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Krista litigates high-stakes disputes and advises clients on a full range of employment issues.

Krista is an experienced employment attorney and litigator. She represents clients in high-stakes disputes in court and arbitration. Krista handles all types of employment litigation, from claims of discrimination and retaliation to cases involving compensation disputes, workplace accommodations, and medical leaves. Krista also litigates a variety of commercial disputes, including breach of contract, fraud, defamation, and consumer privacy cases.

Krista counsels clients on a full range of employment issues, from hiring and discharge to restrictive covenants and compliance with the ever-changing landscape of New York employment law. She helps businesses develop effective workplace strategies to manage employment risks, and skillfully advocates for clients when litigation ensues.

Throughout her career, Krista has devoted considerable time to pro bono work. She has represented individuals in civil rights and consumer fraud litigation and counseled non-profit organizations on employment matters.

Education

  • Georgetown University Law Center (J.D., 2013)
  • Duke University (B.A., 2007)
    • cum laude

Bar Admissions

  • New York

Court Admissions

  • U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
  • U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
  • U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Accolades

  • Best Lawyers® Ones to Watch in America, 2026
  • Consistently providing pro bono legal assistance to those in need through Dorsey’s Pro Bono program

Insights

Blog Post

Amendments to New York City’s Earned Safe and Sick Leave Law

April 6, 2026

Blog Post

Now that a court has enjoined the FTC Non-compete rule, can employers go back to business as usual?

