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Client Alert

To Shoot or Not to Shoot? The Legality of Downing a Drone

September 25, 2017

by Christopher Ainscough

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When it comes to nuisance drones, landowners are stuck.  If they shoot down a drone, they may face criminal and civil penalties.  However, without the ability to identify a drone operator remotely, they can’t necessarily count on getting relief from courts or government authorities.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), commonly called drones, are becoming useful tools for producers and growers to more efficiently manage their operations.  However, UAS may create a nuisance, or a privacy and business risk, when they fly where they are not wanted.  Producers and growers often ask, “Can I shoot down a drone that is taking pictures of my property, facilities, or animals without my permission?”  This question pits the rights of landowners — to privacy and quiet enjoyment of their land — against the property rights of UAS owners.  The question also implicates where, when, and in what manner it is lawful to discharge a firearm.  Federal aviation laws regarding shooting aircraft also come into play.  This article addresses each of these issues.

Landowners have the fundamental legal right to privacy and to enjoy their property free from nuisance, interference, or trespass.  Owners of personal property have the fundamental legal right not to have their property damaged or taken.   The downing of unwanted UAS over private land sets these two fundamental rights against one another. 

One of the first court cases to test this issue is Boggs v. Meredith.  William Meredith is alleged to have shot down a UAS flown by John Boggs.  The UAS was flying over Meredith’s property, without his permission, when he allegedly shot it down.  Boggs sued Meredith in a federal court in Kentucky seeking $1500 for damage to his UAS.  To justify jurisdiction in a federal rather than a state court, Boggs argued that the UAS was flying in federal airspace, not on Meredith’s property.  If the UAS were on Meredith’s property, Meredith might have had a privilege under state tort law to damage the UAS if, “the act [shooting the UAS] is, or is reasonably believed to be, necessary to protect the actor's land or chattels . . . and the harm inflicted is not unreasonable as compared with the harm threatened.”   Ultimately, the court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds without deciding whether the UAS was in federal airspace or on Meredith’s property.   

Under federal law, it is a felony to willfully damage or destroy aircraft.  18 U.S.C. § 32.  In Boggs v. Meredith, the judge found that the federal criminal statute did not give Boggs the right to bring a civil lawsuit in federal court.  Nevertheless, a landowner who shoots down a drone risks prosecution under that federal criminal law.  

Under state law, it may be useful to imagine a more common situation:  if someone were to drive onto a landowner’s property and take pictures, could the landowner shoot the trespasser’s car or the trespasser?   Laws vary by state, but generally, a landowner is permitted to damage another’s property to protect himself when he is threatened, or reasonably believes he is threatened.  But, proportionality is key.  Is a gun the appropriate response to a camera?  Some states have adopted the so-called “Castle Doctrine” which allows landowners to protect themselves and their property when threatened.  This doctrine has limits and only applies to the property areas where a landowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy, like inside the house.  What if the UAS is not above a landowner’s property but is filming from an adjacent area where the UAS operator has a right to fly?  Again, analogize to a person in a car.  Would it be acceptable to shoot someone taking pictures of your house from across the street?  No.

The question of UAS aside, firearm use is often restricted by state law.  For instance, Nebraska places limits on the discharge of firearms within counties containing metropolitan areas or in the direction of people or structures.

Shooting down a UAS could subject a landowner to both civil and criminal liability.  The liability under state tort law could be substantial.  Some UAS cost tens of thousands of dollars and carry payloads that cost as much or more.   Firing a gun in violation of state gun laws could subject the shooter to criminal, and if someone were injured, civil liability.  If a downed UAS crashed, injuring someone or causing property damage, the shooter could face liability to the injured party in addition to the UAS owner.  The penalty under federal 18 U.S.C. § 32 may include a fine and/or imprisonment for up to twenty years.

If reaching for the old Mossberg isn’t the best option, then what recourse do landowners have?  Landowners may seek relief under a variety of state UAS laws.  At least thirteen states have passed laws restricting UAS surveillance of individuals without consent, and under most states’ laws, individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy.  The Arkansas statute is representative.  It is a crime to “knowingly use an unmanned vehicle or aircraft . . . to secretly or surreptitiously . . . view by electronic means a person” without his consent, or under circumstances where he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Some states have passed agriculture-related UAS laws.  In Utah, it is a misdemeanor to chase, disturb or harm livestock with a UAS.  In Texas, it is a crime to fly a UAS over animal feeding operations. In February 2017, an Oklahoma state senator introduced a bill that would exempt landowners from liability for damage to a UAS under certain conditions.

However, some of these laws may not help if a landowner cannot identify the UAS operator.  Some consumer UAS can fly over four miles, so the operator could be far away at the time of an incident.  In the future, technology may permit operator identification.  To encourage this development, the Federal Aviation Administration convened the UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee in May 2017 and charged it with recommending technologies and requirements to help remotely track and identify UAS.  The committee membership includes UAS industry groups, police departments, airport authorities, D.C. think tanks, mobile phone companies, online retailers, and aerospace companies.  Its charter currently expires on October 31, 2017.

In addition to operator identification, technology may help in other ways.  Companies have introduced weapons intended to shoot down drones without destroying them.  In the future, perhaps landowners will be able to technologically designate their property as a no-fly-zone where UAS signals will be jammed or disrupted.

In the meantime, privacy advocates have sued the FAA for failing to include privacy protections in its recent drone regulations.  Several federal drone privacy laws are pending including the Drone Aircraft Privacy & Transparency Act and the Drone Federalism Act.  However, it is unlikely that these laws, even if passed, will include a right to shoot a nuisance drone. 

The law will evolve as legislatures and courts weigh in, and technology will evolve to meet society’s demands.  Given the ambiguity between state and federal laws and the potentially high risks of civil damages, imprisonment, and fines, if a drone is annoying you, it would be wise to reach for the phone for competent legal help, before reaching for a shotgun.

The author wishes to thank Dorsey summer associate Chris Ainscough for his assistance with this article.

This article was published in the September 2017 issue of Nebraska Cattleman.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.