.

Client Alert

The Families First Coronavirus Response Act: Twenty (Or So) Questions With Dorsey’s Labor and Employment Team

March 27, 2020

by Ryan E. Mick, Aaron Goldstein, and Jillian Kornblatt

Download as a PDF

Share this page

Since the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (“FFCRA”) was passed into law on March 18, 2020, crucial questions about the Act’s requirements have remained unanswered. Yesterday (on March 26, 2020), the United States Department of Labor issued a new, expanded set of FAQs that provides further guidance on employers’ paid leave obligations. Dorsey’s Labor & Employment team has parsed the text of the FFCRA and the DOL’s FAQs to answer many of your urgent questions.

Although the DOL’s expanded FAQs provide a useful resource for employers, other questions remain unanswered, and employers must continue to analyze the application of the FFCRA to their individual facts and circumstances.  Please do not hesitate to contact a Dorsey employment expert to help tackle the many employment-related issues created by the COVID-19 pandemic and federal, state and local efforts to respond.

Applicability

1. When does the FFCRA take effect? April 1, 2020.

2. Does the FFCRA apply to leave taken before April 1, 2020? No, the FFCRA only applies to leave taken between April 1, and December 31, 2020. In other words, neither form of leave in the FFCRA (or the related tax credits for businesses) is retroactive.Employers may provide leave benefits before April 1, 2020, but those benefits will not count against the employer’s leave obligations under the FFCRA and the employer will not be eligible for tax credits to offset the value of paid leave benefits provided before April 1, 2020.

3. To which employers does the FFCRA apply? The FFCRA applies to employers with fewer than 500 employees. Employers that have fewer than 50 employees may request an exemption from the Secretary of Labor if compliance would jeopardize the viability of the business. To determine if a business has fewer than 500 employees, it should count employees on leave, temporary employees (including those who are jointly employed with another employer), and day laborers as of the day the employee requests the leave. Independent contractors do not count as employees for purposes of determining whether the employer clears the 500-employee threshold.

Generally speaking, separate corporate entities will be treated as separate employers for purposes of determining whether each entity is subject to the FFCRA.  However, distinct business entities may be counted as a single employer in different circumstances.  In situations such as parent-subsidiary companies, affiliated companies or companies that share or lease employees, the employees of distinct entities may be counted together if the distinct entities share common management, interrelation between operations, centralized control of labor relations, or some common ownership or financial control, or if the different entities share control over employees (i.e., hiring and firing authority, day to day supervision, and control over the terms of employment).These determinations turn on fact-specific application of multiple tests and should be made with the advice of counsel.

4. How does the FFCRA apply to employers with 500 or more employees? It does not. Private sector employers need only comply with the FFCRA if they have fewer than 500 employees.Larger employers may provide paid leave benefits consistent with those available to smaller employers under the FFCRA, but they are not required to do so and will not be eligible for tax credits to reimburse them for the paid sick-leave benefits they pay to employees.

5. Are employers with fewer than 50 employees exempt from the FFCRA? No. Small businesses are eligible to apply to the Secretary of Labor for an exemption if providing paid leave would “jeopardize the viability” of the business as a going concern, but they are not automatically exempt from the FFCRA’s paid leave provisions or exempt from liability.The DOL has not yet advised on how to apply for such an exemption, but in the FAQs it instructs employers to document the reasons why that employer believes it qualifies for an exemption.

6. Are employees who have been furloughed (or whose businesses have closed) entitled to FFCRA leave? No. Employees are only “unable to work” (including telework) if the employer has work for them to do and if one of the qualifying reasons listed in Question 8 applies. Thus, employees who are on a furlough (short-term layoff) are not eligible for paid leave as of the effective date of the furlough (they may be eligible for FFCRA paid leave benefits up to the effective date of a furlough, if after April 1). Similarly, if a business shuts down based on a business need or as required under a federal, state, or local “stay at home” order, its employees are not eligible for leave under the FFCRA after the effective date of the shut-down.

However, employees who are on a furlough or are out of work because of a shutdown may be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits.

Employers who furlough employees, but do not terminate their employment, should consult benefits counsel to ensure proper treatment of health and welfare benefits during the period of furlough.  Employers must also be aware of state requirements for furloughed employees.  By way of example only, California employers generally must pay out accrued but unused PTO when an employee is furloughed, if such furlough will last longer than the current pay period.

Emergency Paid Sick Leave

7. Which employees are eligible for emergency paid sick leave? All employees of companies with fewer than 500 employees, as long as they satisfy the conditions discussed below.

