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Legal Developments in the World of Trademarks, Copyrights, Advertising and Beyond

Licensing

Whataburger v. What-A-Burger #13 – A battle for trademark rights in North Carolina, and potential defenses for junior trademark users

July 29, 2024

by John Mixon

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Allegations Against What-A-Burger #13

Whataburger has once again found itself in the news over a lawsuit it filed over naming rights against a long-standing East Coast burger establishment for its purported infringement of the WHATABURGER trademark. On June 11, 2024, Whatabrands LLC, the Texas-based burger establishment, sued What-A-Burger #13, Inc., a North Carolina-based burger establishment, based on its use of the mark “What-A-Burger #13.”

According to Whataburger’s complaint, it was founded in 1950 in Corpus Christi, Texas as a single location hamburger stand, but has since expanded its operations to over 1,000 restaurants in 16 states, with its rate of expansion increasing significantly since 2020. But burgers is not all that Whataburger offers. It also sells condiments, sauces, and other food items under the WHATABURGER mark in more than 5,000 grocery stores across 25 states and Mexico. In other words, Whataburger alleges it has garnered significant goodwill in its WHATABURGER mark, for which it first obtained a federal registration in 1957. With respect to What-A-Burger #13, the complaint alleges that, since no earlier than 1969, the North Carolina burger establishment has offered goods and services under the name and trademark “What-A-Burger #13” that are identical to those Whataburger offers—namely, restaurant services and food products—in connection with two North Carolina locations and a food truck. Critically, Whataburger alleges that What-A-Burger #13’s use of the mark began more than a decade after Whataburger registered its mark.

Whataburger often receives publicity about expansion into additional states and, since 2022, this publicity has included speculation about Whataburger expanding into North Carolina. While that has yet to officially occur, in April 2024 Whataburger publicly announced its plans to expand its restaurant footprint into North Carolina in 2025. Whataburger began plotting its expansion into North Carolina as early as 2022. Pursuant to this plan, Whataburger reached out to What-A-Burger #13 in October 2022 to discuss its anticipated expansion and a likelihood of confusion between the entities, which resulted in the parties entering into a coexistence agreement in May 2023.

Under the coexistence agreement, What-A-Burger #13 was permitted to use the What-A-Burger #13 mark solely in connection with their existing locations and single food truck “in limited ways.” However, Whataburger alleges that days before the coexistence agreement was signed, What-A-Burger #13 secretly formed a separate LLC called WAB #13, LLC “to circumvent the purpose and intention of” the agreement. According to Whataburger, the formation of WAB #13, as well as What-A-Burger #13’s use of its food truck, constituted breaches of the agreement. Based on these alleged events, Whataburger filed suit against What-A-Burger #13, its related entities and affiliates, and its owner, Zeb Bost, alleging federal trademark infringement, federal and common law unfair competition, breach of contract, and unfair and deceptive trade practices.

What-A-Burger #13’s Response

Although What-A-Burger #13 has not yet filed an answer or otherwise formally responded to the complaint, the law firm representing it provided the following statement:

What-A-Burger is a small family business that originally opened in in the 1950s in Kannapolis North Carolina. Now in its third generation of ownership by the Bost family, Zeb Bost, who is the grandchild of one of the founders operates two What-A-Burger restaurants in Stanly and Cabarrus Counties. Starting in 1970, the Bost family entered into an agreement with the then-owner of WhatABurger out of Texas that it would operate without interference in Stanly and Cabarrus Counties. The Texas company broke that agreement in 2022. Now, after being in business for seventy years, What-A-Burger’s future is being threatened by this large national retailer, and the Bost family is being victimized by big money interests.

The law firm’s response raises two noteworthy legal issues and potential defenses for What-A-Burger #13: (1) the assertion that What-A-Burger #13 opened in the 1950s belies the allegations in the complaint and gives rise to a potential good faith carveout for use of the mark, and (2) the assertion that Whataburger and What-A-Burger #13 entered into an agreement in 1970 under which Whataburger would not interfere with What-A-Burger #13’s operations in Stanly and Cabarrus Counties gives rise to a potential breach of contract counterclaim. In fact, as to the first point, the Mooresville-South Iredell Chamber of Commerce’s website states that What-A-Burger #13 was founded in 1956—one year prior to Whataburger’s federal registration for the WHATABURGER mark. As What-A-Burger expanded, each new location was named sequentially. What-A-Burger opened its first location in 1956 and its thirteenth location, What-A-Burger #13, in 1969. It will be interesting to see how What-A-Burger #13 claims that the current entity is the successor in interest to the rights commencing in 1956 and how it accounts for the variation in numbering.

