorsey relies solely on the ‘legitimate interest’ basis for processing that data, in which case we will be legally required to stop processing the user’s information unless we have compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the user’s privacy rights and interests; or 
  • (ii) the information is used for direct marketing purposes, in which case we will immediately stop processing the user’s information for such purposes;

(h) Users have the right to lodge a complaint with the data protection supervisory authority of the EU member state where the user resides.

18. CALIFORNIA PRIVACY RIGHTS
Under California Civil Code Section 1798.83, if you are a California resident and your business relationship with us is primarily for personal, family or household purposes, you may request certain data regarding our disclosure, if any, of information to third parties for the third parties' direct marketing purposes. To make such a request please fill out the request form. You may make such a request up to once per calendar year. If applicable, we will provide to you via email a list of the categories of information disclosed to third parties for their direct marketing purposes during the immediately-preceding calendar year, along with the third parties' names and addresses. Please note that not all personal data sharing is covered by Section 1798.83's requirements.

19. QUESTIONS/CONTACTING US
If you have any questions regarding this Privacy Policy or if you wish to make a request in accordance with paragraphs 17(d) and/or 18 above, you may email the Data Privacy Team at dataprivacy@dorsey.com or call +1 (612) 340-2600 or contact us by mail at the address below.  Please note that email from unrecognized addresses may be rejected by our security measures and therefore not be received.  If you do not receive an acknowledgment concerning a data privacy request sent by email within 3 business days, please contact us by phone or letter.

Dorsey and Whitney, LLP
Attn: Data Privacy Team
50 South Sixth Street
Suite 1500
Minneapolis, MN 55402-1498
United States of America

Firm Highlights

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

News

Dorsey & Whitney Advises Beijing Xunzhong on Two Consecutive H Share Placings Raising HK$418.5 Million

International law firm Dorsey & Whitney LLP acted as Hong Kong legal advisors to Beijing Xunzhong Communication Technology Co., Ltd. (“Xunzhong”) as to Hong Kong law in connection with two consecutive placings of new H shares under general mandate (the “First Placing” and the “Second Placing”, respectively, and together, the “Placings”). Xunzhong’s H shares are listed on the Main Board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Stock Code: 2597). Winbull Securities International (Hong Kong) Limited acted as sole overall coordinator and placing agent on both Placings. The First Placing of 11,190,000 new H shares at HK$28.20 each was completed on September 17, 2026, followed by the Second Placing of 3,550,000 new H shares at HK$29.00 each on October 30, 2026. The Placings raised approximately HK$315.56 million and HK$102.95 million in gross proceeds, respectively, or approximately HK$418.51 million in aggregate (approximately HK$415.96 million in aggregate net proceeds). Both Placings were conducted under the same general mandate granted by shareholders at Xunzhong’s 2025 annual general meeting, and each was completed within one week of the signing of its placing agreement. Completing placings in consecutive months is relatively uncommon in the Hong Kong market, and doing so called on the technical depth of Dorsey’s Hong Kong Capital Markets team. Working closely with Xunzhong to understand its business needs and prepare the transaction documents, the team addressed in quick succession the remaining capacity under the general mandate, disclosure of the use of proceeds and the maintenance of Xunzhong’s public float, enabling both Placings to be completed seamlessly. “We are pleased to have advised Xunzhong on both Placings,” said Rachel Han, Partner and Co-Head of Dorsey’s Asia Capital Markets practice. “We appreciate the trust placed in our team and the close collaboration among all parties involved. We look forward to supporting Xunzhong as it continues to execute its growth strategy and pursue future capital markets opportunities.” Xunzhong is principally engaged in cloud-based communications services and enterprise digitalization services in the PRC. As disclosed in its announcements, the net proceeds of the First Placing are allocated to developing Xunzhong’s new computing power operation services business, while those of the Second Placing will be used to integrate model-as-a-service (MaaS) and AI agent capabilities into its existing cloud communications platform-as-a-service (PaaS) platform and software-as-a-service (SaaS) products. Approximately 55% of the net proceeds of the Second Placing will be used for computing power equipment upgrades for the MaaS system, approximately 35% for MaaS, PaaS and SaaS platform upgrades, and approximately 10% for working capital and general corporate purposes. With a single MaaS platform and shared computing power supporting its PaaS and SaaS offerings, Xunzhong intends for its MaaS, PaaS and SaaS capabilities to complement and reinforce one another, and to address customer needs from multiple angles, from embedding AI in customer communications and business workflows to maintaining stable performance at scale and keeping customer data within controlled environments. Partner and Co-Head of Dorsey’s Asia Capital Markets practice Rachel Han and Of Counsel in the Capital Markets and Corporate Compliance group Carlton Ng, along with Associate Kristy Ting, led the Dorsey Hong Kong Capital Markets & Corporate Compliance group in advising Xunzhong on both Placings.

