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Data Protection Reform: Changes in the UK Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and the EU Digital Omnibus Regulation Proposal

April 1, 2026 – The TMCA

by Ron Moscona and Sam Fitzgerald

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Eight years on from the introduction of the GDPR, both the United Kingdom and the European Union appear to be taking on board the calls from the business community for reform and for a fairer balance between individual data protections and the need for less burdensome restrictions on businesses. In the UK, this has come in the form of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 (“DUAA”). The goal of the Act is to promote innovation and economic growth. In the EU, the Digital Omnibus Regulation Proposal (“Digital Omnibus”) aims at consolidating and simplifying existing, often overlapping, European data related regulation, such as the GDPR, Data Act, EU AI Act and ePrivacy Directive. The goal of the reform is to promote competitiveness and reduce compliance burdens for businesses.

Businesses operating in the UK should be aware of the new changes brought in by the DUAA and, for those also operating in the EU, it is important to be aware of the current proposals and how these differ from the DUAA. The two sets of measures are not identical and present the beginning of a divergence in data protection regimes in the two jurisdictions. Below we discuss some of the key changes brought in by the DUAA and key proposals under the Digital Omnibus.

1. What are the Changes?

1.1  The DUAA

The commencement of the DUAA is phased; the majority of the data protection law changes came into force on 5 February 2026, and the new statutory complaints process will commence on 19 June 2026.

New recognised legitimate interests

The DUAA creates a new lawful ground at UK GDPR Article 6(1)(ea), which permits processing necessary for certain “recognised” legitimate interests, with no requirement to balance these against the rights of data subjects. Essentially, the DUAA creates a list of legitimate interests, which the UK legislature has deemed to be sufficient in all cases to justify the processing of personal data. This should help to reduce the burden on data controllers of balancing the applicable tests for the “legitimate interest” lawful grounds for processing and to reduce compliance risk. Some of the recognised categories of ‘legitimate interest’ include, among others, processing necessary to: (i) detect, investigate or prevent crime; (ii) disclose personal data to public authorities making public task requests; and (iii) safeguard vulnerable individuals.

Data subjects can still exercise a right to object to the processing of their data based on these recognised ‘legitimate interest’ categories in accordance with the existing rules under Article 21(1) GDPR (and if an objection is made, the controller has to demonstrate a “compelling legitimate interest” to justify any further processing).

Exemptions to the requirement for consent to cookies

The DUAA amended the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations cookies framework which, until now, required that organisations obtain the user’s consent for placing (or viewing) cookies on a device in all cases except where the cookie code is strictly necessary for providing the service or where the sole purpose of the cookie is for transmitting communications over an electronic communications network. The DUAA created a number of additional exemptions to the requirement to obtain user consent for the use of cookies, including:

  • where the service provider uses the cookie for the sole purpose of collecting statistical information about visitors to its information society service (or a website through which the service is provided) to improve it;
  • where the sole purpose is to enable the screens or functionalities of a website to be adapted to the preferences of the user or to allow some other enhancement of this nature; and
  • where the sole purpose is to allow the provider to identify the physical location of the user (or the user’s device) in response to a request for emergency assistance.

The DUAA also clarifies the original exception which applies where use of the cookie is deemed “strictly necessary”. A non-exhaustive list of examples of “strictly necessary” cookies is provided in the legislation, including cookies used to ensure device security, prevent or detect fraud or technical faults, or to authenticate the identity of the user.

Controllers may now be able to redesign cookie banners to reflect these new exemption categories, reducing consent prompts for qualifying low-risk cookies.

However, fines for breaches of these rules now increase to a maximum of 4% of worldwide turnover (an increase from a maximum of £500,000 before the DUAA).

Further processing for research, archiving or statistical purposes

The DUAA introduced an important exception to the rule on ‘purpose limitation’, under new Articles 84A and 84B UK GDPR, which will help research institutions, commercial companies, public sector entities and other organisations engaged in scientific or statistical research to use data which was collected for one particular research purpose for other research purposes, even those unrelated to the original one. This includes where the use of the data was originally based on data subject consent.

