On June 25, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States issued four decisions:
Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068: This products-liability and federal-preemption dispute addresses whether a plaintiff may bring a state-law failure-to-warn claim alleging that Roundup should have carried a cancer warning when EPA-approved labeling did not require one. Monsanto manufactures Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide, and EPA has repeatedly concluded that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer and has not required a cancer warning on glyphosate-based pesticide labels. John Durnell sued Monsanto in Missouri state court, alleging that he developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma after using Roundup for approximately 20 years and that Monsanto should have warned users that Roundup could cause cancer. A jury awarded Durnell more than $1 million on his failure-to-warn theory, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Monsanto’s argument that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) expressly preempted the claim. In a decision authored by Justice Kavanaugh, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell’s failure-to-warn claim because the claim would impose a state-law labeling requirement “in addition to or different from” the federal labeling requirements imposed through EPA’s approval of Roundup’s label. The Court reasoned that once EPA approves a pesticide label, the manufacturer must use that label unless and until EPA approves or requires a change, so a state-law duty requiring Monsanto to add a cancer warning would conflict with FIFRA’s uniform labeling regime. Justice Thomas concurred separately to raise broader concerns about administrative preemption and agency power, while Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented, arguing that FIFRA does not make EPA label approval conclusive and that state-law duties equivalent to FIFRA’s own misbranding requirements should not be preempted.
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Wolford v. Lopez, No. 24-1046: This Second Amendment dispute addresses whether a State may prohibit licensed concealed-carry permit holders from carrying firearms on private property open to the public unless the property owner gives express permission. After the Supreme Court held in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to carry handguns outside the home for self-defense, Hawaii revised its carry laws to restrict where permit holders could bring firearms. One challenged provision reversed the ordinary common-law default rule for businesses and other private property open to the public: instead of allowing entry unless the owner objects, Hawaii barred licensed carry unless the owner affirmatively consented. Several Hawaii residents with concealed-carry permits and a gun-rights organization sued, arguing that the rule effectively prevented permit holders from carrying firearms during routine daily activities at places such as gas stations, restaurants, and stores. The district court enjoined the law as applied to private property open to the public, but the Ninth Circuit reversed the injunction. In a decision authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Hawaii’s default no-carry rule violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments because it burdens the right recognized in Bruen and is not supported by a sufficient historical analogue. Justice Barrett concurred. Justice Kagan dissented on historical-analogue grounds, arguing that Hawaii’s law fit within a tradition of requiring landowner consent before carrying firearms onto private property. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, dissented more broadly, arguing that the Second Amendment does not give permit holders a right to carry firearms onto private property without the owner’s consent and that, in any event, Hawaii had identified sufficient historical support for its rule.
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Mullin v. Al Otro Lado, No. 25-5: This immigration dispute addresses when a noncitizen seeking to enter the United States from Mexico “arrives in the United States” for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s (“INA”) inspection and asylum provisions. Beginning in 2016, Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) used a “metering” policy at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border, limiting the number of asylum seekers who could enter each day for inspection and asylum processing when port capacity was strained. Al Otro Lado and individual asylum seekers challenged that policy, arguing that noncitizens who presented themselves at the border and sought asylum were entitled to inspection and asylum processing even if CBP officers prevented them from physically crossing into the United States. The district court certified a class and granted summary judgment to the challengers, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part, holding that a noncitizen “arrives in the United States” when, while standing on the Mexico side of the border, the noncitizen encounters a U.S. official at the border. In a decision authored by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a noncitizen standing in Mexico does not “arriv[e] in the United States” by attempting, but failing, to enter; rather, the noncitizen arrives only when crossing the border. The Court reasoned that this reading follows the ordinary meaning of “arrives in,” is supported by the INA’s text and structure, and avoids giving the inspection and asylum provisions extraterritorial effect. Justice Thomas concurred separately to argue that the lower courts’ relief raised additional statutory and constitutional concerns, while Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented, arguing that the decision allows the Government to avoid mandatory inspection and asylum-processing duties by physically blocking asylum seekers at the border; Justice Jackson also dissented separately on mootness grounds.
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Mullin v. Doe, No. 25-1083; Trump v. Miot, No. 25-1084: This immigration and administrative-law dispute addresses whether courts may postpone the termination of Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) for Syria and Haiti while litigation challenging those terminations proceeds. Congress created TPS to provide temporary humanitarian protection to nationals of countries where armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary conditions make return unsafe. Syria received a TPS designation in 2012 because of extraordinary conditions related to the Assad regime, and Haiti received a TPS designation in 2010 after a devastating earthquake; in 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced that both designations would terminate. Syrian and Haitian TPS holders sued, asserting Administrative Procedure Act claims and, as to Haiti, an equal-protection claim alleging that the termination was racially motivated. The district courts granted interim relief postponing the terminations, and the Second Circuit and D.C. Circuit declined to stay that relief. In a decision announced by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the TPS statute bars judicial review of respondents’ nonconstitutional claims and that the Haitian respondents were unlikely to succeed on their equal-protection claim. Justice Thomas concurred separately, arguing that the statutory review bar also precludes constitutional claims and that noncitizens have no equal-protection claim against the Federal Government in this context; Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented, arguing that the statute permits review of mandatory procedural requirements and that the record supported interim relief.
View the Court's decision.