Insights

Construing Congressional Silence: With the Natural Gas Act’s Not Addressing Compensation in Pipeline Condemnations, Can Courts Use State Law to Award Attorney Fees?

On November 9, 2026, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in Leonard W. Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. to determine: “In private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act, should just compensation be determined by reference to state law?” North Dakota ranchers litigated the price of a natural gas pipeline easement during three years of condemnation proceedings, settled on the easement price, and were awarded attorney fees based on state law, but the fees were denied by Eighth Circuit, which held that because the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”) provision authorizing pipelines to use of eminent domain does not address compensation, the Fifth Amendment standard must necessarily apply, that is, “just compensation” for property, but not attorney fees.1 Four other circuits disagree. The Court will resolve the circuit split, likely making some pipeline condemnations less expensive and quicker or, alternatively, more expensive and take longer. Whatever the result, Congressional action could follow. Background Section 7(c) of the NGA requires the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to issue a certificate of public convenience and necessity, before new interstate natural gas pipeline facilities can be constructed and operated.2 Significantly, only a private party – not the federal government, not a state, nor a municipality – can obtain certificate authorization.3 The NGA did not initially address property acquisition, leaving certificate holders to rely on state condemnation law to secure necessary property rights to develop their projects, rendering some with “only an illusory right to build.”4 Congress resolved that by enacting NGA Section 7(h), which vests certificate holders with the ability to exercise eminent domain in a federal or state court where the property is located.5 Yet Section 7(h) does not address compensation: it does not indicate whether attorney fees can be recovered; “it does not even expressly require that just compensation be provided.”6 Litigation over the meaning of the Congressional compensation silence ensued. After Years of Litigation, Parties Agreed on Easement Price, but Not Attorney Fees In February 2018, WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. (“WBI”) received certificate authorization to construct and operate approximately 12 miles of 24-inch diameter pipeline through ranch land in western North Dakota, in the heart of the oil and gas producing Bakken formation of the Williston Basin.7 WBI and the ranchers could not agree on an easement price: the ranchers had recently negotiated easement prices with oil pipelines (which do not have eminent domain rights and must pay “market” prices to obtain easements) and sought a similar deal,8 but WBI was unwilling, instead offering only what it paid for a parallel natural gas line easement years earlier.9 So WBI filed in federal district court a complaint to take by eminent domain a permanent easement and temporary rights-of-way to construct the pipeline. Shortly thereafter, with the agreement of the ranchers, the court ordered that WBI could have immediate use and possession of the easements necessary for construction, leaving for trial the amount of compensation.10 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.11 WBI and the ranchers disagreed on what constitutes “just compensation.” WBI maintained that compensation should be determined solely by the “before and after rule” – i.e., the difference between the market value of the land free of the easement and the market value burdened with the easement.12 The ranchers argued that other factors should also be considered, such as market rate paid by oil pipelines for easements on the properties.13 WBI filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence and testimony of such payment information, which the trial judge denied,14 leading to a confidential settlement on the value of the easement, with the ranchers’ reserving their right to seek attorney fees and expenses and WBI’s reserving its right to contest. After three years of litigation, the ranchers sought to recover $383,375.76 – that is, $332,274.96 in legal fees and $50,650.86 in costs and expenses.15 WBI claimed that the amount was unreasonable and should be limited to $220,625.52.16 The trial court, recognizing that the NGA was silent on compensation issues, relied on United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.17 to analyze whether to “fill in the gap” with North Dakota condemnation law and ultimately concluded it could award attorney fees and costs.18 WBI appealed. Four Circuits Rely on Kimbell Foods and State Law to Award Attorney Fees Courts have recognized the difference between condemnations by the federal government and a private party: “the sovereign need only pay for what it actually takes rather than for all that the owner has lost.”19 “[W]here the federal government is the condemnor there exists a significant concern about the spending of federal dollars, one that does not exist when a private entity is the condemnor . . . pursuing the condemnation ‘for purposes of profit.’”20 As such, four circuit courts have applied federal common law to allow recovery of attorney fees and costs in condemnations under the NGA.21 “In crafting such federal common law, courts need not inevitably … resort to federal rules,”22 but rather, after weighing various considerations set forth in the Supreme Court’s 1979 opinion in Kimbell Foods, can apply state law.23 In particular, the four circuits answered “no” to each of the following three questions posed in Kimbell Foods: “(1) whether the federal program, by its very nature, required