.

Client Alert

U.S. Customs Authorizes Seizure of Stevia from China for Alleged Use of Forced Labor

October 29, 2020

by Dave Townsend and T. Augustine Lo

Download as a PDF

Share this page

On October 20, 2020, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) published a finding that stevia extracts and derivatives produced in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) by Inner Mongolia Hengzheng Group Baoanzhao Agriculture, Industry, and Trade Co., Ltd. (“Baoanzhao”) are subject to seizure and forfeiture at U.S. ports because CBP asserts that forced labor was used in their production.1  This CBP decision could have potential implications for U.S. food producers and, eventually, U.S. consumers, as stevia extract has become increasingly popular as a natural sugar substitute in beverages and food products.

Stevia is a small shrub whose leaves can produce an extract that is 200 – 350 times sweeter than sugar but also has zero caloric content, making it a strong contender as a sugar replacement.  Although biologists believe stevia is native to the region in modern day Paraguay and Brazil, the plant is well suited to any tropical climate with ample water, long hours of sunlight and warmth.  Stevia extract is one of the latest additions to the unique “artificial sweeteners” segment of the global food and beverage industry that is projected to reach some two billon U.S. dollars by 2024.

Stevia is now grown commercially in Mexico and other parts of Latin America and in Asia, especially in the PRC.  The PRC has become the world’s largest global producer of stevia products for the beverage and food industries, both in the United States and around the world, and, within the PRC, large amounts of stevia are grown in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (“Xinjiang”) which has vast amounts of agricultural land with abundant warmth and sunny weather.

CBP’s October 20 publication capped a four-year saga that began in May 2016 when CBP first issued a Withhold Release Order (“WRO”) to detain imported stevia extract made by another PRC company, PureCircle, Ltd. (“PureCircle”), alleging such products had been made with forced labor in violation of Section 307 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. §1307).  In August 2020, CBP announced that it had collected $575,000 in civil penalties from PureCircle in connection with its customs violations.2  However, PureCircle stated in a press release that its imports of stevia extract did not involve forced labor; that CBP had withdrawn its WRO against PureCircle as a result; and that the penalty payment, which represented a settlement of only seven percent of CBP’s original demand, was without any admission of Section 307 liability by PureCircle.3

Apparently undeterred by its modest results against PureCircle, CBP proceeded to issue its recent finding against other stevia products sourced from Baoanzhao in the PRC.  However, unlike the earlier WRO against PureCircle, which merely authorized the detention of imported merchandise pending a further factual determination whether it had been made with forced labor, CBP’s October 20 published finding against Baoanzhao indicates CBP has already reached that threshold determination and so it establishes the basis under U.S. customs law for CBP to seize and forfeit this merchandise at any U.S. port of entry (i.e., to cause the importer the permanent loss of its property rights in such goods).  CBP port directors across the United States are now required to be on the lookout for Baoanzhao’s stevia products to detain and then to seize and forfeit them, including any merchandise that has been held in customs custody since CBP’s issuance of its initial WRO for stevia imports against PureCircle in 2016.

To contest any such CBP detention of stevia under this new finding against Baoanzhao, importers of the detained merchandise would need to follow the procedures set forth in CBP’s regulations to “establish by satisfactory evidence that the merchandise was not mined, produced, or manufactured in any part with the use of a class of labor specified in the finding.”4  If CBP remains unpersuaded and commences forfeiture proceedings, the importer then would need to consider submitting a petition to CBP for remission or mitigation of the forfeiture.5  Alternatively, the importer could commence a lawsuit in the federal courts to challenging the seizure and forfeiture.

However, the legal authority of CBP’s finding against Baoanzhao may be in some doubt.  Under CBP’s regulations, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), the Cabinet department that oversees CBP, must approve any Section 307 finding.6  However, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office and a recent U.S. federal court ruling, Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf, who currently occupies that position, was not properly appointed by President Trump and so is not legally able to act as the DHS Secretary, as he apparently sought to do in his approval of the CBP Section 307 findings against Baoanzhao.7  To remedy that apparent appointment issue, President Trump has recently nominated Mr. Wolf for the DHS Secretary position, and, as of this date, his confirmation remains pending in the U.S. Senate.  Assuming Mr. Wolf is so confirmed by the Senate, it remains unclear if such an after-the-fact confirmation would be given retroactive effect in regard to this particular Section 307 finding by CBP or if the Secretary might have to “re-sign” it following his proper confirmation.  It is also not known if any U.S. stevia importers adversely affected by the October 20 CBP finding would raise this particular procedural issue to contest such forfeitures.