October 10, 2024

Employers who wish to enter into non-compete agreements with their employees breathed a collective sigh of relief on August 20, 2024, when a federal district court struck down the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) new nationwide ban on non-compete agreements (the “Non-Compete Rule” or “Rule”).  Although for now the Federal Trade Commission Act does not prohibit the use of non-compete agreements, employers should be vigilant in seeking to comply with other federal laws and the laws in all fifty states which continue to govern the enforceability of non-compete agreements. In this month’s column, we will analyze the court’s decision striking down the Non-Compete Rule and provide a brief overview of the patchwork of state laws that apply to non-competes.  We will conclude by offering some practical suggestions for employers who wish to use non-compete agreements for their workers in compliance with law. Injunction of the Non-Compete Rule In Ryan, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, Case No. 3:24-cv-00986 (N.D. Tex.), the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas concluded that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the Non-Compete Rule and that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious.  The court set the Rule aside, preventing it from taking effect shortly before its effective date of September 4, 2024.  The Ryan decision prevents the FTC from enforcing the Non-Compete Rule against any company nationwide. The FTC estimates that one in five American Workers—or approximately 30 million workers—is subject to a non-compete agreement.  With few exceptions, the Non-Compete Rule would have prevented employers from entering into non-compete agreements with workers, and would have required employers to rescind existing non-compete agreements for all workers except senior executives.  The Rule therefore would have rescinded tens of millions of non-compete agreements.  It also would have prohibited employers from falsely representing to workers that they were subject to a non-compete clause.  The FTC classified each of these practices as “an unfair method of competition” under the Rule.  See 16 C.F.R. § 910. The court in Ryan conducted its analysis pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).  As the Supreme Court recently explained in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, the APA was enacted “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in the legislation creating their offices.”  144 S. Ct. 2244, 2261 (2024) (quotations omitted).  The APA proscribes procedures for agency action and delineates the contours of judicial review of such action.  When reviewing an agency action, the APA requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be [inter alia] . . .  arbitrary and capricious” or “in excess of” statutory authority.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)–(C). In concluding that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority in implementing the Non-Compete Rule, the court held that the FTC lacks substantive rulemaking authority with respect to unfair methods of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act.  The court rejected the FTC’s position that Section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers it to create substantive rules regarding unfair methods of competition.  The court described Section 6(g) of the Federal Trade Commission Act as a “housekeeping statute,” which authorizes the FTC to promulgate procedural, rather than substantive, rules. The court also held that the Non-Compete Rule is “unreasonably overbroad without a reasonable explanation,” rendering it arbitrary and capricious under the APA.  The court noted that the Non-Compete Rule is broader than any state law, and that the FTC failed to provide evidence or a reasonable basis to support the imposition of such a sweeping ban, rather than targeting specific, harmful non-competes.  The court also criticized the FTC for failing to sufficiently consider less disruptive alternatives to a nationwide ban on non-competes. The FTC currently is considering an appeal.  It has until October 19th to appeal the district court’s decision.  If the FTC appeals, it will face an uphill battle.  The appeal will be decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and ultimately the United States Supreme Court, both of which have recently issued decisions curtailing the power of federal agencies.  Any appeal will also unfold against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Loper Bright, overruling precedent under which courts afforded deference to a federal agency’s interpretation of its own power, commonly referred to as “Chevron deference.”  Thus, courts will not afford deference to the FTC when considering its legal arguments in support of the agency’s authority to promulgate the Non-Compete Rule. Although the court in Ryan set aside the Non-Compete Rule, the decision does not prevent the FTC from continuing to bring enforcement actions against employers who use non-compete agreements.  The FTC remains free to target conduct it considers to be unfair methods of competition by adjudicating the merits of individual non-compete agreements on a case-by-case basis.  Moreover, although no federal law comprehensively addresses the enforceability of employment non-compete agreements, other federal agencies, including the Department of Justice—through its Antitrust Division—and the National Labor Relations Board, have taken hostile positions towards non-compete agreements and other restrictions on employee mobility and have sought to rein in their use.  Proposed legislation to ban or limit non-compete agreements has been introduced in Congress several times in recent years, but such proposals appear to have made little progress. State Non-Compete Laws Now that a court has set aside the FTC’s Non-Compete Rule, employers should focus more of their attention on legislative and administrative actions by the states.  In recent years, states have enacted a flurry of laws limiting the use of non-compete agreements.  At least thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutes in place that restrict the use of non-compete agreements.[1]  California, Oklahoma, North Dakota and Minnesota have near-total bans on non-compete agreements.  Eleven states and the District of Columbia ban non-competes for low-wage workers.  Eight states and the District of Columbia impose notice requirements that must be satisfied in order for non-compete agreements to be enforceable.  In 2022, Colorado severely restricted the use of non-compete agreements and added a criminal sanction to its statute.  Additionally, proposed legislation restricting the use of non-competes is pending in states across country. Many states restrict the use of non-competes in other ways.  State common law imposes additional restrictions on non-competes, both in states with statutory restrictions and those without any.  For example, state common law may govern issues such as the nature and adequacy of consideration, the enforceability of clauses allowing judicial reformation of overbroad agreements, and requirements that a non-compete agreement be reasonable in duration, geographic coverage and scope. A new statute restricting the use of non-competes in New York may be on the horizon.  In 2023, the New York State Legislature passed a bill that would have prohibited most non-competes in New York.  See Senate Bill S.3100-A.  The bill would also have created a private right of action for workers to sue their employers to void unlawful non-competes and allowed them to recover up to $10,000 in damages.  However, New York Governor Kathy Hochul ultimately vetoed the bill, after failing to negotiate an amendment to narrow the ban to apply to low and middle-income workers.  Nevertheless, Governor Hochul has expressed support for a ban on non-competes for middle-class and low-wage workers, leaving open the possibility that more narrowly tailored non-compete legislation may be reintroduced in the future.[2] In addition to legislative activity at the state-level, state attorneys general may bring more enforcement actions against companies that use non-compete agreements, particularly for low-wage workers.  In 2016, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman conducted high-profile investigations into the non-compete policies and practices of three major companies: Law360, a legal publishing company, Jimmy John’s, a gourmet sandwich chain, and Examination Management Services, a nationwide medical information services provider.  As a result of these investigations, all three companies agreed to limit their use of non-compete agreements with respect to lower-level employees.[3] Practice Considerations In light of the decision in Ryan v. Federal Trade Commission, for now employers need not worry about compliance with the Non-Compete Rule, which would have required employers to notify millions of workers that their non-compete agreements were unenforceable.  However, employers should continue to be mindful of potential government enforcement actions and compliance with state law.  Employers should review their non-compete agreements and assess whether they are necessary to protect legitimate business interests, such as confidential information or goodwill.  Employers should consider whether less restrictive means will suffice to protect their legitimate interests, including the use of garden leave (wherein an employer pays the departing employee not to compete during the restricted period), non-solicitation and confidentiality agreements, and policies and practices restricting the use and disclosure of confidential information. For multi-state employers, given the present patchwork of state laws governing non-compete agreements across the country, crafting a one-size-fits-all non-compete agreement for employees in different states is an increasingly complex task.  Employers seeking to use a single form of agreement may craft agreements imposing a lowest common denominator approach, essentially allowing the most restrictive state laws to govern all or most of their workers.  Even in such agreements, employers will often expressly exempt application to workers in states where non-competes are not enforceable, such as California.  Employers may instead choose to use several forms of agreement to take advantage of the laws in states allowing restrictions that are more favorable to the employer.  Employers using multiple forms of non-compete agreement will need to invest in training human resources and benefits professionals in charge of onboarding workers subject to non-competes on when and how the various forms of agreement should be used. Reprinted with permission from the October 3, 2024 edition of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL © 2024 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALMReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com. [1] Economic Innovation Group, State Noncompete Law Tracker: https://eig.org/state-noncompete-map/. [2] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/22/nyregion/kathy-hochul-veto-noncompete.html. [3] https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2016/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-jimmy-johns-stop-including-non-compete (Jimmy John’s and Law360); https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2016/ag-schneiderman-agreement-ends-non-compete-agreements-employees-national-medical (Examination Management Services).

Firm Highlights

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EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.

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The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?