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Chicago

The image shows the Chicago skyline with the John Hancock Center visible on the left, reflected in the calm waters of Lake Michigan along the lakefront.

Dorsey's Chicago office advises businesses, family offices, and high-net-worth individuals on matters that require thoughtful planning and practical guidance. The office serves clients throughout the Chicago area and beyond, helping them navigate legal, financial, and business challenges at every stage of growth.

Chicago attorneys work closely with colleagues across Dorsey's offices in the United States and around the world to provide strategic counsel tailored to each client's objectives. The office has experience serving family offices, business owners, executives, and organizations facing complex regulatory, employment, litigation, and wealth planning matters.

Our Practices in Chicago

In the heart of the Loop, our attorneys in Chicago provide comprehensive legal services related to tax, trusts and estates, family offices, commercial litigation, securities litigation, and labor and employment matters. Our clients include local Chicago-based companies, national and international organizations, family offices, and high-net-worth individuals.

In the Community

We believe in shaping the communities in which we live. Our Chicago attorneys volunteer and serve in leadership positions in organizations that contribute to the wellbeing of the Chicago area including Epilepsy Foundation of Greater Chicago, Mothers Against Violence in Schools (MAVinS), and Autism Speaks, Chicagoland Chapter. Our team is also involved with civic and cultural organizations including the Economic Club of Chicago, Chicago Innovation, the Goodman Theatre, and the Art Institute of Chicago.

Frequently Asked Questions

What kind of legal services can Dorsey offer my family office?

Our Chicago attorneys advise family offices on a broad range of matters, including fiduciary litigation, securities issues, wealth preservation and transfer, family investment vehicles, charitable giving, and multigenerational and business succession planning. Learn more about our Family Offices practice.

Do your Chicago attorneys represent clients in securities litigation and regulatory enforcement matters?

Yes. Our Chicago attorneys represent companies, officers, directors, and trustees in complex securities litigation and enforcement matters involving both federal and state regulators. Learn more about our Securities & Financial Services Litigation & Enforcement practice.

Can your attorneys help Chicago-area companies navigate employment disputes and compliance matters?

Yes. Our Chicago attorneys advise clients across the full spectrum of employment matters, from day-to-day compliance questions to high-stakes disputes involving Title VII, FLSA, ADA, and FMLA. We represent clients in mediations, arbitrations, and state and federal courts, including before the Seventh Circuit. Learn more about our Labor & Employment practice.

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Client Alert

Navigating the Financial-Institution Exemption under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act