This latest CBP action involving stevia imports from Xinjiang follows a series of CBP detentions of Chinese-origin goods and threatened WROs under Section 307 that have increased in intensity and frequency since May 2020.  Section 307 had long prohibited the importation into the U.S. of goods made with convict labor, forced labor, or indentured labor, but the law was little used or enforced for decades, particularly because the original 1930 legislation had contained an exemption for imports that met U.S. “consumptive demand.”  In early 2016, Congress enacted an amendment to Section 307 to remove that exemption, which substantially stiffened the law and made it more amenable to meaningful enforcement by CBP.8  Invigorated by that amendment and other enforcement powers granted under the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, CBP has actively pursued enforcement actions since mid-2016 against imports that appear to involve the use of forced labor.  Moreover, CBP has indicated that, given sufficient facts, it is now prepared to apply its WRO authority to exclude not only the individual products of specific individual companies but all such products made in a particular region of a country where the use of forced labor appears to be endemic and widespread, as it recently signaled in regard to cotton goods sourced from Xinjiang.

The Trump Administration has raised many trade tensions with the PRC and has sought to disrupt many established U.S. supply chains reliant upon Chinese-origin goods in an effort to “re-shore” manufacturing and manufacturing jobs to the United States.  In line with that White House strategy, CBP has increased its Section 307 enforcement with respect to the PRC to a level that has not been seen since the early 1990s, issuing eight different WROs just since May 2020 (as compared with one such case in each of the entirety of 2018 and 2019).  All of these recent WROs stem from allegations that certain products made in Xinjiang involve the use of forced labor from the Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang and coincide with significant bipartisan political pressure in the United States to confront the PRC with respect to the human rights situation in Xinjiang.  (We have previously highlighted these same sorts of human rights issues in regard to the importation of cotton and cotton-based products such as garments and textiles from Xinjiang in an earlier article, which can be found here.)

It is unclear how (or how much) CBP’s invocation of its Section 307 authority against Chinese-origin stevia extract will affect U.S. food processors and beverage makers, but various private studies had projected a steadily growing use of stevia and a growing American consumer acceptance of this particular sugar substitute.  However, with multiple non-sugar sweeteners on the market today (and with many Latin American and other Asian producers of stevia extract and products still competing actively for a share of that growing world market), these latest CBP actions under Section 307 may not cause either U.S. producers or U.S. consumers to abandon stevia as a sweetener of choice if that is their preference.

As U.S. importers have previously looked to diversify and augment their supply chains because of various disruptions such as punitive U.S. import tariffs on Chinese-made goods over the past few years, U.S. importers of stevia products may consider shifting all or part of their supply chains to other eagerly interested foreign stevia producer nations such as Paraguay, Brazil, Mexico and other Asian countries.  Moreover, given the strong and growing political consensus between Republicans and Democrats in Washington DC about the human rights problems in Xinjiang, the pressures to invoke Section 307 against stevia products (or other goods) from Xinjiang will probably not diminish in the coming years, regardless of whichever party prevails in the upcoming Presidential and Congressional elections on November 3, 2020.

# # # # #

Located in offices across the United States, Canada, Greater China, and the United Kingdom, Dorsey’s attorneys counsel clients on cross-border matters including U.S. customs and international trade regulation, and transactions relating to the food and agricultural sector.  If you have questions about this E-Update, please feel free to contact the attorneys whose pictures appear below.


1 Notice of Finding That Certain Stevia Extracts and Derivatives Produced in the People’s Republic of China With the Use of Convict, Forced or Indentured Labor Are Being, or Are Likely To Be, Imported Into the United States, 85 Fed. Reg. 66,574 (Oct. 20, 2020) (CBP Dec. 20-17).
2 https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-collects-575000-pure-circle-usa-stevia-imports-made-forced-labor. 
3 https://purecircle.com/news/purecircle-and-u-s-customs-and-border-protection-resolve-2014-stevia-sourcing/.
4 19 C.F.R. §§12.42(g), 12.43.
5 19 C.F.R. §171.0 et seq.
6 19 C.F.R. §12.42(f).
7 In the Matter of Department of Homeland Security—Legality of Service of Acting Secretary of Homeland Security and Service of Senior Official Performing the Duties of Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, Dec. B-331650 (U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off. Aug. 14, 2020); Memorandum Opinion at 44-45, Casa de Md., Inc. v. Wolf, No. 20-cv-02118-PX, ECF No. 69 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2020).
8 Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, tit. III, §307, 46 Stat. 689; Pub. L. 114-125, tit. IX, §910, 130 Stat. 239 (Feb. 24, 2016).

 

Firm Highlights

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.