Obtaining a new consent will not be required if it would not be possible or would require disproportionate efforts. In addition, the obligation to inform data subjects of the new purpose of processing will also be exempted. Other conditions and safeguards also apply. Within the limitations of the new rules, however, this new exemption should be highly relevant, for example, when dealing with patient data or consumer data collected for research purposes and the researcher has no practical means by which to seek further consent for the use of the data for new research purposes and no practical way of informing the data subjects of the additional processing.

Data Subject Access Request (“DSAR”) changes

There is a new right for data controllers to request clarification after they receive a DSAR, under the new UK GDPR Article 12A, and to effectively then pause the timeframe for responding to the request. Data controllers can request clarification where they “reasonably require” further information to identify the relevant personal data required by a DSAR, for example where they hold “a large amount of information concerning a data subject”. Under the new article 15(1A), controllers will only be required to undertake “reasonable and proportionate searches” for the personal data of data subjects. This could in many cases considerably reduce the burden of responding to a DSAR.

New right to complain

The DUAA inserts Article 164A to the Data Protection Act 2018 (“DPA”) introducing a new right to complain to a data controller where a data subject believes the manner in which their information is used breaches data protection legislation. Data controllers will now be required to establish a formal data protection complaints process, acknowledge a complaint within 30 days and respond in full “without undue delay”. This measure will commence on 19 June 2026.

In practice, complaints are likely to be made to data controllers in the same circumstances (and probably often at the same time) as when a data subject makes a DSAR. Whilst the new complaints procedure may add to data controllers’ compliance burden, it could potentially provide an alternative to making complaints to the regulator (i.e., the Data Commissioner). This may be designed primarily to relieve pressure from the regulator, but for data controllers that receive complaints, it should be easier to respond to a data subject complaint than to an investigation by the Data Commissioner which may be instigated in response to a complaint. In any event, organisations will need to update their procedures and IT systems to address the requirement to respond to data subject complaints.

Automated decision-making

A “solely automated decision” is a decision with “no meaningful human involvement”. Under new Articles 22A-22D, UK GDPR, solely automated decisions – which were generally prohibited by GDPR with very limited exceptions – are now permitted, albeit subject to certain safeguards being put in place. A clear notice will have to be given to data subjects who will still have a right to contest the automated decision making, make representations and seek human intervention in such decisions. However, there are various limitations to the right to use automatic decision making and data controllers would need to develop their processes and systems to meet the requirements of the new rules.

Data transfer changes

Under GDPR, strict rules apply to the transfer of personal data to other jurisdictions unless the jurisdiction into which the data is imported is recognised as providing adequate protection to the data and the privacy rights of individuals.

Schedule 7 of the DUAA introduces a new “data protection test” which asks whether the level of protection secured by the laws of the foreign jurisdiction is “not materially lower” than the standard of the protection provided for data subjects in the UK. It will be a matter for the UK Government to apply the test when considering the recognition of other jurisdictions as having adequate protection to data and privacy rights.

New powers for the ICO

The DUAA will replace the ICO (i.e., the current Information Commissioner’s Office) with the “Information Commission”. It is yet to be seen how this will affect regulatory activity, but it is generally seen as a measure to reduce the role of the regulator.

The DUAA introduces new investigation powers which would help the Information Commission to investigate serious complaints of breaches of the data protection rules. These include powers to obtain information from data controllers and processors, a power to require staff and management to make themselves available for interviews and a power to require a controller or processor to appoint an independent third party to prepare a report for the Commissioner about an issue of interest to an investigation.

1.2  The Digital Omnibus

The Digital Omnibus was published by the European Commission on 19 November 2025, and will likely undergo changes during the legislative process in the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament throughout 2026. The European Commission has already launched a consultation on a “Digital Fitness Check” to evaluate the cumulative impact of EU digital regulations on competitiveness and consumer protection. The consultation ended on 11 March 2026.

