.

Client Alert

Justice Department Eliminates Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VI

December 30, 2025

by Alex Hontos, Jack Sullivan, and Matthew Gillespie

Download as a PDF

Share this page

On December 9, 2025, the Justice Department (“DOJ”) issued a final rule eliminating disparate impact liability from its enforcement regulations for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the “Final Rule”),1 overturning a 50-year-old regulatory regime. Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance, which is broadly defined.

What is “disparate-impact liability” and why did DOJ make this change?

Disparate-impact liability refers to a theory of liability for discriminatory conduct that has the “effect of” discriminating against protected classes of individuals, in contrast to intentionally discriminatory acts or policies. DOJ’s move follows an April 23, 2025 executive order directing federal agencies to “deprioritize enforcement of all statutes and regulations to the extent they include disparate-impact liability” and to “repeal or amend” Title VI regulations that implement disparate-impact liability.2 DOJ implemented these revisions without notice-and-comment rulemaking based on the Administrative Procedure Act’s exception for rules “relating to agency management or personnel or to public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.”3

DOJ is not the only federal enforcement agency to reject disparate-impact liability in response to the April 2025 executive order. On September 15, 2025, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued an internal directive instructing investigators across the country to close all pending charges based on alleged disparate impacts in employment cases, which are subject to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

What does the Final Rule actually do?

The Final Rule removed the “disparate-impact prohibition” to DOJ’s Title VI implementing regulations. These regulations previously prohibited federal funds recipients from “utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination” due to race, color, or national origin, or that “have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.”4 In so doing, the Final Rule removes DOJ’s authority to pursue Title VI cases based on a theory of unintentionally discriminatory conduct that results in a disparate impact on individuals based on race, color, or national origin.

The Final Rule also specifically addressed the applicability of disparate-impact liability in certain contexts. For example, the Final Rule removed regulations prohibiting federal funds recipients from engaging in employment practices that “tend[ed] . . . to exclude persons from participation in, to deny them the benefits of, or to subject them to discrimination under the program.”5 Similarly, the Final Rule eliminated a restriction on federal funds recipients’ placement of facilities in locations that have the “effect of excluding individuals from, denying them the benefits of, or subjecting them to discrimination” based on protected status.6

In addition to repealing regulations providing for liability based on disparate impact, the Final Rule also removed the obligation for programs with a history of discrimination to take “affirmative action” to remedy the effects of such discrimination. Before the Final Rule took place, DOJ’s Title VI regulations obligated recipients of federal funds that administered programs that “previously discriminated against persons on the ground of race, color, or national origin” to “take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination.”7 Even absent such discriminatory history, federal funds recipients could still “take affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions” that limited protected classes’ participation.8 Under DOJ’s new Title VI regulations, this language is omitted, and the explanation to the Final Rule suggests such “affirmative action” could, in fact, lead to liability for “promot[ing] potentially illegal race, color, and national origin discrimination.”

Notably, however, the Final Rule does not foreclose the use of disparate-impact data to prove intentional discrimination—and, in fact, the Final Rule specifically provides that “data on disparate outcomes” can still serve “as a potential indicator of intentional discrimination.”9 To that end, the Final Rule does not undermine the existing framework for proving intentional discrimination via a facially neutral policy as expressed in Arlington Heights (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977)). The Court in Arlington Heights provided that courts look to several factors in weighing whether there is intentional discrimination, including disparate impact.10 The Final Rule does not appear to—or purport to—undermine this framework.

How should federal funds recipients respond?

The immediate effect of the Final Rule is more academic than practical: because there is no private cause of action for disparate-impact discrimination under Title VI, the Final Rule, in effect, simply memorializes DOJ’s preexisting policy not to pursue disparate-impact cases. In so doing, the Final Rule also ensures that DOJ will be forced to prove intentional discrimination even as it asserts novel discrimination theories, such as through use of “proxies” or DEI programming.11 This shift could also result in unintended consequences in other litigation: for example, False Claims Act relators may have greater difficulty pleading and proving claims based on noncompliance with federal civil rights laws without greater evidence of discriminatory intent. Regardless, by memorializing the changes in regulation, the second Trump administration has ensured that these changes will last for at least some time beyond the end of the current presidential term.

Nonetheless, while the Final Rule emphasizes the shift in civil rights enforcement in DOJ, the ongoing relevance of disparate-impact showings in intentional discrimination cases encourages continued caution by federal funds recipients to ensure their programs do not result in potential Title VI liability. To that end, federal funds recipients should continue to monitor and be mindful of the potential civil rights implications of their programming and practices. When faced with potentially hot-button issues, such as around DEI, “proxies,” or affinity groups, federal funds recipients should also fastidiously document their non-discriminatory intent and rationale to guard against potential intentional discrimination claims.

90 Fed. Reg. 57141-01 (Dec. 9, 2025).
Executive Order 14281, 90 Fed. Reg. 17537 (Apr. 23, 2025).
Id.
 
28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2024).
 
28 C.F.R. § 42.104(c) (2024).
 
28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(3) (2024).
 
28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(6) (2024).
 
Id.
 
90 Fed. Reg. 57141-01, 57144 (Dec. 9, 2025).
 
429 U.S. at 265-66, 97 S. Ct. 563-64.
 See, e.g., “DOJ’s New Anti-Discrimination Guidance: Pushing the Legal Envelope?”

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.