uniformity; (2) whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program; and (3) whether application of uniform federal law would disrupt existing commercial relationships predicated on state law.”24 The Eighth Circuit took a different tack. Eighth Circuit Reversed and Barred Attorney Fees, Breaking with Sister Circuits The Eighth Circuit framed the issue this way: “Under North Dakota law, as the district court points out, attorney fees are available in condemnation proceedings. WBI’s view is that federal law applies because it was exercising the eminent-domain power of the United States, which would owe no attorney fees if it did the condemning.”25 The court then held: “Just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment has a well-established legal meaning that usually equates to “market value,” the “full monetary equivalent of the property taken.” * * * But the focus is always on the value of the property itself, not what the owner spends trying to keep it. * * * Under the Fifth Amendment, property owners cannot recover for “indirect costs” like attorney fees and expenses. Only a statute can require more. * * * [T]he Natural Gas Act says nothing about the measure of compensation due to a property owner.  It does not even use the words “just compensation,” let alone say that attorney fees are available or that an agency or state law can provide them. Without such an exercise of “legislative grace,” the default rules applies: “just compensation” under the Fifth Amendment.26 The Eighth Circuit recognized “that different concerns are at stake when the United States is exercising its own power under the Fifth Amendment…. But these are policy arguments better addressed to Congress.”27 Petition For Writ of Certiorari Granted to Resolve Circuit Split The ranchers filed with the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve the split between the Eighth Circuit and four other circuits.28 WBI initially opposed the petition,29 but relented after the Solicitor General urged the court to grant petition and uphold the Eighth Circuit opinion.30 The attorneys general of ten states31 and a national network of eminent domain and property lawyers filed amici curiae (friends of the court) briefs in support of the ranchers’ petition.32 Shortly after WBI and ranchers filed supplemental briefs,33 the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari on June 26, 2026.34 Ranchers Focused on Statutory Interpretation, Six Amici on Economic Fairness Rather than rely primarily on Kimbell Foods, the ranchers’ merits brief used statutory interpretation to argue that private condemnation lawsuits under the NGA should use state law compensation rules.35 They contend that, in contrast to various ways that the federal government can take land,36 NGA Section 7(h) grants a limited “delegation of power to take property through a condemnation lawsuit – to file what is sometimes called “a straight condemnation,”37 where authorization to take property is not sought, but instead for the court to adjudicate the value of the property: “If the condemnor wants to buy the property at the court’s price, it tenders payment; if not, it can abandon the condemnation.”38 Thus, the ranchers submit that their rights to compensation under the NGA flow not from the Fifth Amendment, but rather from the NGA’s authorizing “the filing of a lawsuit whose purpose is to adjudicate how much they must be paid for their land.”39 If the condemnor were the federal government, compensation would not be greater than the Fifth Amendment minimum, absent statutory authorization;40 but that does not require the same to result in a private condemnation. The ranchers suggest that several additional reasons support using state law to resolve property compensation issues. First, given that real property law “lies at the core of traditional state authority”,41 compensation should consider “North Dakota’s rule that property owners cannot be made to bear the cost of their condemnation….”42 Second, based on the “Court’s longstanding practice of borrowing state substantive law,” the issue is not whether NGA Section 7(h) incorporates state land valuation rules, but “whether the statute preempts them.”43 Third, unless an easement’s value is above a statutory minimum,44 the condemnor can only file in state court: “If Congress expected those state courts to look to a source of law other than the one they would ordinarily look to in a property case, one could expect it to have left some hint to that effect in the text. But there isn’t one.”45 Fourth, awarding attorney fees under state law is consistent with the purpose of NGA Section 7(h): Respondent suggests that Congress, out of a desire to fix a problem in Missouri (where interstate natural-gas companies lacked an eminent-domain cause of action), also decided to take some money away from farmers and ranchers in places like Iowa (where the companies already had a cause of action). Surely not.46 Six groups filed amicus briefs supporting the ranchers.47 Among them, Florida property owners, who were involved in a different condemnation proceeding,48 contend that (1) compensation rules for federal government acting in its own name should not apply to private, for-profit companies acting under a limited delegation of eminent domain,49 and (2) “property owners who are without economic wherewithal proceed in an unrepresented fashion and are typically forced to accept a compromise close to the amount of the private licensee company’s low offers because they are not otherwise with the means to prepare their own valuation estimates and defend their respective constitutional entitlement to compensation.”50 This was reinforced by a group of property lawyers: In 2016, under the auspices of the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”), the Sabal Trail natural gas pipeline project in Florida took land from Ryan B. Thomas and offered him $6,800 in exchange. A