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Parting Ways Professionally: Key Considerations in Drafting Separation Agreements

October 6, 2026

by Nicholas J. Pappas and Nicholas Wing

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When it comes to agreements governing an employee’s separation from employment, the fine print matters—and in New York, that print has recently become even finer. Courts across the state have enforced tightened requirements on what employers must do to draft valid separation agreements, applying new statutes governing confidentiality clauses and strictly enforcing consideration and revocation timelines. Gone are the days of dusting off a boilerplate separation agreement template. In this article, we analyze and distill several recent developments in New York concerning separation agreements and provide some practical guidance to employers seeking to draft strong agreements.

Confidentiality Clauses

To begin, General Obligations Law § 5-336(3)(b), enacted in 2023, invalidates the “release of any claim, the factual foundation for which involves unlawful discrimination, including discriminatory harassment, or retaliation…if as part of the agreement resolving such claim…the complainant is required to forfeit all or part of the consideration for the agreement, for violation of a nondisclosure clause or non-disparagement clause.” Practitioners have questioned whether, in light of this rule employers may continue to include in their separation agreements confidentiality clauses intended to protect their trade secrets and confidential information, or if the statute should now be read to ban such clauses if the separation agreement includes a release of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation claims.

A recent New York case answers these questions. In Corcino v. N.Y. Times Co., 2026 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2748, *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 7, 2026), the court evaluated whether a separation agreement containing non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses remained enforceable even when the plaintiff entered the agreement following plaintiff’s allegations of employment discrimination and retaliation. The court upheld the non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses because the agreement expressly stated that the employee could still reveal the underlying facts or circumstances of claims of discrimination. The court reasoned that the law “was never intended to make all non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses, such as those pertaining to trade secrets and proprietary information, unenforceable.” Instead, the “legislative intent was to make unenforceable certain non-disclosure and non-disparagement clauses that imposed liquidated damages on a complainant for disclosing facts related to retaliation, discrimination, or harassment.”

Drafting Implications

The Corcino case holds that attorneys can continue to include non-disclosure and confidentiality clauses in separation agreements that include releases of claims of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, so long as such clauses do not prevent disclosure of the underlying facts of the wrongful conduct or impose a liquidated damages clause. Assuming an employee has previously asserted a “claim” of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation prior to executing the separation agreement, practitioners would be prudent to include language in the agreement stating explicitly that the employee retains the right to disclose the underlying facts and circumstances of such claims. Employers similarly may wish to make explicit that no liquidated damages or financial penalties attach to such disclosure.

If an employer wishes to enter a nondisclosure agreement with a departing employee with respect to the factual basis for claims of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, the law provides a mechanism for the employer to do so. Under 5-336(b), an employer and employee may agree to such a condition “in writing…in plain English,” provided that the employee receives “up to twenty-one days to consider such term or condition” and that the employee’s preference for confidentiality is “memorialized in an agreement signed by all parties” and revocable for “at least seven days following the execution of such agreement.”

Group Terminations

Separate and apart from confidentiality clauses, a number of recent New York cases have clarified how courts evaluate group terminations. As employment lawyers know, the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) imposes strict procedural requirements for a valid the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) waiver. Generally, the OWBPA requires individuals to, among other things, receive at least 21 days to consider the separation agreement and seven days to revoke the agreement containing the waiver following its execution. The absence of these procedural requirements invalidates the separation agreement in its entirety. However, several recent cases raise an additional pitfall that employers must consider: What happens when an employer terminates the employment of a group of employees?

Under the OWBPA, when there is a “group termination”, the employer must give the employees 45 days to consider the proposed separation agreement rather than 21 days, and the employer also must provide the employees with certain details about the so-called “termination program” under which the separation occurs. The definition of “group termination” is critical for employers to understand to comply with the statute, but the statute itself is silent as to what constitutes a “group termination.”

