William J. Miller

The Iowa Supreme Court recently decided Teig v. Hart, No. 24-0029 (Nov. 25, 2025), which provides much-needed clarity to governmental bodies on the limits to Iowa’s open meetings law. The Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion in Teig clearly establishes that local officials, not a reviewing court, should determine whether a closed session is necessary to prevent “needless and irreparable injury” to the reputation of a candidate for employment with the public body. However, this decision has implications for the wide range of actions related to a governmental body evaluating an individual’s professional competency. The Iowa Open Meetings Law (Iowa Code Ch. 21) requires most governing bodies in the state—whether at the state, county, city, school, or local level—to conduct its business in open, public meetings so that Iowans have “access to the deliberations and decisions of their government.”1 But this access is limited by practicality, and the statute: the Open Meetings Law describes twelve circumstances in which a body may enter a “closed” session, where the public is not allowed and records of discussions are sealed from public inspection.2 While many of the exceptions pertain to legal or other sensitive matters (e.g., closed sessions “to discuss strategy with counsel[,]” or “to discuss hearings to suspend or expel a student[]”), the law also provides a body may enter closed session: To evaluate the professional competency of an individual whose appointment, hiring, performance, or discharge is being considered when necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to that individual’s reputation and that individual requests a closed session.3  This “Evaluation Exception” has three operative parts. First, the governmental body must be considering the professional competency of a past, current, or future employee, contractor, or appointee Second, the discussion about the employment action must have some risk of causing “needless and irreparable injury to [the] individual’s reputation[.]” Finally, the individual must request a closed session.  The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Teig helps answer how to apply these portions of the Evaluation Exception in practice. The Teig case involved the City of Cedar Rapids’s hiring a new city clerk. The interim city clerk applied and requested a closed session. Testimony in the case established that the interim clerk did not know all of the incumbent city council members (who would interview her), nor did she expect any specific issues regarding her performance in her city employment to be discussed. Testimony also established that the city council members had no reason to expect negative or harmful information would be disclosed in the closed session. In actuality, the closed-session job interview was “positive in tone” and the interim city clerk was offered the role as permanent city clerk following the end of the closed session.  After the hiring of the interim clerk, a resident of Linn County requested documents relating to the reason to hold a closed session for a job interview and then sued the city for violations of the Iowa Open Meetings Law. The district court in Linn County rejected the resident’s claims, but the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed that ruling. The resident’s primary complaint, which was echoed by the court of appeals decision, was that the Cedar Rapids City Council never asked or considered whether a closed session was actually necessary to prevent “needless and irreparable injury” to the interim city clerk’s reputation. As the evidence showed, there was no reason to believe such injury to reputation was imminent, and seemingly none occurred: the interim clerk was offered the permanent role. The court of appeals determined the interim clerk’s request, without any information supporting it or inquiry by the city council, was not sufficient to trigger the Evaluation Exception.  The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the Iowa Court of Appeals, reinstating the original district court ruling determining that the city council had not violated the Iowa Open Meetings Law. The supreme court recognized the inherent unpredictability of a job interview, where applicants do not know the questions to be asked and the prospective employer does not know how the applicant will respond or what they may volunteer. Protecting the privacy of those conversations, when the applicant requests a closed session, serves the prophylactic purpose of the statute: to “prevent” harmful reputational disclosures, not to “remedy” or “recompense” for reputational damages. In other words, allowing closed sessions for job interviews is consistent with the other provisions of the Iowa Open Meetings Law: it avoids trying to “un-ring the bell,” by preventing the harm to the applicant in the first place.  The supreme court’s ruling in Teig implicitly directs courts to take a softer, more deferential approach to reviewing claims under the Iowa Open Meetings Law with respect to the Evaluation Exception. But Teig is no license to go too far in the other direction by holding closed meetings if they are not justified or improperly noticed or closed. Evidence that a public body was engaged in bad faith, for example by trying to close an interview to circumvent a fair process, would require different analysis. And, as the supreme court reminded readers, the records from closed sessions must be maintained (even if they are not publicly reviewable).  Finally, the supreme court emphasized that the closure of a public meeting under the Evaluation Exception is a mutual agreement: the individual must request the closed session, and the governmental body must vote (by a two-thirds margin) to enter closed session. This mutual buy-in from the individual and the elected representatives of the public maintains the balance between providing Iowans access to government decision making and protecting the reputation of those seeking to serve the public. However, when it comes to individuals whose professional competence is being evaluated, Teig confirms that it is unnecessary to scrutinize the motives or basis for that individual’s request for a closed session.  1 Teig, Slip. Op. at 3.  2 See generally Iowa Code § 21.5 (2025).  3 Iowa Code § 21.5(1)(i).   