Florida jury later determined that the measure of compensation for Sabal Trail’s taking was $463,439. Sabal Trail had thus initially offered Mr. Thomas 1.4% of his land’s value. Between the initial offer and the jury’s determination of compensation lay months of litigation work by Mr. Thomas and his attorney.51 The property lawyers also argued that affirming the Eighth Circuit’s decision would strip property owners of state law protections in 21 states.52 WBI Argued NGA Silence on Attorney Fees Intentional, Supported by Three Amici WBI’s merits brief contends that condemnation by a private party is nothing new and does not require a different set of rules from the Federal government’s condemning land: “For as long as the eminent domain power has been exercised by the United States, it has also been delegated to private parties.”53 These private delegatees “knitted together the expanding nation by building railroads, bridges, roads, and telegraph and telephone lines”54 and, absent a Congressional directive, paid the fair market value of the property taken, as required by the Fifth Amendment.55 WBI points to a 1943 case, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Powelson,56 which summarized then existing law: “[i]n the absence of a statutory mandate, the sovereign must pay only for what it takes, not for the opportunities which the owner may lose”.57 Indeed, Congress knew how to depart from the Fifth Amendment’s fair-market-value measure of condemnation compensation: “One year before enacting Section 717f(h), in the General Bridge Act of 1946, Congress authorized private parties to condemn land for bridges and expressly required that compensation ‘be ascertained and paid according to the laws of [the] State’ where the property sits.”58 Additionally, WBI argues that the ranchers essentially urge the court to adopt a patchwork of individual state compensation laws, which would undermine what Congress did in enacting NGA Section 7(h) --“eliminate state-by-state variation in NGA condemnations so that certificate-holders could efficiently construct interstate pipelines.”59 Three amicus briefs were filed in support of WBI, including one from the Attorney General, who reiterated: “Just compensation under the Fifth Amendment ‘is for the property, and not the owner. Accordingly, ‘indirect costs to the property owner caused by the taking of his land,’ such as ‘attorneys fees’ are ‘generally not part of the just compensation to which his is constitutionally entitled.’”60 Another amicus brief filed by trade associations claimed that interstate natural gas pipelines are responsible stewards of eminent domain, exercising it only as a last resort, as evinced by a survey indicating that, over a recent nine-year period FERC-certificated pipeline projects more than ten miles in length (25,268 tracts) resulted in only 10% of the tracts requiring condemnation and less than one percent (1%) required litigation.61 Finally, the US Chamber of Commerce emphasized the importance of natural gas to businesses,62 and urged the Court not to create obstacles that would “chill investment in essential infrastructure….”63 Crystal Ball Judicial Tension between “Strict Construction” and Support for Property Rights? Hoffmann could set up a clash between a favored method of the Supreme Court for resolving conflicts and a centuries’ long commitment to protecting a fundamental right. Questions during oral arguments could foreshadow which way the Court will lean. On one hand, the Court could rely on NGA Section 7(h)’s “’plain meaning’ derived from an ordinary understanding of the words and structure of the statutory text.”64 Consider the Supreme Court’s rationale in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization,65 which overruled the landmark Roe v. Wade:66 “The Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly protected by any constitutional provisions including . . . the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”67 This type of “strict construction”68 aligns most closely with WBI’s argument that Section 7(h) does not specifically provide for attorney fees, and the silence was intentional, given that Congress expressly permitted recovery of attorney fees in eminent domain actions under the General Bridge Act of 1946, the year before enactment of NGA Section 7(h).69 On the other hand, the ranchers’ arguments resonate with a long line of cases protecting property rights. More than 130 years ago, the Court in Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U.S.70 explained that in condemnation cases the courts should adhere to “the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed.  A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right….”71 Half a century ago, the Supreme Court, in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp,72 emphasized: “Property does not have rights. People have rights.”73 Three years ago, all nine justices, in Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota,74 ruled for a property owner, holding that a local government cannot keep the surplus profit after selling a seized home for unpaid taxes.75 The policies in these (and other cases cited by the ranchers) would appear to support landowners’ recovering the costs incurred to defend their property in condemnation proceedings. Whether a strict construction of NGA Section 7(h) permits those policies to be realized in Hoffmann remains to be seen. Implications and Possible Congressional Action The amount of compensation offered by pipelines and the length of condemnation proceedings may change, depending on how the Supreme Court rules. If the Court upholds the Eighth Circuit opinion – and concludes that attorney fees and costs cannot be recovered –a landowner may be presented with an unsavory decision: accept the pipeline’s offer or, alternatively, refuse the offer, go to court, and watch legal fees erode any compensation ultimately