The case of Gerrits v. IBM Corp. , 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93321, *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2022) clarified the definition of group termination.  There, the court held that indicia of “group” terminations include the use of a standardized formula or package of employee benefits that is available to more than one employee; lack of negotiation between the parties; and advisement from the employer that the termination is not a function of the employee’s individual status. The court further observed that normally one would expect an employer to provide a package of benefits to two or more employees for the termination to be part of a “group termination” as that term is used in the statute.

In Gerrits, plaintiffs failed to make this showing. The court noted that plaintiffs were terminated individually over a period of years with no apparent groupings or waves of terminations or other unifying factors. In addition, the employer gave each employee “a specific, individualized reason for his or her termination.”

When drafting separation agreements employers also should keep in mind that drafting a valid ADEA release may not be enough to shield the employer from discovery in the event of litigation over alleged discrimination in connection with a termination of employment. For example, in Dale v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102693 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 13, 2023) a valid ADEA release was not enough for the employer to escape discovery into the facts underlying a purported group termination.  In Dale, the court considered the parties’ separation agreement and supplemental release but found that it could not conclude from those documents at the motion to dismiss stage that plaintiff’s release of any ADEA claims pursuant to that agreement was knowing and voluntary, pursuant to the specific requirements of the ADEA. The court found that the separation agreement appeared to comply with many of the ADEA’s requirements. However, the court could not decide “without discovery whether the list of affected employees that Defendant provided as an exhibit to the Separation Agreement was accurate and conveyed all of the information required by the ADEA.”

Drafting Implications

To optimize separation agreements for individual employees, employers would be prudent to give each employee the reason for the termination of employment. Employers further would be well served to individualize the separation packages and benefits offered to individual employees to avoid any appearance that the terminations were connected where no actual connection existed in the separate termination decisions.

As for group terminations, employers should comply with the OWBPA and ADEA, which require employers to include, among other things, details concerning the “termination program” governing the offer of severance benefits. Employers should be prepared for litigants who may seek to demand discovery into the termination program even if the separation agreement satisfies all statutory requirements. For larger terminations, employers also should confirm compliance with other laws, such as the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (WARN Act), to determine whether the group termination satisfies any separate legal requirements that may exist.

Two-Stage Releases

Another common scenario that arises when employers are drafting separation agreements is when an employer terminates the employment of an employee who will continue to work for the employer after the employee executes the separation agreement. In such circumstances, employers frequently structure their separation agreements to include two parts.  The first part involves the employee signing the separation agreement, including the release of claims, during employment.  The second part involves the employee signing a document that updates the period covered by the release of claims following completion of the employee’s period of employment and subsequent termination of employment.

The two-stage release structure serves an important function. Because separation agreements that comply with the OWBPA may not release claims arising in the future, the agreement will typically include releases of claims arising up to the date that they were signed. The second document, on or after termination of employment, updates the release of claims to capture any claims arising after the signing of the original separation agreement but before termination of employment and reaffirms the parties’ intent to achieve a global resolution of any disputes relating to termination of employment. See, e.g., Nelson v Lattner Enters. of N.Y., 108 A.D.3d 970 (3d Dep’t 2013) (employee executed two release agreements on two separate dates).

Drafting Implications

When using this structure, employers frequently draft one agreement containing the complete terms of the separation agreement including a clear specification of the consideration for the release of claims. That initial agreement will typically provide that the employee will sign the first agreement during employment, and that the employee will sign a second document that updates the release of claims no earlier than the employee’s last day of employment.  The agreement will condition delivery of any severance pay or benefits on the signing and effective date of both the initial agreement and the document updating the release of claims.

Conclusion

Separation agreements and releases remain powerful tools for employers seeking to resolve or minimize employment disputes without litigation. But to obtain that benefit, employers should be aware that courts scrutinize these agreements carefully, and statutory protections continue to evolve. New York’s GOL § 5-336 restricts confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses in discrimination cases, but it does not eliminate them—employers may still protect trade secrets, proprietary information, and settlement terms so long as employees retain the right to disclose the underlying facts of discrimination. The OWBPA imposes strict requirements for ADEA waivers, with heightened obligations for group terminations. And strategic use of two-stage separation agreements can capture all claims through the final separation date, provided that the separation agreement is knowingly, voluntarily signed, and supported by adequate consideration.