June 16, 2026

The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA” or “the Act”) is one of the most restrictive biometric privacy laws in the United States. Consumers have obtained over $800 million in BIPA settlements from Meta, Google, and TikTok alone.1 However, a recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and another pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, shed light on how much leeway the Act may give to defendants facing BIPA lawsuits under its so-called “financial-institution” exemption. This article provides background on BIPA’s enforcement, including recent developments in how courts interpret its financial-institution exemption. Further, it provides insights on potential litigation risks for companies handling individual biometric data or working with business partners who do so. I. BIPA is enacted in 2008, and an explosion of litigation follows. The Illinois legislature enacted BIPA to protect consumer privacy by regulating the collection and use of biometric data.2 Biometric data is information that describes and classifies certain human biological, physical, or behavioral characteristics, such as fingerprints and facial recognition. Its use is ubiquitous in modern society. Billions of consumers worldwide rely on the convenience of biometric data. The appeal is unsurprising: placing your thumb on a screen is faster and easier than entering a complex password. But with convenience comes heightened risk. Unlike passwords or social security numbers, biometric data is effectively immutable; a social security number can be changed, a fingerprint cannot. As a result, a data breach affecting consumer biometric information creates a substantial risk of identity theft.3 BIPA obligates private entities that collect or use biometric data to adopt a public retention-and-destruction policy, obtain informed written consent before collecting biometric identifiers, protect data using reasonable security measures, and take other actions to safeguard biometric data.4 Further, it bars entities from selling, profiting from, or disclosing biometric data without informed consent or a statutory exemption.5 BIPA allows recovery of $1,000 per negligent violation and $5,000 per reckless or intentional violation.6 Before BIPA was amended in 2024, Illinois courts considered each instance of biometric data collection or use as an independent violation under the Act.7 This exposed defendants to hundreds of billions of dollars in damages, particularly through class actions.8 In 2021, TikTok’s parent company, ByteDance, settled a BIPA class action for $92 million, based on its use of face and voice data through the TikTok app.9 In 2022, Google settled an Illinois BIPA class action for $100 million in connection with its use of facial recognition technology recognition without express consent.10 II. In 2024, the BIPA tide turns toward defendants. In 2024, the Illinois legislature, by amendment,11 and the Illinois Supreme Court, in Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital,12 reined in BIPA’s exceedingly plaintiff-friendly apparatus.13 The amendment limited damages under BIPA to one violation per person,14 and Mosby declined to extend BIPA’s protections to patients and healthcare workers whose information is governed under HIPAA.15 Most recently, McGoveran v. Amazon Web Services,16 a May 2026 decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, suggests that another defendant-friendly shift under BIPA is on the horizon. III. Recent developments under BIPA’s financial-institution exemption create uncertainty and risk for defendants outside the financial industry. a. BIPA Section 25(c): the financial-institution exemption. Under Section 25(c) of BIPA, financial institutions subject to Title V of the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (the “GLBA”) are exempt from BIPA liability.17 The GLBA, like BIPA, obligates financial institutions to protect their customers’ privacy and nonpublic personal information.18 The GLBA defines “financial institution” as “any institution the business of which is engaging in financial activities as described in section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 [12 USCS § 1843(k)].”19 In turn, the Bank Holding Company Act recognizes several activities that are “financial in nature,” including lending, exchanging, insuring, and dealing in securities,20 providing financial, investment, or economic advisory services,21 and engaging in any activity that the Federal Reserve Board determines is “closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks.”22 b. Defendants face mixed results when moving to dismiss BIPA claims under Section 25(c) at the pleadings stage. BIPA’s financial-institution exemption was first examined by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois in the 2020 case, Stauffer v. Innovative Heights Fairview Heights, LLC.23 In Stauffer, an employee sued her employer, Innovative Heights, for collecting, storing, and using employee fingerprint data in violation of BIPA.24 During discovery, the employee learned that another company, Pathfinder, controlled and operated the system containing employees fingerprint data.25 The employee then amended her complaint to assert a BIPA claim against Pathfinder. Pathfinder moved to dismiss the BIPA claim on several grounds, including Section 25(c)’s financial-institution exemption. The Court declined to conclude at the motion-to-dismiss stage that Pathfinder is a financial institution exempt under BIPA.26 In denying Pathfinder’s motion, the Court explained that Pathfinder described itself as a “leader in the entertainment software industry,” not a financial institution, and did not engage in the type of activities that would subject it to the GLBA.27 In a BIPA suit before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, defendant Northwestern University claimed it was exempt under BIPA’s financial-institution exemption.28 As in Stauffer, the Court’s decision turned on whether the defendant’s activities were financial in nature.29 Citing the Federal Trade Commission’s GLBA Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule, which recognizes colleges and universities as financial institutions if they “appear to be significantly engaged in lending funds to consumers[,]”30 GLBA’s “broad definition”31 of financial institution, and publicly available documents confirming that Northwestern is significantly engaged in lending funds to consumers,32 the Court concluded that Northwestern is exempt from BIPA under section 25(c).33 c. The Third Circuit upholds dismissal of BIPA claims against a technology company at the pleading stage, based on the Act’s financial-institution exemption. In McGoveran, Illinois consumers filed a putative class action under BIPA against John Hancock in the Circuit Court for the Third Judicial Circuit in Madison County, Illinois.34 Consumers alleged that when they called John Hancock, a financial services company, about their retirement accounts, their calls were routed through Amazon Connect, which employed Pindrop Security, Inc. (“Pindrop”) to authenticate callers using voiceprints without obtaining consent.35 After an arduous procedural journey,36 the plaintiffs filed a similar suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware.37 The Court dismissed the BIPA claim against Pindrop, citing the financial-institution exemption.38 The consumers appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which