received. Worse yet, with litigation unlikely, pipelines may submit “low ball” offers, believing that the landowner will not likely want to risk costly litigation. Conversely, if the Supreme Court reverses the Eighth Circuit and holds that attorney fees and costs can be recovered, the number of condemnation cases could increase, as landowners’ eyeing large payouts reject pipeline offers and take their chances in court. This in turn could increase pipeline costs (that are passed on to ratepayers). In short, depending on the Supreme Court rules, pipeline condemnations could become less expensive and quicker or, alternatively, more expensive and take longer. No matter how the Supreme Court rules, Congressional action could (and arguably should) follow. If the Eighth Circuit opinion is affirmed, Congress may be pressured to protect landowner property rights by amending NGA Section 7(h) to provide for the recovery of attorney and fees and costs. Under similar circumstances in 1954, Congress responded to an unpopular Supreme Court opinion on federal regulatory jurisdiction by amending the NGA.76 But even if the Eighth Circuit opinion is reversed, the result would be a geographical crazy quilt of federal common law stitched together from applicable state condemnation statutes, tying recovery of attorney fees in NGA condemnations to the state law in which the property is located, possibly leading to disparate cost recovery by landowners for the same pipeline project, prompting calls for a clear, uniform rule. 1 Click on the hyperlink in the body to access all motions and briefs submitted in the Supreme Court proceeding. 2 NGA § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c)(1)(A) (“No natural-gas company … shall … undertake construction of extension of facilities … unless there is in force with respect to such natural gas-company a certificate of public convenience and necessity….). 3 Id. § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 717a (“’Natural-gas company’ means a person engaged in the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce….; ‘Person’ includes an individual or a corporation.”). 4 PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U.S. 482, 489 (2021). 5 NGA § 7(h), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h), Pub. Law No. 80-245, 61 Stat. 459 (1947). Section 7(h), in pertinent part, provides: When any holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity cannot acquire by contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property to the compensation to be paid for, the necessary right-of-way to construct, operate, and maintain a pipe line or pipe lines for the transportation of natural gas, and the necessary land or other property . . . , it may acquire the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the district court of the United States for the district in which such property may be located, or in the State courts. Id. 6 Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC v. Permanent Easement for 7.053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2019). 7 Under FERC’s regulations, once issued a “blanket certificate,” an interstate natural gas pipeline may file a “prior notice” for certificate authorization to construct and operate facilities of limited cost, which, if not protested within 60 days after publication in the Federal Register, is authorized by operation of law. 18 C.F.R. § 157.205. On November 30, 2017, WBI filed a prior notice request to construct and operate certain facilities in McKenzie County, North Dakota; because no protests were filed, certificate authorization for the pipeline project was granted by operation of law. WBI estimated the project cost to be $27.2 million (WBI’s Prior Notice Request, Docket No. CP18-21-000 (Nov. 30, 2017) at 8), including $1,115,153 in pipeline right-of-way costs. WBI’s Supplemental Prior Notice Filing, Docket No. CP18-21-000, Exhibit K (Dec. 7, 2017) (Estimated Cost of Facilities). 8 “Leonard Hoffman was offered roughly half the market rate for gas pipeline access across his pastureland….” Chris Bennett, “Lowballed by Eminent Domain, ND Farmers Appeal Landmark Case to Supreme Court,” AG Web (Sept. 16, 2025) https://www.agweb.com/news/business/farmland/lowballed-eminent-domain-nd-farmers-appeal-landmark-case-supreme-court. 9 The pipeline at issue would run parallel to an existing pipeline on the ranchers’ land, which WBI uses to transport gas from the Wild Basin and Garden Creek processing plants to an interconnection with the pipeline system of Northern Border Pipeline Company. Brief of Respondent, Leonard W. Hoffman v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., No. 25-159 (filed Sept. 14, 2026) (“Respondent’s Brief”) at 7; id. (“Despite having earlier reached voluntary agreements for WBI’s immediately parallel pipeline at substantially lower rates, petitioners rejected WBI’s compensation offers.”) (citation omitted). 10 WBI Energy Transmission Inc. v. Easement and Right-of-Way Across, 189.9 rods, more or less, Case No. 1:18-cv-078, slip op. (D.N.D. May 7, 2018) (order adopting stipulation). 11 U.S. Const. amend. V (takings clause). 12 See United States v. 1129.75 Acres of Land, 473 F.2d 996, 998 (8th Cir. 1973) (“When land is taken by eminent domain, and the title acquired is not a fee, but merely an easement, the proper measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the land free of the easement and the market value burdened with the easement.”). 13 WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., v. Easement and Rights-of-Way Across 189.9 rods, more less, Case No. 1:18-cv-078, slip op. at 3 (D. ND, April 1, 2021) (Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Other Transactions). 14 Id. at 17 (“In this case, it may be appropriate for the fact finder to consider comparable pipeline easement transactions, particularly based on the unique natura of pipeline development in the Bakken oil field development occurring in McKenzie County, North Dakota.”). 