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Melissa Moyle structures and negotiates commercial real estate transactions — from landlord and tenant matters to cross-border corporate deals — so that property companies, private equity investors and financial institutions can move with confidence in the U.K. market.

Melissa brings experience across the full lifecycle of commercial real estate in the U.K., advising clients at every stage from initial acquisition to disposal, financing and strategic exit. Whether a client is entering a new lease, restructuring an existing one or acquiring a portfolio asset, Melissa provides clear, practical guidance on the legal and commercial issues that matter most.

Melissa advises on the complete range of commercial real estate work, including landlord and tenant matters, development, acquisitions and disposals, property investment and property finance. She also frequently advises on the real estate dimensions of U.K. and cross-border corporate transactions, making her a natural fit for clients whose real estate needs arise in the context of a broader deal.

Her clients include property companies, corporates, private equity investors and financial institutions. Melissa understands the different priorities and risk tolerances that each type of client brings to a transaction and she structures her advice accordingly.

Melissa is a member of Dorsey & Whitney's London Real Estate Group.

Select Experience

Representative Experience

  • Advising a global spirits manufacturer on the lease of its UK flagship retail premises in central London.
  • Advised Datatec Plc on their new London headquarters.
  • Advised an international client on a 320,000 sq ft warehouse facility at St Modwen Park.
  • Advised Graphite Capital Management LLP on all real estate aspects of their relocation to new London headquarters.

Education

  • College of Law, London (LPC, 2000)
  • Trinity College, Dublin (LLB (Ling. Germ), 1998)

Bar Admissions

  • England & Wales

Languages

  • German

Insights

Client Alert

The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022: New Rules for Overseas Entities Owning Land in the UK

January 9, 2023

The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 (“Act”) introduces new measures to tackle illicit wealth in the UK property market.  The Act is comprised of three parts and Part 1 of the Act (“Part 1”), which became effective on 1 August 2022, is the focus of this update. Part 1 requires any Overseas Entity which owns or acquires property in the UK to be entered on a new Register of Overseas Entities (“Register”) held at Companies House.  An overseas entity is a legal entity (corporate body, partnership or other entity) governed by the law of a country or territory outside the UK (“Overseas Entities”). Overseas Entities are required to take reasonable steps to: identify any registerable beneficial owners; and ·obtain the required information in respect of each registrable, beneficial owner and in respect of any registrable beneficial owner who is a trustee, the trust. Required information includes personal information (where an individual), the basis for being a beneficial owner, and whether an individual is a “designated person” for the purposes of certain sanctions and anti-money laundering legislation. The Act defines registerable beneficial owners as an individual, legal entity, government or public authority with (directly or indirectly): more than 25% of the shares or voting rights in the Overseas Entity. the right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the Overseas Entity. those who actually do, or hold the right to, exert significant influence or control, over the Overseas Entity. The Overseas Entity must then submit an application of registration with the Register to Companies House containing a specific statement which best describes its beneficial ownership, together with details of its beneficial owner(s) as required by the Act.  As part of the application the Overseas Entity must serve an information notice on each beneficial owner to confirm their details and subsequently ensure the information in the application is independently verified by a UK-based agent. Overseas Entities are also subject to an annual “update period” beginning with the date of an Overseas Entity’s entry on the Register.  Every twelve months, within 14 days after the end of each update period, the Overseas Entity must update the registrar as to its beneficial ownership and confirm ongoing compliance with the Act. The Act will apply retrospectively to Overseas Entities that acquired property interests of (a) freeholds or leases of seven years or more in England and Wales (b) freeholds or leases of twenty-one years or more in Northern Ireland and (c) freeholds or leases of more than twenty years in Scotland (a “Qualifying Estate”): ·on or after 1 January 1999 in England & Wales; or ·on or after 8 December 2014 in Scotland; or ·on or after 1 August 2022 in Northern Ireland. An Overseas Entity must also apply to be added to the Register where: (1) it wishes to sell, grant a lease of more than seven years, or grant a legal charge of a Qualifying Estate it already owns when the related application to the Land Registry will be submitted on or after 1 February 2023; or (2) it wishes to buy or become the tenant of a Qualifying Estate where its application to the Land Registry has been submitted on or after 5 September 2022. As a transitional measure, Overseas Entities that own a Qualifying Estate in England & Wales or Scotland will have a six-month window ending on 31 January 2023 to become registered. Where an Overseas Entity has made a disposition of a Qualifying Estate between 28 February 2022 and 31 January 2023, the Overseas Entity must disclose the details of such dispositions to Companies House.  Key Points to Note: The Act prevents an Overseas Entity from acquiring or dealing with a Qualifying Estate if they are not registered on the Register. In England & Wales those Overseas Entities that purchased a Qualifying Estate on or after 1 January 1999 must become registered by 31 January 2023 or they will be committing a criminal offence under the Act. Entry upon the Register at Companies House is now necessary for Overseas Entities to acquire ownership of UK property. Failure to do so will prevent an Overseas Entity from being registered as the new owner of a property at the Land Registry. The Land Registry will also place a restriction on the title to a Qualifying Estate which will prevent the Qualifying Estate from being transferred, charged or let in the future unless registration at Companies House as an Overseas Entity is maintained. It is possible for any member of the public to inspect the register or request a copy of any material on the register, subject to certain personal information which will be kept confidential. Failure to comply with the Act is a criminal offence punishable by fines and imprisonment. Compliance should therefore be taken very seriously. Authors:  Jane Last