Employers and their counsel would be prudent by drafting their separation agreements with precision, maximizing compliance with applicable statutes, providing employees with the information and time needed to make informed decisions, and building a record that will withstand judicial review. These practices strengthen enforceability and reduce litigation risk.


Reprinted with permission from the October 6, 2026 edition of the New York Law Journal  © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com.

Firm Highlights

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.

News

Dorsey & Whitney Partner Michael W. Droke Releases Fourth Edition of Cooperative Business Law: A Practical Guide with Enhanced Insights for Today's Cooperatives

Industry-leading reference updated with practical tips and current cooperative law developments Dorsey & Whitney LLP is pleased to announce the publication of the fourth edition of Cooperative Business Law: A Practical Guide to the Special Laws Governing Cooperatives, authored by Dorsey Partner Michael W. Droke. Drawing on more than 20 years of direct experience as outside general counsel to major agricultural and food industry cooperatives, Droke has updated this essential resource with new practical tips, real-world guidance, and insights into emerging cooperative law issues that matter to cooperative leaders and their advisors. Since its initial publication, this comprehensive guide has become the standard reference for attorneys, executives, and cooperative governance professionals navigating the unique legal landscape of cooperative organizations. The new fourth edition builds on that foundation by incorporating practical lessons learned from recent cooperative transactions, governance challenges, and regulatory developments. "I am grateful for Dorsey's continued support of this work and for the opportunity to contribute to the cooperative community," said Droke. "Over the past 20 years, I've had the privilege of serving as outside general counsel to some of the nation's most successful cooperatives. The practical insights gained from that work inform every page of this edition. I wanted to create a resource that helps cooperative leaders and their legal advisors tackle real business challenges with confidence." The Fourth Edition features: Practical tips and real-world case examples drawn from decades of cooperative practice Guidance on cooperative formation, governance, member rights, and voting structures Current analysis of antitrust and Capper-Volstead Act issues affecting modern cooperatives Insights into financing, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate restructuring for cooperatives Member relations strategies and dispute resolution approaches specific to cooperative structures About Michael W. Droke Michael W. Droke is a Partner at Dorsey & Whitney LLP and Firmwide Co-Chair of the Food, Beverage & Agriculture practice group. He serves as outside primary counsel for numerous cooperatives, providing comprehensive legal guidance on all aspects of cooperative operations, governance, member relations, corporate restructuring, financing, and mergers and acquisitions. His representative clients include National Co+op Grocers, Darigold, the Northwest Dairy Association, Organic Family Farms Cooperative, Chelan Fruit Cooperative, and Sacramento Natural Foods Co-op. A former business executive who brings a dual perspective to his practice, Droke combines legal expertise with practical business acumen. He has served as an outside board member and general counsel for major cooperatives and maintains deep involvement in the cooperative community through regular presentations and participation in industry organizations including NCBA CLUSA, the National Society of Accountants for Cooperatives, and the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives. About Dorsey & Whitney's Cooperative Law Practice Dorsey & Whitney's Cooperative Law practice group is a recognized national leader in cooperative law with more than 45 years of experience serving agricultural cooperatives, rural electric cooperatives, purchasing cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, worker cooperatives, and cooperative start-ups across the nation. The practice includes 20 dedicated lawyers who advise cooperatives and other agriculture-related organizations on formation and organization, voting rights and governance, antitrust and Capper-Volstead Act compliance, tax issues, project development and finance, mergers and acquisitions, real estate, labor and employment, environmental compliance, and all other aspects of cooperative business operations. Cooperative Business Law: A Practical Guide to the Special Laws Governing Cooperatives, Fourth Edition, is available from major book retailers and online booksellers.

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.