8. When may an employee use emergency paid sick leave? Emergency paid sick leave is available for employees who are “unable to work (or telework) due to a need for leave” for any of six reasons:

(1) the employee is subject to a “Federal, State, or local quarantine or isolation order” related to COVID-19;

(2) the employee has been advised by a health care provider to self-quarantine due to COVID-19-related concerns;

(3) the employee us experiencing symptoms of COVID-19 and seeking a medical diagnosis;

(4) the employee is caring for an individual who is subject to a “Federal, State, or local quarantine order” or who has been advised by a health care provider to self-quarantine due to COVID-19;

(5) the employee is caring for a son or daughter of such employee due to a school or child care closure or unavailability due to COVID-19 precautions; or

(6) the employee is experiencing a “substantially similar condition” to be specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

9. How are the qualifying reasons for emergency paid sick leave likely to be interpreted? The six reasons that trigger the right to emergency paid sick leave, listed above, have been subject to interpretation questions since the FFCRA was passed. Particularly, the first reason, that the “employee is subject to a ‘Federal, State, or local quarantine or isolation order’ related to COVID-19” has been the source of confusion, since terms like “isolation” and “quarantine” do not typically appear in federal employment statutes. 

The DOL’s March 26, 2020, updates to the FAQs shed some light on this topic. They suggest that a “quarantine” or “isolation” order is an order that an individual employee receives related to an exposure or suspected exposure to COVID-19. See Q. 21 (the “intent of FFCRA is to provide such paid sick leave as necessary to keep you from spreading the virus to others”). Similarly, the second enumerated reason—that the “employee has been advised by a health care provider to self-quarantine due to COVID-19-related concerns”—likely refers to advice related to an individual employee’s potential exposure to COVID-19, in addition to medical advice for an individual to self-quarantine due to an underlying health condition. The DOL’s guidance also suggests that emergency paid sick leave would not be triggered by compliance with the multiple “stay at home” orders issued by state governors and local officials, which limit excursions only to “essential” activities and business. See Q. 27 (stating that emergency paid sick leave would not be available if employees could not report to work “because [the employer] was required to close pursuant to a Federal, State, or local directive”).

The FFCRA has a broad remedial purpose to provide benefits to workers who are adversely impacted by COVID-19.  Because several of the qualifying reasons for leave are ambiguously worded, an employer faces some risk if they deny an employee benefits, even under a reasonable interpretation of the statutory text.  To mitigate this risk for employers, the DOL has established a 30-day temporary period of non-enforcement after the FFCRA takes effect, so long as the employer has acted reasonably and in good faith to comply with the Act.

10. How much emergency paid sick leave do employees receive? Effective immediately on April 1, full-time employees are eligible for up to 80 hours to use for the purposes described in Question 8. Part-time employees are entitled to leave in the amount of the average number of hours they work in a two-week period.

11. What about employees who earn overtime hours? Under the EFMLEA, an employer must pay the employee for the hours they would have normally been scheduled to work—even if that work exceeds 40 hours in a week. However, emergency paid sick leave need only be paid up to 80 hours over a two-week period, so an employee who regularly works overtime might reach the 80-hour cap before the end of the second week.Employers should also keep in mind the daily and aggregate caps discussed in Question 12 below.

12. How much will an employee be paid while taking emergency paid sick leave? The amount an employee receives will depend on the reason for his or her leave:

When taking leave for their own use, (reasons 1-3 in Question 8), employees are entitled to receive the greater of the regular rate of pay, the federal minimum wage in effect under the FLSA, or the applicable state or local minimum wage. For these employees, emergency paid sick leave wages are limited to $511 per day, or $5,110 in the aggregate, over the entire paid sick leave period.

When taking leave to care for others (reasons 4-6 in Question 8), employees are entitled to receive two-thirds of their pay, calculated from the greater of the three tests listed above. Emergency paid sick leave used to care for others is limited to $200 per day, or $2,000 in the aggregate, over the entire paid sick leave period.

13. Is an employee entitled to 80 hours for every qualifying reason under the FFCRA? No, he or she is entitled to 80 hours total, regardless of the reason(s) for his or her leave.

14. What if an employer gave an employee paid leave for COVID-19 before April 1? That leave would not be subject to the FFCRA, or eligible for reimbursement via tax credits. The FFCRA imposes a new leave requirement on employers that is effective beginning on April 1, 2020.

15. Are employees who are teleworking able to use emergency paid sick leave benefits? Employees who can telework, but who are unable to perform their tasks or work the required hours because of one of the qualifying reasons listed in Question 8, are entitled to take emergency paid sick leave.To the extent that employees can telework while caring for their child, emergency paid sick leave is not available.

16. Are employees who are teleworking able to use emergency paid sick leave benefits on an intermittent basis? Teleworking employees who are eligible to take emergency paid sick leave may take such leave intermittently or on a reduced schedule, in any increment, provided they receive permission from their employer.