Court of Appeal provides clarity as to the question of whether a tenant has a ‘Covid defence’ to a landlord’s claim for rent arrears: Bank of New York Mellon (International) Ltd v Cine-UK Ltd; London Trocadero (2015) LLP v Picturehouse Cinemas Ltd and others [2022] EWCA Civ 1021

August 18, 2022

  The case concerned the combined appeals of Bank of New York Mellon (International) Ltd v Cine-UK Ltd and others [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB) (the “Hengrove case”) and London Trocadero (2015) LLP v Picturehouse Cinemas Ltd and others [2021] EWHC 2591 (Ch) (the “Trocadero case”), in which the tenants sought unsuccessfully to resist their respective landlords' claims for rent for periods when the COVID-19 pandemic meant the demised premises could not be used as a cinema. The Trocadero case involved two leases, dating from 1994 and 2014 respectively, the latter of which followed a reorganisation of the tenants and incorporated all the terms, requirements, covenants and conditions of the 1994 lease for an annual peppercorn rent. No distinction was made between the two leases by the parties or the Court at first instance or upon appeal. In each case, summary judgment was successfully granted in favour of the landlords on the basis that the tenants had no defence to the claim of rent. The tenants subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal against those orders. In both appeals the tenants sought to argue that in respect of the periods when it was unlawful to operate a cinema from the demised premises, the tenants were relieved from the obligation to pay rent for the following reasons: It was fundamental to the basis of the leases that the premises would be capable of lawful use. The effect of the Government regulations making it illegal to use the premises as a cinema caused a failure of that basis, and the tenants would therefore have a claim in unjust enrichment in respect of any rent or other sums paid in the illegal periods. It was an implied term that the tenant should be relieved of the obligation to pay rent where the tenant could not lawfully use the premises as a cinema. In the Trocadero case, it was also an implied term that rents would be payable only when the premises could be used as a cinema with attendance commensurate with the levels anticipated at the time the Trocadero leases were entered. In the Hengrove case, the tenant had an additional ground that it was relieved from the obligation to pay upon a true construction of the rent cesser provision in the lease. A rent cesser provision is a clause in a lease that provides for the suspension of a tenant’s obligation to pay rent under certain circumstances (e.g. where the whole or part of a premises is damaged or destroyed).  In the Hengrove case, the tenant argued that the term “damage” within the lease’s rent cesser provision should be interpreted to include not only physical damage, but also financial / non-physical damage of the nature caused by the pandemic restrictions. At First Instance the Court Found: Hengrove Case The rent cesser clause would only relieve the tenant from the obligation to pay rent in the event that the occupation or use of the property was impeded due to physical damage or destruction affecting the fabric of the building. The most persuasive point in the court’s reaching this view being that the tenant’s construction of the clause (extending beyond physical damage) did not fit the words used whether taken alone or in the context of the lease as a whole. There should not be a term implied into the lease that there should be an equivalent rent cesser in the circumstances, where: (i) COVID and the COVID Regulations were unprecedented, and unforeseen, but had forced the closure of the premises; and (ii) the Landlord had chosen to insure so that the Insured Risks extended to such matters, and had done so at the expense of the Tenants, and in the context where the Leases (and the Insurance) provided for cover to include loss of Rent. This was particularly the case given that (1) the lease was a lengthy standard form professional document which went into great detail about a range of circumstances, with express provisions as to rent cesser limited to physical deterioration, but did not include the term contended for, and (2) the implied term was not necessary to give the lease business efficacy and worked well without it. The tenant had not established that the effect of it not being able to operate from the premises in accordance with the Permitted Use resulted in a partial failure of consideration which relieved it from its liability to pay rent. Trocadero Case The Trocadero tenants advanced similar arguments to the Hengrove tenant which were also rejected by the Court. The Trocadero tenant also advanced the argument of failure of basis leading to unjust enrichment. This argument being that the leases had been temporarily frustrated during the lockdown periods at which time the premises could not be used as a cinema (the argued “basis” on which the parties entered into the leases), resulting in rents not being payable during this time. The Court held that this failed due to fact that, taking into account the terms of the leases, the use of the premises was not “fundamental to the basis” on which the parties entered