15 The legal fees were “based upon a total of 1,295.4 hours, billed at hourly rates ranging from $115 to $350.” WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Easement and Right-of-Way Across 189.9 rods, more or less . . . ., 2024 WL 1477719 (D. ND March 5, 2024). “The expenses include payments for court fees, travel expenses, legal research, and expert witness fees.” Id. 16 Each party and various amici curiae have expended considerable time and money to resolve the slightly more than $150,000 difference between the attorney fees and costs actually incurred ranchers and what WBI considered reasonable, underscoring that from the start this appeal has been about whether attorney fees should be awarded, not whether the ranchers’ attorney fees were reasonable. 17 440 U.S. 715 (1979). 18 WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., 2024 WL 1477719. 19 Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 931 F.3d at 244 (citations omitted); cf. Georgia Power, 617 F.2d at 1118 (“Thus by definition a licensed project does not implicate the interests of the United States to the degree that is thought desirable that the project be undertaken by the United States itself.”). 20 Tennessee Gas Pipeline, 931 F. 3d at 249 (citation omitted). 21 See Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, LLC v. Permanent Easement for 7,053 Acres, 931 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2019). The court explained: “Federal common law refers to the development of legally binding federal rules articulated by a federal court which cannot be easily found on the face of a constitutional or statutory provision.” The need for common lawmaking “stems from the inability of legislators to anticipate every possible contingency and the impracticality of judges[‘] returning all unanswered questions to the legislature.” Id. (citations omitted). The Third Circuit explained that “when Congress has not spoken in an area comprising issues substantially related to an established program of government operation, … the Supreme Court has direct[ed] federal courts to fill the interstices of federal legislation according to their own standards.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 22 Id. (citation omitted). 23 Id. The Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods was tasked with either crafting a uniform, national rule or, alternatively, utilizing state law, to determine whether contractual liens under federal loan programs take precedence over private liens. After establishing and applying a three-part test, the Court ultimately decided that nondiscriminatory state laws should be utilized. 440 U.S. at 740. The 3rd Circuit in Tennessee Gas Pipeline ruled that Kimbell Foods “and its progeny reflect a presumption in favor of state law, one not rebutted here.” 931 F.3d at 255. 24 The 5th Circuit applied Kimbell Foods first in a condemnation involving the Federal Power Act (Georgia Power Co. v. 138.30 Acres of Land, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980)) and later in an NGA condemnation. Mississippi River Transmission Corp. v. Goerge S. Tabor, 757 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1985). The 6th Circuit (Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Natural Gas Storage Easement, 962 F. 2d 1192 (6th Cri. 1992), 3rd Circuit (Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 931 F. 3d at 245-46), and 11th Circuit also followed suit. Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy County, 59 F.4th 1158 (11th Cir. 2023). The geographic footprint of each of these four circuits include significant oil and gas formations and, therefore, associated pipeline transportation systems: Third Circuit (Marcellus Formation), Fifth Circuit (Eagle Ford, Haynesville, and Permian Formations), Sixth (Devonian, Marcellus, and Utica Formations), and Eleventh Circuit (transmission from Marcellus and Utica Formations). These formations account for approximately 75% of the natural gas produced in the U.S. Ryan Bellafontaine, “Mapped: Where is U.S. Natural Gas Produced?” (Aug. 17, 2026) (Sources: EIA 2026) https://www.visualcapitalist.com/sp/sc02-mapped-where-is-u-s-natural-gas-produced/. 25 WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. 189.9 Rods, More or Less, 1332 F.4th 1058, 1060 (8th Cir. 2025). 26 Id. at 1060-61. 27 Id. at 1062. 28 Leonard W. Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., petition for cert. filed, No. 25-159 (U.S. Aug. 7, 2025) at 8-11. The petition was a long shot. Each year, the Court reportedly receives more than 7,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari, but only hears oral argument for 100 or less. Nora Collins, “The serious decline in petitions before the Supreme Court,” SCOTUS Blog (May 11, 2026) https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/05/the-serious-decline-in-petitions-before-the-supreme-court/. 29 WBI argued that “this case is a poor vehicle for review of the question presented” because North Dakota does not require, but merely allows the award of attorney fees (Brief in Opposition of WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. No. 25-159 (Oct. 2025) at 2) and urged the Court to wait and see if other courts agree with the 8th Circuit. Id. 30 Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae, No. 25-159 (May 22. 2026) at 2. 31 The ten states on brief included North Dakota, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas. Brief of North Dakota, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, No. 25-159 (Sept. 8, 2025) at 4 (“just compensation” should be determined under state law because, among other things, the NGA “was not intended to displace traditional state authority for assessing real property value.”). 