On April 2, 2024, Governor Kim Reynolds signed Senate File 2095, the Iowa Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which became effective immediately. Iowa’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) is modeled on a similar law that Congress enacted in 1993. According to The Becket Fund, which supports the passage of RFRA-style laws, a total of 28 states have enacted state-level RFRA laws since Congress took action. Iowa’s RFRA limits the actions of employers in some cases, while empowering employers in other respects. In other words, it is a statute that can both be used by employers and against employers, depending on the circumstance. As a restriction, the Iowa RFRA prohibits “state action” from “substantially burdening” a “person’s” exercise of religion. Each of the quoted terms is given a specific meaning by the statute. “State action” means the application of any law, ordinance, regulation, or policy, or the actions of any public official as authorized by law. Actions taken by public employers, such as cities, counties, and related entities, fit directly within the definition of “state action.” In certain cases, the conduct of private employers could be “state action,” if the private employer is taking action to implement or apply a law or regulation. For example, a private employer that requires an employee to register with the state pursuant to a regulatory requirement could be taking “state action.” State actions “substantially burden” religious practice if the conduct “constrains, inhibits, curtails, or denies the exercise of religion . . . or compels any action contrary to a person’s exercise of religion[.]” Finally, “person” is defined broadly to include any “individual, association, partnership, corporation, church, religious institution, estate, trust, foundation, or other legal entity.” State action that substantially burdens a “person’s” exercise of religion is permissible if “the burden to that person’s exercise of religion is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” In other words, exceptions to the general rule require a very good justification and proof that the restriction is the least restrictive way to achieve that justification. For example, a general policy that requires individuals to shave their face and head for boot camp training presumably would be found to burden the religious practice of individuals for whom shaving or cutting hair is prohibited. Where the policy is only motivated by a general desire for unit cohesion, the policy does not support a compelling interest, nor is it the least restrictive means of achieving that goal.[1] The Iowa RFRA authorizes employers to take action in other instances. Given the broad definition under the statute, many Iowa employers are also “persons” who also have protections against state action that substantially interferes with the exercise of religion. Perhaps the most well-known application of this principle came in the United States Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. There, an employer objected on religious grounds to a regulation under the Affordable Care Act requiring insurance coverage for certain contraceptives. The Supreme Court, applying the federal RFRA, determined that the requirement was not the least restrictive means of achieving the goal of providing contraceptive coverage, and granted an exception from the general regulation to the employer. Employers in other states have also argued RFRA laws provide exceptions to generally applicable laws, such as child labor codes and emergency medical care statutes. When a “person’s” exercise of religion is substantially burdened, the Iowa RFRA allows the person to go to court and obtain “appropriate relief, including damages, injunctive relief, or other appropriate redress[,]” including attorney’s fees. Where conduct is religious in nature and challenged, a “person” can also assert an RFRA affirmative defense to justify otherwise (presumably) unauthorized conduct. It remains to be seen how Iowa courts will apply this statute. Given the developing state of the law in this area, there are a few key points for employers to keep in mind: Discrimination is still prohibited by the Iowa Civil Rights Act and federal law. The enactment of the Iowa RFRA makes no changes to Iowa Code Chapter 216, the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Employment, education, and public accommodation discrimination remains prohibited on the basis of race, color, creed, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, pregnancy, and disability. Similarly, while an employer can be a “person” entitled to justify certain actions based on its religious beliefs, an employer who adopts a “favored” religion in the workplace may still face religious discrimination claims from members of the “non-favored” group. Employers should consult with legal counsel before taking an employment action that could be perceived as motivated by an individual’s membership in a protected class. Review religious accommodation policies. While most employers maintain reasonable accommodation policies relating to disability, it is important to ensure religious accommodations are also available where appropriate. Revising and updating religious accommodation policies is especially timely given the Supreme Court’s Groff v. DeJoy decision last summer, which discussed an employer’s obligation to accommodate an employee’s religion. Public employers specifically should ensure the process for asserting religious objections is controlled by a written policy. Additional trainings may be appropriate. Iowa’s RFRA protects the exercise of all religions, whether that exercise is unfamiliar or well known. Employers may choose to use this opportunity to adopt policies that support and reflect a religiously diverse workforce. While Iowa’s RFRA is modeled on federal and out-of-state counterparts, it remains to be seen how Iowa courts will interpret and implement it. Employers seeking to mitigate RFRA-related risk should contact their trusted Dorsey & Whitney counsel for advice and best practices.  [1] Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88 (D.C. Cir. 2022).