into the leases. The Judge reiterated that the question of whether something was “fundamental to the basis” was to be answered by taking into account the specific terms of the leases and the allocation of risk between the parties. The Court subsequently held that the alleged failure of basis would interfere with the agreed express allocation of risk between the parties and would be inconsistent with the terms of the leases. Upon Appeal The Court of Appeal: Rejected the rent cesser defence in the Hengrove case. The Court held that the rent cesser provision operated only where there was physical damage or destruction to the property by an Insured Risk (as defined within the lease). This was the correct construction of the provision taken as a whole within the lease. The Court also confirmed that the high court had been right to conclude the insurance taken out by the landlord was to insure against financial loss to the landlord’s business as a property owner, where the tenant was not legally obliged to pay the rent (such as where the rent cesser provision applied) and not where the tenant had chosen not to pay.    Rejected the proposed implied terms. In the appeal judgment it was emphasised that where the underlying contracts are detailed documents prepared by lawyers, the scope for implied terms is limited. The Court concluded that both leases worked ‘perfectly well’ without the implied term(s), and allocated the risk that the premises could not be used for their intended purpose to the tenant, so that the tenant was obliged to continue to pay rent where the rent cesser provisions were not available. The Court concluded further that there was nothing unworkable or incoherent about the allocation of risk. And further, that none of the alleged implied terms could be implied into the leases because they were inconsistent with the express terms of the leases, in the sense that they sought to reallocate the allocation of risk set out in the bargain which the parties made. It also concluded that none of the proposed implied terms satisfied the business efficacy or obviousness tests required to be fulfilled in order for an implied term to be considered valid. Business Efficacy test: will only be satisfied where, without the implied term, the contract would lack commercial or practical coherence. The Court concluded that the leases worked well without the implied terms, and that the proposed term(s) sought to imply into the respective leases a broader cesser of rent provision than the express terms of the leases permitted. Both leases allocated the risk that the premises cannot be used for their intended purpose to the tenant, so that the tenant is obliged to continue to pay rent where the cesser of rent provisions were not applicable Obviousness test: the term which it is sought to imply has to be precisely expressed and must be so obvious to go without saying. The Court emphasised that it was clear that the parties to the leases had turned their minds to what would happen if the premises could not be used by the tenant and that, within the detailed lease documents, had chosen not to make more extensive cesser of rent provisions. This made it doubtful a term to the contrary was obviously implied into the contract. The second implied term alleged in the Trocadero case was also unworkable as there was no evidence or material available from which the Court could assess anticipated cinema attendance levels, and the Court added, even where expert evidence might have been provided, it might well have been disputed – ‘an impossible scenario for the implication of a term’. Rejected the ‘failure of basis’ (unjust enrichment claim). The Court clarified that as both appeals concerned subsisting contracts, the limitations on the application of the law of unjust enrichment identified in by Carr LJ in Dargamo Holdings Limited v Avonwick Holding Limited [2021] EWCA Civ 1149 applied.That being, (i) a claim in unjust enrichment could not contradict the terms of the contract and (ii) for a failure of consideration to be made out despite the existence and performance of a valid contract, it was necessary to identify a ‘gap’ in the contract. The judge held that there was no “gap” in the leases which required filling by the law of unjust enrichment. The Court emphasised that the leases contained a carefully worked out contractual regime for the allocation of risk and the “proposed failure of basis” would subvert that regime and contradict the terms of the contracts in a way in which the law does not permit. The Court further clarified that, in the Hengrove and Trocadero cases, it was clear that the consideration for the obligation to pay rent was the demise of the premises for, in each case, a 35 year term, giving the tenant exclusive possession. Conclusions The Courts have now made clear that it is the tenant who bears the financial burden in such circumstances and that difficulties faced by tenants during the pandemic will not be accommodated at the expense of developing or departing from existing principles or specific legislation. The decision is welcome news to landlords who may have been concerned about limited routes to rent arrears recovery during the Covid-19 moratoriums.

Firm Highlights

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.