Personal data

The Digital Omnibus includes an important proposal to amend the definition of personal data under GDPR Article 4(1). The proposed change would codify the recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in  Case C-413/23 P EDPS v SRB, by clarifying that information is not personal data for a given entity where that entity does not have the “means reasonably likely to be used” to identify the natural person to whom the information relates.

This means that where data is received by a company or organisation after it has been coded or “pseudonymised” it will no longer be deemed “personal data” unless the recipient has the means to reidentify the individuals.

It has long been recognised that the risk to privacy interests where data is properly pseudonymised is negligible and the requirement to comply with GDPR rules in relation to such data is an unnecessary burden. This change would correct that anomaly.

Controller’s information requirements

Articles 13 and 14 GDPR set out the general rules requiring data controllers to provide data subjects with information on the processing of their personal data (the “processing notification” requirement). A new proposal under the Digital Omnibus would establish that Article 13 will not apply in certain situations where the data is collected in a “clear and circumscribed relationship”, the activity of data controllers is not “data intensive” or “high risk” and where there are reasonable grounds to believe the data subject already has the specified information. This does not affect the processing notification requirement applicable (under Article 14 GDPR) where personal data is not collected directly from the data subject.

Scientific research

The Digital Omnibus proposal provides a new definition for ‘scientific research’ (Article 4 GDPR), clarifies that further processing for scientific purposes is compatible with the initial purpose of processing (Article 5(1)(b) GDPR), and clarifies that scientific research constitutes a legitimate interest within the meaning of Article 6(1)(f) GDPR. These changes would have similar benefits for the use of personal data in scientific research as the changes introduced under the DUAA.

Artificial Intelligence

Another proposal in the Omnibus would reduce the legal uncertainty concerning the use of personal data for AI development. It is proposed to expressly recognise that legitimate interests (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR) provide a lawful basis for processing personal data where such processing is necessary in the controller’s interest to develop and operate an AI system, provided it is appropriate, satisfies the balancing test and does not override the freedoms and rights of individuals. The proposal suggests certain conditions or exceptions, for example where EU or member state laws explicitly require consent. There may also be further safeguards where the ‘legitimate interest’ basis applies, such as strict data minimisation obligations, requirements to protect against residual disclosure or unintended output of personal data, greater transparency, and that individuals may have an unconditional right to object. This amendment will clarify that controllers of personal data may be able to rely on legitimate interests for AI training, testing and activities while still retaining appropriate safeguards. The clarification would be welcome by AI developers particularly those developing general purpose LLMs that rely on training models with large amounts of data which may include sporadic elements of personal data for which it is unrealistic, in practice, to obtain data subject consent and no other “lawful basis” under GDPR applies.

A related proposal would permit residual processing of special category data in limited circumstances where it is necessary for AI development and operation. This will be permitted under strict conditions, such as a requirement to remove such data once it is identified and to protect such data from being used to infer outputs, being disclosed or otherwise made available to third parties. Again, this is likely to be important particularly in the context of general purpose LLMs where the training of the model does not focus necessarily on specific categories of data but since large amounts of data are used for model training, small elements of data falling under the special categories may be used.

Right of access

Currently, data subjects (those whose personal data is processed by a controller or processer) have the right to obtain from the data controller confirmation as to whether or not their personal data is being processed, and have access to that data. Organisations have often complained of receiving repeated and strategically motivated requests, including for information gathering purposes in litigation (rather than genuine data protection concerns). The Omnibus proposes to amend GDPR Article 12 so that a data controller can either reject a data subject’s right of access request or charge a reasonable fee, where the data subject is abusing the right of access provision. An example of an abuse as such would be when a data subject intends to cause the controller to refuse an access request in order to claim compensation, possibly under the threat of bringing a claim for damages.

