.

Steele leverages his attention to detail and legal imagination to deliver results for clients.

In Dorsey’s trial group, Steele’s experience ranges from healthcare arbitration to employment litigation. During law school, Steele served as an editor for the Iowa Law Review and competed in moot court competitions. Steele also maintains a pro bono practice of representing veterans in benefits cases.

Education

  • University of Iowa College of Law (J.D., 2024)
    • magna cum laude; Order of the Coif; Note and Comment Editor, Iowa Law Review
  • Northwestern University (B.A., Anthropology, 2019)

Bar Admissions

  • Minnesota

Accolades

  • MSBA, North Star Lawyer, 2024-2025
  • Dorsey & Whitney – Scales of Justice Team Award (Veterans Rights Team; Housing Discrimination Claim v. City of Minneapolis Team), 2025
  • Consistently providing pro bono legal assistance to those in need through Dorsey’s Pro Bono program

Insights

Client Alert

DOJ Antitrust Division Issues Updated Guidance on Evaluating Corporate Compliance Programs

November 26, 2024

In recently released updated guidance,[1] the Antitrust Division (“Antitrust Division”) of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) outlined how its prosecutors will assess corporate compliance programs when conducting criminal antitrust investigations. The updated Antitrust Division guidance, called Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations, is the first amendment to guidance that was first published 2019. The guidance tracks the DOJ Criminal Division’s recently updated Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs policy.[2] During the charging and sentencing stages of the criminal process, prosecutors will evaluate a company’s compliance program in effect at the time of the offense as well as any subsequent changes that the company made to improve the compliance program.  At the charging stage, for example, prosecutors will ask three preliminary questions: Does the compliance program address and prohibit criminal antitrust violations? Did the compliance program detect and facilitate prompt reporting of the violation? To what extent was a company’s senior management involved in the violation? These answers to these questions will guide the prosecutor’s evaluation of nine additional factors in assessing an antitrust compliance program. Those factors are: Design and Comprehensiveness. The Antitrust Division will give little weight to an antitrust compliance program that is in-name-only. Companies should have a real, rather than paper, antitrust compliance program that establishes standards and procedures to detect criminal conduct. The Antitrust Division will also look at whether the antitrust compliance program is integrated into the company’s business and whether compliance resources are available to employees. In particular, companies should have clear guidelines regarding the use of ephemeral messaging or off-channel means of communication, including addressing whether such communications are required to be preserved.[3] Culture of Compliance. Companies need to put their antitrust compliance programs into practice and emphasize to employees the importance of participation. The guidance emphasized that companies should not only encourage a “culture of compliance” at the top, but also “from the middle” and at all levels. Responsibility for the Compliance Program. Whoever is responsible for the antitrust compliance program must have the qualifications, autonomy, and resources to implement an effective program. The Antitrust Division will review the infrastructure that a company has created to oversee and carry out the compliance function. Companies may improve on this factor by ensuring antitrust compliance efforts are meaningfully communicated to senior leadership, including the board of directors. Risk Assessment. Compliance programs should be evaluated and tailored to the unique antitrust risks that the company faces. Compliance personnel should be responsive to the challenges that an effective compliance program uncovers. In this factor specifically, compliance programs should address the risks posed by artificial intelligence (AI), algorithmic revenue management software, and other new technology tools. Training and Communication. Employees need to understand their obligations in carrying out an effective antitrust compliance program. This factor looks at the steps a company took to train employees on how to avoid antitrust violations. Whether training is adequate will depend on steps the company has taken to distribute training materials, certify training, and ensure compliance after training takes place. Periodic Review, Monitoring and Auditing. Periodic review of an antitrust compliance program is essential for reaffirming commitment to compliance, assessing efficacy, and detecting illegality. Indeed, the Antitrust Division calls this factor “critical.” Companies should develop the capacity to conduct prompt audits to detect antitrust violations and policies to use audit findings to improve compliance. Confidential Reporting Structure and Investigation Process. Employees must be able to report antitrust violations without fear of retaliation. The ability to report violations confidentially is integral to facilitating an antitrust compliance program. This factor also considers whether there are mechanisms in place for ensuring that compliance personnel receive and act upon a report. Incentives and Discipline. Companies need to implement incentive structures that promote antitrust compliance and discipline violations. On the incentive side, prosecutors will consider whether compliance has factored into employee compensation or promotion decisions. As for discipline, prosecutors will evaluate the procedures that exist to discipline employees for antitrust violations and whether an employee has ever been disciplined in that manner. Remediation and Role of the Compliance Program in the Discovery of the Violation. When a company detects an antitrust violation, it should revise its compliance program to try to prevent recurrence of the detected violation (or similar conduct). While a compliance program cannot prevent every antitrust violation from occurring in the first place, detection is relevant to whether the program was effective. After a violation has occurred, prosecutors will be especially interested in how companies revise their compliance programs to prevent similar violations going forward. Sentencing Considerations The updated guidance also addresses how the Antitrust Division will determine whether to bring criminal charges against a company, and if so, how it will evaluate potential sentencing reductions to a company deemed to have an effective antitrust compliance program: By implementing an effective compliance program according to the factors identified in the Antitrust Division’s guidance, a company can avoid charges and the criminal process altogether even when a violation occurs. When the Antitrust Division does decide to bring charges, an effective compliance program may entitle a company to credit under the sentencing guidelines, including reductions in statutory fines. Key Takeaways Companies should review their existing compliance policies and procedures in light of the updated Antitrust Division guidance and should consider the following: Assess Risks: Companies should identify risks that have emerged since the last time the policy was evaluated (such as AI, pricing algorithms, and new other technology) and should review the adequacy of the compliance policy’s substance and procedures for addressing those risks. Update Policies and Procedures: Companies should ensure that their policies comply with critical components of the updated guidance, such as robust training and communications regarding authorized use of AI and clear provisions on the use and preservation of ephemeral messaging. Reviewing compliance policies can help companies not only to mitigate criminal risk, but also to reduce the risk of civil antitrust claims.  As the updated guidance notes, “[a] strong culture of compliance can allow a company to steer clear of civil antitrust violations and, if violations do occur, to promptly self-disclose and remedy them and cooperate with a civil antitrust investigation.” By understanding these updates and implementing these key takeaways, companies can strengthen their antitrust compliance programs and demonstrate a commitment to a “culture of compliance.”  [1]  Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs in Criminal Antitrust Investigations [2] DOJ Updates the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Program Memorandum, Emphasizing Emerging Technologies, Data Analytics, and Whistleblower Protections | News & Resources | Dorsey. [3] This guidance tracks updated guidance from DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission regarding the requirement that the government’s standard preservation letters and subpoenas include language about the preservation of ephemeral messages. Office of Public Affairs | Justice Department and the FTC Update Guidance that Reinforces Parties’ Preservation Obligations for Collaboration Tools and Ephemeral Messaging | United States Department of Justice.

