The Supreme Court of the United States issued decisions in five cases today:

Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, No. 14-981: Petitioner Abigail Fisher applied for admission to the University of Texas at Austin’s 2008 freshman class and was rejected. She then brought a suit challenging the University’s consideration of race as violating the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. The University’s admissions program, pursuant to Texas statute, filled 75% of the incoming class by automatically accepting the top ten percent of high school seniors. The remaining 25% were admitted based on a combination of their Academic Index (“AI”) and Personal Achievement Index (“PAI”). The PAI, which is a number ranging from 1-6, is determined based primarily on the applicant’s essays and Personal Achievement Score (“PAS”). The PAS, in turn, is a score based upon (1) the essays, (2) other supplemental information such as letters of recommendation and resumes, and (3) potential contributions to the University’s student body in a number of areas, including “special circumstances,” which can include race. This is Fisher’s second time before the Supreme Court. The District Court originally granted summary judgment to the University, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed applying a “good faith” standard to the University’s program. The Court in Fisher I articulated its view of the proper standard and remanded. On remand, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed. Today, the Court affirmed and upheld the constitutionality of the University’s admission program, holding that it satisfied the three controlling principles the Court had articulated in Fisher I: (1) race may not be considered by a university unless the admissions process can withstand strict scrutiny; (2) once a university gives a reasoned, principled explanation for its decision to pursue student body diversity, deference must be given to its conclusion that a diverse student body would serve its educational needs; and (3) no deference is owed when determining whether the use of race is narrowly tailored to achieve the university’s permissible goals, with the university bearing the ultimate burden of demonstrating that race-neutral alternatives that are both available and workable do not suffice.

The Court's decision is available here.

Birchfield v. North Dakota, No. 14-1468; Bernard v. Minnesota, No. 14-1470; Beylund v. Levi, No. 14-1507:  These cases involve the “implied consent” laws in place in North Dakota and Minnesota to combat drunk driving.  All States have laws prohibiting motorists from driving with a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) exceeding a certain level, and all States in turn have also enacted implied consent laws imposing penalties on motorists who refuse to undergo BAC testing.  North Dakota and Minnesota, however, have increased their implied consent penalty for noncompliance from suspension or revocation of the motorist’s license, and instead criminalize the refusal to be tested.  These three cases presented the question of whether such laws violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches.  The Court today held that because breath tests are significantly less intrusive than blood tests and in most cases amply serve law enforcement interests, a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving, and a warrant is not needed in that situation.  Correspondingly, the Court also held that motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense. 

The Court's decision is available here.

Mathis v. United States, No. 15-6092:  The Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. §924(e), imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on certain federal defendants who have three prior convictions for a “violent felony,” including “burglary, arson, or extortion.”  Here, petitioner Richard Mathis pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the Government requested a sentence enhancement based on his five prior Iowa burglary convictions.  To determine whether a past conviction is for one of the ACCA offenses, courts compare the elements of the crime of conviction with the elements of the “generic” version of the listed offense, here burglary.  And under Supreme Court precedent, the prior crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.  The Iowa burglary statute at issue here covers more conduct than generic burglary, and does so as alternative ways of satisfying a single element, rather than listing elements in the alternative.  In other words, the statute defines one crime, with one set of elements, broader than generic burglary – while specifying multiple means of fulfilling its locational elements, some but not all of which (i.e., buildings and other structures, but not vehicles) satisfy the generic definition.    The District Court imposed the enhancement after determining Mathis had previously burgled structures, rather than vehicles, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.  Today, the Court reversed, holding that the ACCA does not make an exception to the requirement that the prior crime’s elements must be the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense for the circumstance here where a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements.

The Court's decision is available here.

Dollar General Corp. v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, No. 13-1496:  Respondent John Doe is a member of the Mississippi Bank of Choctaw Indians and alleged that he was sexually assaulted by his supervisor while interning at petitioners’ store, a non-Indian corporation.  Doe’s family brought suit in tribal court against petitioners Dollar General and Dolgencorp (collectively, “Dolgencorp”) for negligence and vicarious liability.  Dolgencorp then brought an action in federal court seeking to enjoin the suit for lack of jurisdiction.  The District Court concluded the tribal court could exercise jurisdiction over Doe’s claim.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Dolgencorp’s consensual relationship with Doe gives rise to tribal court jurisdiction over Doe’s claims under Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981).  Today, the Court issued a per curiam order affirming the Fifth Circuit’s judgment by an equally divided Court.

The Court's decision is available here.

United States v. Texas, No. 15-674:  Twenty-six states challenged the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents program (“DAPA”) under the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.  DAPA expanded the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) implementation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (“DACA”), through which prosecutorial discretion was exercised to defer action on the removal of particular aliens from the United States.   A November 2014 “DAPA Memo” expanded DACA by making millions more people eligible for the program.  States such as Texas challenged DAPA, arguing that it would allow otherwise ineligible aliens to become eligible for state-subsidized driver’s licenses and unemployment insurance, and sued to prevent DAPA’s implementation on the basis that it violated the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), that DHS lacked authority to implement the program, and that DAPA was an abrogation of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s preliminary injunction forbidding implementation of DAPA, holding that the states have standing, have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their procedural and substantive APA claims, and have satisfied the other elements required for an injunction.  The Court granted certiorari on the questions of the states’ standing, whether the DAPA Memo was arbitrary and capricious, and whether the DAPA Memo was subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures.  Today, the Court issued a per curiam order affirming the Fifth Circuit’s judgment by an equally divided Court.

The Court's decision is available here.