Data breach notifications to supervisory authorities

The Omnibus includes a proposal to simplify data breach reporting requirements and reduce the burden on controllers. GDPR Article 33 would be amended so that data controllers are only required to notify supervisory authorities and data subjects of data breaches if there is a “high” risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. Additionally, the proposed change would extend the notification deadline from 72 to 96 hours and require use of a European-level Single Entry Point for notifying breaches, which would streamline such incidents. There would also be a common EU notification template and list of high-risk scenarios to be reviewed every three years.

Cookies

Currently, both the ePrivacy Directive and GDPR contain rules regarding cookies. The Omnibus contains a proposal to move the rules on accessing or storing information through cookies from the ePrivacy Directive into the GDPR.

The goal of some of the proposals is to address the growing problem of consent fatigue and ineffective cookie banners and modernise the current ePrivacy framework. The EU Commission proposes to update the rules on storing information or on gaining access to information stored on devices. The changes will allow users to reject or accept all cookies with the click of one button and if they opt for the former, data controllers will have to wait 6 months before asking the user for consent again.

In addition, the proposal will clarify a list of situations where cookies can be used without the consent of the data subject, namely carrying out the transmission of an electronic communication over an electronic communications network, provision of services explicitly requested by a user, a website operator carrying out analytics where the data is only used for aggregated audience measurement (such as measuring page visits) and maintaining or restoring the security of the provided service.

2. The UK DUAA Versus the EU Digital Omnibus – Side by Side Comparison of Proposed Changes

Topic UK DUAA changes EU Digital Omnibus proposed changes
Personal data definition No change. Amend the definition of personal data under GDPR Article 4(1) to codify the recent CJEU decision P EDPS v SRB, clarifying that information is not personal data for a given entity where that entity does not have the “means reasonably likely to be used” to identify the natural person to whom the information relates.
Legitimate interests Introduces new “recognised legitimate interests”, which allows processing without a balancing test against the data subject’s rights and a legitimate interests assessment. In the context of AI, controllers can process data to develop and operate AI systems by relying on legitimate interests, subject to the outcome of a standard balancing test, any relevant consent rules and other safeguards.
Special category personal data Gives the Secretary of State the authority to widen the scope of special category data. Maintains that special category data should generally not be used when operating or developing AI systems, but residual processing of special category data may be permitted in such instances however the controller must "effectively protect without undue delay such data from being used to produce outputs, from being disclosed or otherwise made available to third parties".
Pseudonymisation No proposed change. In certain circumstances, pseudonymised data would no longer constitute personal data for certain entities. The Commission would provide further details of such circumstances via implementing acts.
Cookies Introduces new exemptions for cookie consents, for example when cookies are used to prevent and detect fraud. Emphasises the concept of “consent fatigue” and introduces an option where users can refuse consent requests via the click of a button.
Data Subject Access Requests Establishes a standard of “reasonable and proportionate” searches for controllers to limit the scope of searches for DSARs. It also introduces a pause mechanism where data controllers require additional information. Focuses on “abusive” and “excessive” access requests. It introduces a provision where a data controller can reject “abusive” requests or charge a fee. It reduces the controller’s burden of proof for showing that a DSAR is “excessive”.
Data breaches No substantive change unless you are a provider of public telecommunication services, which are now required to report personal data breaches to the ICO without undue delay, and where feasible, no later than 72 hours of becoming aware of the breach (rather than within 24 hours currently). The Omnibus extends the deadline for a data controller to report a breach to 96 hours, introduces a single reporting point and raises the supervisory authority notification threshold to “high risk”.
Data transfers Replaces the “essential equivalence test” for assessing the adequacy of a third country’s data protection regime to a new test of “not materially lower” than the standard of the protection provided for data subjects in the UK No changes.
Automated decisions The existing default prohibition on solely automated decisions with legal or similarly significant effect is removed provided that the data is not special category data. Whether a process is “solely automated” is clarified to mean a decision with no “meaningful human involvement”. Focuses on how to interpret “necessity” when assessing whether an automated decision is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller. The assessment of “necessity” does not require that the decision could be taken only by solely automated processing.

Firm Highlights

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?