17. Are employees who are working at their usual work site able to use emergency paid sick leave benefits on an intermittent basis? Generally no. Unless the employee is teleworking, emergency paid sick leave for qualifying reasons related to COVID-19 must be taken in full-day increments. It cannot be taken intermittently.However, if the employer and employee agree, emergency paid sick leave may be taken intermittently if the employee requests intermittent leave or a reduced schedule to care for the employee’s child whose school or place of care is closed, or whose child care provider is unavailable.

18. If an employee’s qualifying reason for using emergency sick leave ends before the employee has used all 80 hours, does the employee retain the balance for later use? Yes. If an employee no longer has a qualifying reason for taking emergency paid sick leave before the leave is exhausted, the employee may take any remaining emergency paid sick leave at a later time, until December 31, 2020, if another qualifying reason occurs.

Emergency FMLA (“EFMLEA”) Leave

19. What is EFMLEA leave, and which employees are eligible? All employees of companies with fewer than 500 employees who have been employed for at least 30 calendar days by the employer are eligible for EFMLEA leave. EFMLEA leave is available for only one purpose: to allow an employee who cannot work (or telework) due to a need for leave to care for a son or daughter under 18 years of age because of a COVID-19-related school or child care closure or unavailability. EFMLEA leave consists of twelve total workweeks of leave; the first two weeks of leave are generally unpaid (but may be eligible for emergency paid sick leave at a two-thirds rate), and the remaining ten weeks are paid at a two-thirds salary level (prorated for part-time employees).

20. An employee’s daughter is home because her school closed due to COVID-19. Is the employee eligible for emergency paid sick leave, EFMLEA leave, or both? Both. The employee could use his or her 80 hours of emergency paid sick leave in place of the two weeks of unpaid leave under the EFMLEA (at a two-thirds rate of pay), then use the remaining 10 weeks of two-thirds paid leave under the EFMLEA.

21. Can an employee use the entirety of their EFMLEA leave, then use 12 weeks of FMLA leave? No. The EFMLEA only adds another permissible category of FMLA leave, as well as a requirement that the leave be paid at a two-thirds level (as opposed to unpaid leave) for the qualifying reason. Once an employee uses their 12 workweeks of leave—whether those 12 weeks are under the FMLA, the EFMLEA, or any combination—they have exhausted their FMLA/EFMLEA leave. Similarly, if an employee has used any or all of his or her FMLA leave in the previous 12-month period, the amount of leave available under the EFMLEA is reduced by the amount already used. If an employee has exhausted his or her FMLA leave for the previous 12-month period, the employee is not eligible for EFMLEA leave until the next 12-month period begins.

22. Are employees who are teleworking able to use EFMLEA leave benefits? Employees who can telework, but who are unable to do so because of the need to care for their child whose school or place of care is closed or child care provider is unavailable for COVID-19-related reasons, are entitled to take EFMLEA leave. To the extent that employees can telework while caring for their child, EFMLEA leave is not available.

23. Are employees able to use paid EFMLEA leave on an intermittent basis? Yes, with the employer’s permission.The DOL encourages employers and employees to work together to agree on an adjusted work schedule.

General Questions

24. I am a business with fewer than 50 employees; how do I apply for an exemption? This is not yet known. The DOL has said it will address this issue in more detail in forthcoming regulations. However, businesses should begin documenting why they meet the criteria for an exemption.

25. How does the FFCRA apply to employees who are able to telework for all or part of their normal workday? Employees who are permitted and able to telework (i.e., work from home or at a location other than their normal workplace) must be paid their normal wages and are not compensated under the paid leave provisions of the FFCRA.

26. What kind of documentation do employees need to provide, and do employers need to keep, relating to the emergency paid sick leave and EFMLEA leave? Employees must provide documentation to support the claim that they are unable to work or telework for a qualifying reason. For emergency paid sick leave, such documentation may include a copy of the Federal, State or local quarantine or isolation order related to COVID-19 or written documentation by a health care provider advising you to self-quarantine due to concerns related to COVID-19. For EFMLEA leave, such documentation may include a notice of closure or unavailability from the applicable school, place of care, or child care provider.

Employers granting paid leave to employees under the FFCRA must retain the following:

  1. The employee’s name;
  2. The qualifying reason for requesting leave;
  3. A statement that the employee is unable to work, including telework, for that reason; and
  4. The date(s) for which leave is requested.

Employers must also retain the documentation provided by the employee, just as they would with a traditional FMLA request. Employers that will seek tax credits or other reimbursement from the IRS must retain this information and consult the applicable IRS forms and procedures, which are expected to be released in the coming days.

 

Firm Highlights

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.