Client Alert

Do You Know What to Pay Your Work Force? New Decision Invalidates the Federal Contractor Minimum Wage Rule

November 20, 2024

Employers with Federal contracts have experienced unique challenges in the past few years—from navigating the Federal contractor vaccine mandate to new rules related to sick leave and time off. One of the most significant developments was President Biden’s Executive Order 14026, which imposed minimum wage requirements for Federal contractors. But on November 5, 2024, the Ninth Circuit invalidated Executive Order 14026 and the implementing Department of Labor Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 67,126. In reaching its decision, the court significantly narrowed the President’s power to set a minimum wage through government contracts under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (the “Act”). See Nebraska v. Su, No. 23-15179, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 28010 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2024).  First, some context. Recall that President Obama issued an executive order in 2014 setting the minimum wage at $10.10 per hour. See Executive Order 13658. Then, in 2018, President Trump issued a subsequent executive order that maintained the $10.10 minimum but excluded certain types of contracts from its coverage. See Executive Order 13838. Under President Biden, the DOL issued a final rule, Increasing the Minimum Wage for Federal Contractors, 86 Fed. Reg. 67,126 (Nov. 24, 2021). Soon after DOL finalized its rule implementing EO 14026, five states sued in the District of Arizona to set aside the Rule and the EO. The states also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the government from enforcing the minimum wage requirement anywhere in the United States. The district court denied the preliminary injunction, and the states appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On appeal, the states argued that EO 14026 exceeded the scope of the President’s authority under the Act. In response, the DOL and other government defendants argued the purpose of the Act, as outlined in 40 U.S.C. § 101, was to create an efficient and economical procurement system for the federal government. The Ninth Circuit held that this provision is purposive only and by itself does not confer any procurement authority to the President. The court remanded to the district court to grant an injunction, though the scope of that injunction remains unclear and could apply only in favor of the plaintiff states, only to Federal contractors that reside in those states, or could, conceivably, apply nationwide.   The decision widened an already significant circuit split about the President’s authority to use the Act to impose upon Federal contractors social policy objectives. Most directly, the Tenth Circuit upheld the minimum wage rule and executive order earlier this year. See Bradford v. United States DOL, 101 F.4th 707 (10th Cir. 2024). More broadly, the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that the President has no authority under § 101 of the Act to impose social policy objectives. But the D.C., Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have held that the Act’s purpose confers expansive procurement power to the President in matters of government efficiency and the economy.  With the scope and impact of this decision, clients with federal contracts should consider the following implications. First, clients should reassess the wages and benefits of employees—at a minimum monitoring this litigation and contingency planning about the proceedings on remand. If the requested injunction takes effect, employers may need to evaluate whether to adjust wages. Employers should keep in mind, however, that other prevailing wages regimes may still apply, such as the Service Contract Act or the Davis Bacon Act. Moreover, state minimum wage laws still apply, and several states have implemented minimum wages hikes based on a $15 target, including those newly implemented in states like Missouri and Alaska. Additionally, employers with unionized workforces may face limitations in changing wages unilaterally. Second, the removal of the minimum wage requirement might spark a race to the bottom on wages. That, in turn, could lead to problems retaining employees. That same wage environment, on the other hand, might also create opportunities to pick up employees from competitors. Third, the Ninth Circuit’s decision may signal additional challenges to Rules and EOs in the federal contractor employment context. That signal is likely to be especially strong where the Rule or EO bases its authority under § 101 of the Act. It may also augur future adverse rulings regarding Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs obligations related to affirmative action plans and paid sick leave. Finally, the new Administration has the ability to issue new executive orders, of course. Although the Trump Administration did not revoke the Federal contractor minimum wage the last time around, it may do so this time around—and set its sights on other regulatory obligations enforced by the OFCCP on Federal contractors. For Federal contractors, the pace of the legal and regulatory changes is likely to be the one constant in an otherwise frenetic period reaching back a decade. 

Firm Highlights

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.