upheld the district court’s dismissal of the BIPA claim against Pindrop based on the financial-institution exemption.39 As in Doe v. Northwestern University,40 where the Chicago federal district court relied in part on a Federal Trade Commission rule to conclude Northwestern is a financial institution,41 in McGoveran, the Third Circuit cited a Federal Reserve Board regulation,42 which provides that “authenticating the identity of persons conducting financial and nonfinancial transactions” is an activity “so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident thereto.”43 The Third Circuit’s ruling is the most recent indication that BIPA’s financial-institution exemption may extend beyond traditional financial institutions like banks and insurance companies to entities outside the financial industry. McGoveran reflects that defendants can obtain dismissal of BIPA actions under the financial institution-exemption at the pleadings stage. Dismissal before discovery can spare businesses significant costs. However, the Third Circuit does not have the final say on the scope of BIPA’s financial-institution exemption. Businesses should be mindful that Illinois courts may decline to expand Section 25(c) beyond the GLBA’s traditional domain. d. The Seventh Circuit may weigh in on the scope of BIPA’s financial institution-exemption later this summer. The Seventh Circuit is considering the scope of BIPA’s financial-institution exemption in Cisneros v. Nuance Communications, Inc.44 Like McGoveran, Cisneros concerns whether the defendant, an authentication provider that provides customer identity verification to Charles Schwab, is exempt under Section 25(c).45 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that the authenticator is exempt under BIPA because its services are used to authenticate consumers engaged in financial transactions.46 IV. Prepare for Compliance At this time, companies that do not fit the GLBA’s traditional definition of financial institution will continue to face litigation risk under BIPA. Illinois courts may decide to construe the financial-institution exemption narrowly to promote BIPA compliance. In light of the uncertainty around the exemption’s reach, businesses outside the financial industry should monitor developments in this area of law and examine their biometric data practices. Even traditional financial institutions—such as banks, brokerage firms, and credit unions—should remain attentive to BIPA’s requirements and engage external business partners on how they collect, use, and safeguard biometric data. Litigation against an external business partner, such as an authentication service provider, may nevertheless expose your company to significant operational, financial, and reputational risks under BIPA. V. How Dorsey Can Help Dorsey has an experienced team dedicated to advising companies working with biometric data. Please contact Jose Lopez and Noor Hasan to discuss how Dorsey can help your company navigate compliance and litigation risk under BIPA and its evolving landscape. 1 See Maurice Wells, Biometric Backlash: The Rising Wave of Litigation Under BIPA and Beyond, Epstein Becker Green: Commercial Litigation Update (Aug. 21, 2025), https://www.commerciallitigationupdate.com/biometric-backlash-the-rising-wave-of-litigation-under-bipa-and-beyond. 2 See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/15. 3 S.B. 2400, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2008). 4 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/15(a)–(b), (d)–(e). 5 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/15(c). 6 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/20(a). 7 Wells, supra note 1. 8 Patrick McKnight, Historic Biometric Privacy Suit Settles for $650 Million, ABA Business Law Sec. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/resources/business-law-today/2021-february/historic-biometric-privacy-settlement. 9 Wells, supra note 1. 10 Id. 11 S.B. 2979, 103d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2024). 12 234 N.E.3d 110 (2023). 13 Hana Ferrero, COMMENT: Identifiable to Whom? Clarifying Biometric Privacy Rights in Illinois and Beyond, 92 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1027, 1042–53 (2025). 14 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/20. 15 234 N.E.3d 110, 123. 16 175 F.4th 434 (3d Cir. 2026). 17 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 14/25(c). 18 See 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a). 19 See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)(A). 20 See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A). 21 See id. § 1843(k)(4)(C). 22 Id. § 1843(k)(4)(F). 23 480 F. Supp. 3d 888 (S.D. Ill. 2020). 24 Id. at 894. 25 Id. 26 Id. at 903–05. 27 Id. 28 Doe v. Nw. Univ., 586 F. Supp. 3d 841, 843 (N.D. Ill. 2022). 29 Id. at 843. 30 Id. 31 Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3)). 32 Id. (Fed. Student Aid Office, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter: Protecting Student Information, GEN-15-18 (July 29, 2015), https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/library/dear-colleague-letters/2015-07-29/protecting-student-information). 33 Id. 34 See McGoveran v. Amazon Web Servs., 488 F. Supp. 3d 714, 716 (S.D. Ill. 2020). 35 Id. at 717. 36 Amazon initially removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The federal district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 724. 37 Compl., McGoveran v. Amazon Web Servs. Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-01399-UNA (D. Del. Oct. 16, 2020), ECF No. 1. U.S. District Judge Leonard Stark granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on extraterritoriality. Order on Mot. To Dismiss, McGoveran v. Amazon Web Servs. Inc., Case No. 1:20-cv-01399-UNA (D. Del. Sept. 30, 2021), ECF No. 35. The consumers then amended their complaint against Amazon and Pindrop. First Am. Compl., McGoveran v. Amazon Web Servs. Inc., No. 1:20-cv-01399-LPS (D. Del. Feb. 17, 2022), ECF No. 47. 38 McGoveran v. Amazon Web Servs., No. 1:20-cv-01399-SB, 2023 WL 2683553, at *12 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2023). 39 McGoveran v. Amazon Web Servs., 175 F.4th 434 (3d Cir. 2026). 40 586 F. Supp. 3d 841 (N.D. Ill. 2022). 41 Id. at 843. 42 McGoveran, 175 F.4th at 434 (referencing 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a)(2)(iii)). 43 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(a)(2)(iii)). 44 Cisneros v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., No. 24-2982 (7th Cir.). 45 Cisneros v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-04285, 2024 WL 5703970, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2024). 46 Id. at *8.

Media Mentions

Peter Nelson Highlights Dorsey's "All-In" Strategy in Chicago

December 30, 2025

Dorsey opened a new office in Chicago with a five-attorney team in November. Managing Partner Peter Nelson discussed the expansion in an interview with The American Lawyer: "The challenge with Chicago is that it is such a big market that you can't go in unless you're really going to go all-in." Read the full article in Law.com (subscription is required). For additional coverage of the expansion, read Peter Nelson Discusses Dorsey’s Strategic Growth Plans with Minnesota Star Tribune and Dorsey’s New Chicago Team and Growth in Boise Featured in Multiple Publications. The Firm's original press release is also available. 

Firm Highlights

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.