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McGirt v. Oklahoma

July 14, 2020

by Skip Durocher

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In series of Treaties with the Creek Nation in the 1830s, the United States established a Reservation for the Creeks, covering millions of acres in northeastern Oklahoma, including land on which the City of Tulsa is located. In the succeeding years, the United States chipped away at the Creeks’ governmental authority and landholdings, and the Nation’s continued existence was in peril on more than one occasion. The State of Oklahoma never acknowledged the Reservation, or the Creek Nation’s criminal and regulatory jurisdiction in the area. That all changed on July 9, 2020, as the United States Supreme Court held that the Reservation established for the Creek Nation was never disestablished, and thus much of Northeastern Oklahoma is the Creek Nation Indian Reservation.

The dispute regarding the status of the Creek Reservation arose in post-conviction proceedings in the case of Jimcy McGirt, an enrolled member of the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, who was convicted in Oklahoma state court of serious sexual offenses against a minor. McGirt argued that the state court did not have jurisdiction to convict him of those crimes because the alleged offense occurred within the boundaries of the Creek Reservation. The Major Crimes Act requires that any major crime committed by an Indian in Indian country is “within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,”1, and as a result, McGirt argued, federal law required that his case be tried in federal court, not state court.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma rejected McGirt’s argument and concluded that there was no Creek Reservation in Oklahoma. The United States Supreme Court granted McGirt’s petition for certiorari to answer two questions: did Congress establish a Creek Reservation in Oklahoma, and if so, does that reservation remain in place today?

Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch began the Court’s analysis by answering the first question. Congress clearly established a reservation for the Creek Nation in the 1832 and 1833 “Treaty with the Creeks” in which the United States “solemnly guarantied” to the Creek Nation a “permanent home” in Oklahoma.

To answer the second question and determine whether Congress subsequently disestablished the Creek Reservation, the Court considered its analysis in a prior reservation disestablishment case, Solem v. Bartlett.2 According to Solem, only Congress, armed with plenary power, can disestablish a reservation. Most often, Congress demonstrates its intent to disestablish a reservation by drafting clear statutory language to that effect. However, Solem also suggested that congressional intent could be shown by circumstantial evidence, such as recorded congressional commentary or even geographic or demographic evidence.

The State of Oklahoma relied upon statutory language and circumstantial evidence in arguing that Congress intended to disestablish the Creek Reservation. With respect to statutory language, Oklahoma argued that Congress intended to terminate the Creek Reservation when it passed legislation which divided the Creek Reservation into individual parcels of land, referred to as allotments. This congressional action, Oklahoma argued, was Congress’s “first step in a plan ultimately aimed at disestablishment.” However, while Congress may have wished for the allotment to end the Creek Reservation, the Court found no statutory language in the allotment act “that could plausibly be read as an Act of disestablishment.” As such, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to disestablish the Creek Reservation with the allotment act.

With respect to circumstantial evidence, Oklahoma argued that, under Solem, the Court was required to examine “contemporary events at the second [step], and even later events and demographics at the third [step].” According to Oklahoma, Solem permitted circumstantial evidence of Congress’s intent to disestablish the Creek Reservation to overcome the lack of statutory evidence. Oklahoma’s array of circumstantial evidence spanned a century of congressional action from the allotment era to modern day. Oklahoma raised circumstantial evidence from the allotment era, including Congress’s efforts to abolish Creek tribal courts and its requirement that the Creeks “turn over all ‘tribal properties’ to the Secretary of the Interior.” Moving forward in time, Oklahoma also presented modern demographic evidence showing that Indians only constituted 10 to 15% of the population of northeastern Oklahoma. In presenting these examples, Oklahoma sought to prove that northeastern Oklahoma had “long since lost its Indian character” (citing Solem).

The Court rejected Oklahoma’s interpretation of Solem, “restat[ing] the point” that “[t]here is no need to consult extratextual sources when the meaning of a statute’s terms is clear. Nor may extratextual sources overcome those terms.” Rather, the Court held, “[i]f Congress wishes to withdraw its promises, it must say so.” Finding no such clear statement in the statute, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

McGirt v. Oklahoma is significant for confirming, and clarifying, the Solem factors as the appropriate analysis for determining whether a reservation has been disestablished. The Court made clear that the first Solem factor, statutory language clearly evidencing Congress’s intent to disestablish the reservation, bears the most weight and is necessary in order to conclude in favor of disestablishment. Further, when Congress clearly and unambiguously intends to preserve, and not disestablish, a reservation, a court may not combine circumstantial evidence by “[s]prinkl[ing] in a few predictions here, some contestable commentary there,” in order to cast doubt on language that would be otherwise unambiguous. Indeed, the Court held that it may not “favor contemporaneous or later practices instead of the laws Congress passed” (emphasis in original).

The decision is also significant in the larger context of federal Indian law. The Creek Nation has an opportunity to enhance its civil regulatory jurisdiction and the scope of its governmental services. The holding likely also applies to several other Oklahoma tribes, whose reservations the State has not acknowledged. The holding—especially considered along with the Court’s recent decisions in Cougar Den3 and Herrera4—confirms that courts—and state governments—must respect tribal treaty rights. Furthermore, there can be no doubt now that Justice Gorsuch’s reputation for understanding the nuances and equities of federal Indian law and in particular federal treaty rights is well-deserved, and his presence on the Court is an effective counter to those justices who would undermine or eliminate the fundamental rights of American Indian tribes.


1 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
2 Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
3 Wash. State Dep’t of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1000 (2019). 
4 Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019).

 

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.