32 Owners’ Counsel of America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, No. 25-159 (Sept. 10, 2025) at 8 (presenting a survey showing that property owners in nearly half the states “would be stripped of their guaranteed rights if the Eighth Circuit’s choice-of-law analysis were adopted nationwide.”). 33 Respondent’s Supplemental Brief, No. 25-159 (June 8, 2026) at 1 (agreeing that cert should be granted, but “reserv[ing] the right to argue on remand, should it become relevant, that North Dakota law does not in fact include attorneys’ fees in the state’s measure of just compensation.”); Petitioners’ Supplemental Brief, No. 25-159 (June 5, 2026) at 2 (contrary to the Attorney General’s argument, requiring condemnors to pay for attorney fees would not incentivize landowners to draw out disputes to increase a potential fee award, any more than the status quo encourages condemnors to make unreasonable compensation offers). 34 https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/25-00159qp.pdf; Sup. Ct. R. 16. (if a petition for certiorari is granted, “[t]he case then will be scheduled for briefing and oral argument.”). 35 The ranchers’ merits brief argues that the Kimbell Foods analysis leads to the same result as the statutory interpretation analysis. Brief of Petitioner, Leonard W. Hoffman v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., No. 25-159 (filed August 13, 2026) (“Petitioners’ Brief”) at 37-42. 36 Id. at 13-14 (unlike private parties, the federal government can take property by (1) seizing private property directly, leaving the owners to sue for compensation or (2) invoking the Declaration of Taking Act, where a condemnor takes immediate title to property, leaving compensation litigation for another day). 37 Id. at 14, citing Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. U.S., 467 U.S. 1, 3 (1984). 38 Petitioners’ Brief at 14. 39 Id. at 15. 40 Petitioners’ Brief at 15-16, citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 317 & n.5 (1986). 41 Petitioner’s Brief at 17, quoting Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651, 679 (2023). 42 Petitioners’ Brief at 18; see also id. at 24 (arguing that, for nearly two centuries, Congress has known that the Supreme Court routinely interpreted federal claims by applying substantive state law), citing McCluny v. Silliman, 3 Pet. 270, 276, 278 (1830 (applying state limitations period to plaintiff’s rights under federal law). 43 Petitioners’ Brief at 26; see Agency Holding Corp. V. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 158 (1987) (Scalia concurring). Thus, for example, “congressional silence on the [statute of] limitations issue is ordinarily insufficient to pre-empt state statutes….” Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 162. 44 See NGA § 7(h), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (“the United States district courts shall only have jurisdiction of cases when the amount claimed by the owner of the property to be condemned exceeds $3,000.”). 45 Petitioners’ Brief at 29. 46 Id. at 32. 47 Six amicus briefs supporting the ranchers were filed on August 13, 2026 in Leonard W. Hoffman v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., No. 25-159: Brief of Florida Property Owners Ryan Thomas, Lee Thomas Trust, and Sunderman Groves, Inc. (“Florida Property Owners Brief”); Brief of Gary R. Erb and Lynda Like (“Pennsylvania Property Owners’ Brief”); Brief of Owners Counsel of America (“Owners Counsel Brief”); Brief of Landowner Groups, (“Landowner Groups’ Brief”); Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation (“PLF Brief”); Brief of National Association of Realtors, American Farm Bureau Federation, and Realtors Land Institute (“Realtors Brief”). 48 The Florida property owners report that ten years ago Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC (“Sabal Trail”) filed 263 condemnation cases in federal courts for a 247-mile corridor to construct a 36-inch pipeline to transport 1 Bcf/day. Florida Property Owners Brief at 13-14. In August 2026, the Florida property owners received notice that Sabal Trail is evaluating expansion pipeline project running near or along the current route for 482 miles, (id. at 14) increasing the stakes at issue in Hoffmann. 49 Id. at 8-9 (“Federal actors are ultimately accountable to federal officials, sworn to uphold the Constitution, charged with promoting the public good, and held accountable by the voters on Election Day. * * * And, in direct federal condemnations, the federal government retains a continued ownership interest in the property taken . . . .”); see Pennsylvania Property Owners’ Brief” at 2 (while NGA § 7(h) delegates the power to condemn, “it does not transfer every rule or governmental protection that accompanies condemnation by the United States.”); id. at 7, citing U.S. v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243, n.13 (1946) (distinguishing federal officers acting for the sovereign from private entities authorized to condemn “on behalf of themselves”, whose grants “are, in their very natural grants and of limited powers” that “do not include sovereign powers greater than those expressed or necessarily implied.”). 50 Florida Property Owners’ Brief at 4; id. at 5 (for private licensee companies exercising eminent domain rights under the NGA, “the Fifth Amendment’s measure of compensation should serve as a floor and not a ceiling” -- to do otherwise, “state created rights to attorneys’ fees will be stricken in six of the seven states of the Eighth Circuit, and will be at serious risk in at least 15 other states if the Eighth Circuit’s new-fashioned split widens.”). 51 Owners Counsel Brief at 2 (internal citations omitted). “In the Sabal Trail pipeline litigation, condemnors spent a combined $8.3 million on appraisal work alone across the project.” Id. at 6 (citation omitted); see also Landowner Groups’ Brief at 5 (“The Eighth Circuit’s decision threatens to alter that bargaining framework well before any condemnation proceedings begin. If a company exercising eminent domain … may disregard state compensation protections and pay only the federal constitutional minimum, its fallback position becomes less costly, changing the baseline against which voluntary easement negotiations occur.”). 