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Steve assists clients in construction litigation, banking and trust litigation, employment litigation, securities litigation, commercial litigation, franchise litigation, and intellectual property and trade secrets litigation. 

Steve is Of Counsel in the Trial group.

Select Experience

  • Successfully defended lender liability suit against Brookings South Dakota Bank in Federal District Court for South Dakota in May, 2000. Regularly represents clients in state and federal courts in South Dakota.
  • Chemical Separation Technology v. Environmental Chemical Corporation, successful defense against a claim of misappropriation of trade secrets brought by CST. The case involved the clean-up of the Summitville Mine Superfund site. ECC defended by arguing that it acted at the direction of the United State EPA and that CST had no real trade secret. CST sought damages of $178,000,000. Jury found for defendant on all counts.
  • Burcham, et al. v. Rocky Mountain Oil. Successful settlement of underground petroleum storage tank leak under “Sunburst” damage theories.
  • Jim's Excavating Service v. HKM, Construction litigation case involving claims by a contractor on a municipal water transmission line against the architect/ engineer. Case of first impression in Montana as to whether or not architect/engineer has liability to contractor despite no privity jury award of $381,000.00 -- judgment affirmed by the Montana Supreme Court.

Education

  • University of South Dakota School of Law (J.D., 1978)
    • President, Moot Court Board, 1977-1978
  • Dartmouth College (A.B., History and English, 1974)

Bar Admissions

  • Colorado
  • Montana
  • Wyoming

Court Admissions

  • U.S. District Courts of Minnesota, South Dakota, Montana, and Colorado
  • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Accolades

  • Chambers USA, Litigation: General Commercial, Montana, 2016-2026
  • Best Lawyers in America©, 2018 and 2020-2026
  • Mountain States Super Lawyers®, 2014-2019, 2021-2026
  • Consistently providing pro bono legal assistance to those in need through Dorsey’s Pro Bono program
  • Colorado Super Lawyers®, 2009-2011
  • Rated AV Preeminent® by Martindale-Hubbell®

Select Presentations

  • Speaker, Unemployment Law - Americans with Disabilities Act, State Bar of South Dakota CLE (1993)
  • Speaker, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, Employment Law Seminar in Billings, Montana (January 1992)
  • Speaker, Colorado Human Resources and Employee Benefits Update (July 1995)
  • Speaker, Employee Handbooks in Colorado, National Business Institute Seminar (1998)

Insights

Client Alert

Ninth Circuit Asks Montana Supreme Court for Guidance: Is an Employer Defending Itself in a Wrongful Discharge Lawsuit Limited to the Reasons for Termination Given in a Discharge Letter?

January 20, 2022

Many Montana employees can claim the protection of Montana’s unique Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, which generally bars an employer for terminating an employee without “good cause” after the employee has completed a probationary period. A separate Montana statute permits a discharged employee to demand a “discharge letter” explaining the reasons why the employee was terminated, and some employers make it their usual practice to give terminated employees a written explanation of why they were fired. If an employer has to explain its reason why there was good cause to discharge an employee in a lawsuit, is the employer limited to the reasons given in a “discharge letter”? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has asked the Montana Supreme Court to clarify this important point of law. In the case at issue, Charles Smith sued Charter Communications alleging that Charter did not have good cause to fire him. Smith was a vice-president with responsibility for managing employees at approximately 50 sites scattered in the region. He was required to travel for his job. Although the parties dispute the full extent of a travel requirement, it is clear that the job required Smith to travel to each work site at least quarterly. When he was fired, the corrective action report listed two reasons for the termination. First, Plaintiff allowed an employee to work as an electrician, in violation of the company’s policy. Second, “[i]n December 2017,” Plaintiff “failed to fulfill the 50% travel requirement to [his] management area.” The federal trial court granted summary judgment to the employer. The Court found an issue of fact precluded summary judgment on the allegations about the electrician. The court also found there were conflicting facts about whether a 50% travel requirement existed in 2017. But the trial court concluded that this dispute was “immaterial” because the undisputed evidence established that Plaintiff had “failed to meet even [the] quarterly travel requirement” that Plaintiff conceded was applicable. This last reason was not expressly stated in the termination report. Plaintiff Smith appealed and in a January 18, 2022 decision, the Ninth Circuit decided that Montana law was unclear about whether Charter was limited to the reasons stated in the termination report when asserting that good cause for the termination existed. The Ninth Circuit asked the Montana Supreme Court to answer this question “Whether, in an action for wrongful discharge pursuant to Montana Code Annotated section 39-2-904, an employer may defend a termination solely for the reasons given in a discharge letter, as the court held in Galbreath v. Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., 890 P.2d 382 (Mont. 1995), or whether the 1999 statutory amendments have superseded the Galbreath rule.” In the Galbreath decision, the Montana Supreme Court decided that an employer defending itself against a wrongful discharge lawsuit was limited to the reasons given to the employee in a discharge letter. That is, if the employer didn’t articulate a reason for termination in the letter, the employer couldn’t rely on that reason in court. The Montana Supreme Court has permitted employers to elaborate on reasons given in the letter, such as by providing evidence expanding on a stated reason for discharge. Meanwhile, in recent years, some trial courts in Montana have ruled that certain changes the Montana Legislature made to the discharge letter statute in 1999 means that Galbreath no longer applies. But no Montana Supreme Court decision has overruled Galbreath. The Ninth Circuit has asked the Supreme Court to decide whether Galbreath still applies. It will be many months before the Montana Supreme Court answers the question. While we wait for a resolution of this case, it is a reminder that careful thought should be given to the reasons articulated for a termination, and comprehensive documentation is always the best practice. It can be tempting to limit the reasons given to a discharged employee and hope the matter goes away. But an employer that doesn’t give an employee a complete explanation of why the employee is being terminated might find itself limited in court and unable to fully explain the reasons for the discharge in defending against a wrongful discharge claim. Reminder: Free Covid test kits available at Covidtests.gov.  

Media Mentions

Steve Bell Comments on Vaccine Mandate for Large Employers Reinstated by Court

December 20, 2021

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.