Analysis of What-A-Burger #13’s Potential Defenses as a Junior User

We have seen similar situations play out in the courts before. A national brand with a federally registered trademark discovers that a smaller company is operating under the same or a similar name in a limited geographic region and, in some fashion, aggressively asserts its rights under the Lanham Act. Indeed, Whataburger itself did this with another geographically remote burger establishment using the Whataburger name in Virginia more than two decades ago.

When this situation arises though, it is important to focus on the purpose of trademark law: trademarks exist to aid consumers in identifying and differentiating between brands. They allow trademark owners to protect their goodwill through the exclusive control over the use of their unique mark. When someone uses a confusingly similar name without authorization it could lead to consumer confusion regarding the products or services offered by the junior user and the affiliation or sponsorship of the senior user with those products or services. This would allow the junior user to unjustly benefit from the goodwill established by the first user in association with the mark. Thus, courts assessing trademark infringement focus on the likelihood of consumer confusion.

Notably, when two parties are using similar marks in geographically remote areas, concurrent use may be permissible under certain circumstances without the junior user being considered an infringer. One such circumstance arises where the use of the mark by the senior and junior users are confined to geographically separate markets, with no likelihood that the senior user will expand its use into the junior user’s markets, so that no consumer confusion is possible, then the subsequent user is permitted to continue use of the mark concurrently. This is known as the Dawn Donut rule and is still widely accepted, including in the Fourth Circuit, where the Middle District of North Carolina is located. Importantly, this rule only applies where the senior user is not likely to expand its use of the trademark into the geographic area in which the junior user is using the trademark because without operating in the same area, there is no likelihood of consumer confusion.

Another circumstance under which a junior user will not be considered an infringer is where (1) the junior user adopted the trademark without knowledge of the senior user’s earlier use, and (2) the junior user (or those in privity with it) has continuously used the trademark since before the senior user registered the trademark. This defense is available under Section 1115(b)(5) of the Lanham Act, and only applies to the area in which the junior use proves its continuous prior use.

Under the facts alleged by Whataburger, it is clear that the court would find that the Dawn Donut rule does not apply because of Whataburger’s planned expansion into North Carolina. Although currently Whataburger is not operating in North Carolina, making What-A-Burger #13 a geographically remote junior user, Whataburger has clear plans to expand into North Carolina based on its own announced plans, and the discussions it has had with What-A-Burger #13. Thus, Whataburger is highly likely to expand into What-A-Burger #13’s market and the Dawn Donut rule would not apply.

Though the Dawn Donut rule would not apply, What-A-Burger #13 should or could have a strong argument that it is not infringing Whataburger’s mark under Section 1115(b)(5) of the Lanham Act. Whataburger has not alleged that What-A-Burger #13 knew of its use of the mark in Texas prior to its adoption of the mark and there is no indication that it did. Moreover, it appears that What-A-Burger #13 has been using the mark since before Whataburger registered it. While Whataburger alleges that it registered its mark in 1957 and What-A-Burger #13 has been using the mark since no earlier than 1969, What-A-Burger #13’s statement and the Mooresville-South Iredell Chamber of Commerce’s website indicate that the owners of What-A-Burger #13 opened their first location under the “What-A-Burger” name in 1956. Therefore, What-A-Burger #13 has a strong argument that it has been operating in North Carolina since prior to Whataburger’s trademark registration. Assuming What-A-Burger #13 has sufficient proof of its earlier operation, it would likely succeed in asserting a defense under Section 1115(b)(5).

What-A-Burger #13’s Potential Counterclaim

In addition to asserting a defense under Section 1115(b)(5), it is likely based on What-A-Burger #13’s statement that it could assert a counterclaim against Whataburger for breach of contract. Assuming that the parties did, in fact, enter into a contract in the 1970s under which Whataburger agreed not to interfere in North Carolina in Stanly and Cabarrus Counties, then What-A-Burger #13 may have a claim that Whataburger breached this agreement by planning to expand into North Carolina.

Conclusion

This case is still in its infancy and the facts still need significant development, but it does serve as a cautionary reminder to trademark registrants seeking to expand into new geographical areas that the mere fact that its mark is registered does not give it carte blanche to enjoin any and all uses of similar marks. It also serves as a reminder to junior users that there are important exceptions to trademark priority that may be applicable to them to protect any goodwill they have established. Ultimately, nationwide protection is only available to federal trademark registrants, but the law protects good faith junior users to the extent of their continuous use. Therefore, trademark registrants should be careful to investigate the facts surrounding a junior user’s use of a mark before aggressively asserting any infringement claims.

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Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

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The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

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EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

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SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.