The Supreme Court of the United States issued decisions in six cases today:

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339:  The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (“FCRA”) imposes a number of requirements regarding the creation and use of consumer reports, including that consumer reporting agencies “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of” consumer reports.  The FCRA also provides that “[a]ny person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement [of the Act] with respect to any [individual] is liable to that [individual]” for, among other things, either actual damages or statutory damages, plus attorney’s fees and possible punitive damages.  Petitioner Spokeo is a “consumer reporting agency” that runs a “people search engine” that allows users to search for information about other individuals.  Respondent Thomas Robins learned that Spokeo was disseminating inaccurate information about him and filed a complaint on his own behalf and a class of similarly situated individuals.  The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Article III standing existed because Robins had alleged that Spokeo violated his statutory rights, and that his interests in the handling of his credit information was individualized.  Today, the Court vacated and remanded, holding that the injury-in-fact requirement demands that a plaintiff allege an injury is both “concrete and particularized,” and that the Ninth Circuit focused only on the particularity requirement, while overlooking whether the particular procedural violations alleged in this case entail a degree of risk sufficient to meet the concreteness requirement. 

The Court's decision is available here.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, No. 14-1132:  Respondent Greg Manning and other former shareholders of Escala Group, Inc., brought suit in New Jersey state court against Merrill Lynch, alleging that it had devalued Escala through “naked short sales” of its stock.  The complaint alleged only state law claims, but did refer explicitly to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulation SHO, which concerns such sales.  Merrill Lynch removed the case to Federal District Court, invoking “arising under” jurisdiction under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. §1331, as well as §27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which gives exclusive federal jurisdiction to “all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder.”  The District Court denied Manning’s motion to remand, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that 1) §1331 did not confer jurisdiction because all claims arose under state law and did not necessarily raise federal issues; and 2) §27 of the Exchange Act did not confer jurisdiction because it only extended to cases that would satisfy the “arising under” test for §1331.  The Court today affirmed, holding that the jurisdictional test established by §27 of the Exchange Act is the same as the one used to decide if a case “arises under” a federal law. 

The Court's decision is available here

Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418:  Petitioners in these seven consolidated cases are primarily nonprofit organizations that provide health insurance to their employees and have challenged the Federal Government’s contraceptive mandate as substantially burdening their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Restoration Act of 1993.  Specifically, petitioners challenge the requirement under the Federal regulations that they must cover certain contraceptives as part of their health care plans unless they submit a form stating that they object on religious grounds to providing such coverage.  After oral argument, the Court ordered supplemental briefing as to “whether contraceptive coverage could be provided to petitioners’ employees, through petitioners’ insurance companies, without any such notice from petitioners.”  Both parties expressed that such an option is feasible.  The Court today, in a per curiam opinion, expressed no view on the merits of the case, but vacated and remanded to afford the parties an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage. 

The Court's decision is available here.

Husky Int’l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, No. 15-145:  Petitioner Husky International Electronics Inc. sold its products to Chrysalis Manufacturing Corp., resulting in Chrysalis owing Husky $163,999.   Respondent Daniel Lee Ritz was a director of Chrysalis.  Rather than pay creditors like Husky, Ritz drained Chrysalis of its assets by transferring Chrysalis’s funds to other Ritz-controlled entities.  This caused Husky to file a state lawsuit against Ritz to hold him personally liable for Chrysalis’ $163,999 in debt, arguing that Ritz’s intercompany-transfer scheme was “actual fraud.”  When Ritz then filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Husky brought an adversarial proceeding seeking to hold Ritz personally liable, on the basis that such a scheme constitutes “actual fraud” under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A)’s exemption to discharge.  The District Court held Ritz personally liable under state law, but held that the debt could be discharged because it was not “obtained by . . . actual fraud” under §523(a)(2)(A)’s exemption to discharge.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that under the federal statute, a debt is “obtained by . . . actual fraud” only if the debtor’s fraud involves a false representation to a creditor, which did not exist here because Ritz made no false representations to Husky.  The Court today reversed, holding that the phrase “actual fraud” in §523(a)(2)(A) encompasses fraudulent conveyance schemes, even when those schemes do not involve a false representation.

The Court's decision is available here

Sheriff v. Gillie, No. 15-338:  Respondents Pamela Gillie and Hazel Meadows filed a putative class action alleging that Petitioners Mark Sheriff and Eric Jones, private attorneys appointed as “special counsel” by the Ohio Attorney General, had employed deceptive and misleading means to attempt to collect consumer debts against them, in violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), by using the Attorney General’s letterhead.  Sheriff and Jones had been appointed pursuant to Ohio statute to act on the State Attorney General’s behalf in collecting these debts, and the Attorney General required special counsel to use the Attorney General’s letterhead in communicating with debtors.  The District Court granted summary judgment for Sheriff and Jones.  It first held that they were excluded by the FDCPA’s exclusion for “any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting . . . any debt is in the performance of his official duties.”  The District Court also held that regardless, the use of the Attorney General’s letterhead was not false or misleading.  The Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that special counsel did not qualify for the exclusion, and remanded for trial.  Today, the Court reversed, holding that, even assuming that special counsel are not “state officers,” their use of the Attorney General’s letterhead does not offend the FDCPA.

The Court's decision is available here.

Kernan v. Hinojosa, No. 15-833:  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) requires that if a state court adjudicates a prisoner’s federal claim “on the merits,” then the federal court may only grant federal habeas relief if the state-court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” or “based on an unreasonable determination on the facts.”  Here, respondent Antonia A. Hinojosa’s original petition in California’s Orange County Superior Court was denied on grounds of improper venue, for not filing in the California county where Hinojosa was confined.  The appellate court summarily denied relief, and when Hinojosa then sought an original writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of California,  it was denied without explanation.  While the Federal District Court denied Hinojosa’s subsequent federal habeas petition, the Ninth Circuit reversed, applying a de novo standard on the basis that the state court decision was not “on the merits.”  The Court today reversed, holding that the California Supreme Court’s summary denial was on the merits, because, seeing as there is only one Supreme Court of California, its denial could not be based on filing in the improper California venue.

The Court's decision is available here.