52 Owners Counsel Brief at 10-17 (list of 21 state statutes providing condemnation protection); see PLF Brief at 4 (distinguishing cases relied on by the 8th Circuit); see also Realtors Brief at 5 (cautioning that the 8th Circuit’s reasoning could incentivize “advocates for more public control of private interests….”) (citation omitted). 53 Respondent’s Brief” at 2, quoting PennEast, 594 U.S. at 495; see Respondent’s Brief at 2, quoting Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 530 (1894) (Congress “may at its discretion, use its sovereign powers, directly or through a corporation * * * for the accommodation of interstate commerce.”). 54 Respondent’s Brief at 4. 55 Id. at 2, United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (“[T]he courts early adopted, and have retained the concept of fair market value” as the appropriate compensation); United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341 344 (1923) (“More would be unjust to the United States, and less would deny the owner what he is entitled to.”). 56 United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 391 U.S. 266 (1943). 57 319 U.S. at 281-82. 58 Respondent’s Brief at 2, quoting 33 U.S.C. § 532. 59 Respondent’s Brief at 28 (citation omitted). 60 Brief for the United States, Leonard W. Hoffman v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., No. 25-159 (filed Sept. 21, 2026) at 12 (citations omitted). The Attorney General also noted that the Supreme Court had recently ruled that eminent domain power delegated to a certificate holder is “categorical,” that is, absolute and unconditional. Id. at 10, citing PennEast Pipeline Co., 594 U.S. at 498. 61 Brief of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America and American Petroleum Institute, Leonard W. Hoffman v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., No. 25-159 (filed Sept. 21, 2026) at 11. “INGAA” is the natural gas pipeline trade association, while “API” represents all aspects of the oil and gas industry. Id. at 1. 62 Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the US, Leonard W. Hoffman v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., No. 25-159 (filed Sept. 21, 2026) at 4-6. 63 Id. at 9. 64 Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction,” 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 401 (1994). 65 597 U.S. 215 (2022). 66 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 67 Id. at 231. 68 See id. at n.9 (strict construction “refers to a construction that narrows the scope of coverage or application of a statute….”). 69 See West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 723 (2022) (“We presume that ‘Congress intends to make major policy decisions itself, ….”) (citation omitted). In applying the “major question doctrine,” the Court explained: “The question there [American Elec. Power. Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 131 (2011)] however, was whether Congress wanted district court judges to decide, under unwritten federal nuisance law, ‘whether and how to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from powerplants. We answered no….”’ 597 U.S. at 731. Another reason supports the efficacy of WBI’s argument: the Roberts Court has been labeled “business friendly,” with business winning on average 71% of the cases before the Supreme Court from 2010-20. Lee Epstein and Mitu Gulati, “A Century of Business in the Supreme Court, 1920-2020,” 107 Minn. L. Rev. 49, 59 & n.36-37 (2022). 70 148 U.S. 312 (1893). 71 Id. at 325. The Court concluded that if the government condemns a series of locks and dams built by a company to make a river navigable, whose passage is compensated with tolls, it must compensate a company not just for the value of the tangible property, but also for the franchise to take tolls. Id. at 344-45. 72 405 U.S. 538 (1972). 73 Id. at 552. After lower courts allowed a credit union to seize a woman’s savings account (without notice) for failure to repay a loan, the Court remanded and explained: “The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a ‘personal’ right ….” Id. (emphasis added). 74 598 U.S. 631 (2023) (J. Gorsuch and J. Jackson concurring). 75 After Hennepin County sold her condominium $40,000 to satisfy a $15,000 tax bill and kept the surplus, a 94-year-old woman filed claims (under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment and Excessive Fines Clause of the 8th Amendment) against the county, which the trial court dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the 8th Circuit affirmed. 598 U.S. at 635-36. In a companion case, Sackett v. EPA, 598 U.S. 651 (2023), landowners wanting to build a house used sand and gravel to fill in a lot next to a ditch, but the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) considered their land protected wetlands under the Clean Water Act, told the landowners that they could not build, directed them to remove the sand and gravel or face $40,000/day fines. Id. at 662. The Supreme Court reversed the underlying opinion siding with the EPA and limited the scope of the “waters of the United States,” allowing the landowners to build their house. Id. at 684. 76 NGA § 1(c), P.L. 83-323, 68 Stat. 36 (1954) (exempting from federal regulation natural gas companies operating entirely within a single state, effectively overturning FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950) that had ruled an otherwise local, in-state gas company was subject to federal regulation because it crossed state lines to receive gas).

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The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?