.

Blog Post

Privacy Litigation Trends – Back to the Future

October 26, 2023 – The TMCA

by Austin T. Chambers and Deb Howitt

Download as a PDF

Share this page

Plaintiffs look to the past to take action against modern web tracking

As states rapidly enact new consumer privacy legislation, businesses have been working tirelessly to comply with extensive new data protection obligations and build out compliance programs. Despite the fact that these new state laws lack a private right of action for violations associated with online tracking and data sharing, private plaintiffs across the country have found creative workarounds, filing a wide range of novel claims alleging violations of decades-old privacy laws. These claims seek to expand the reach of these older laws to modern technologies, adding a new, dynamic layer to businesses’ privacy concerns.

Driving the explosion in litigation are a series of decisions that have given new life to claims under state and federal wiretap laws and for violation of state constitutional common law privacy rights in the context of common online technologies. As a result, private plaintiffs are increasingly bypassing the broad limitations on private rights of action common to state consumer privacy laws, and making demands that go beyond, or potentially conflict, with the requirements set out in those laws.

For now, many of these actions are relatively novel claims working through lower courts, often on preliminary motions. The causes of action and defenses continue to evolve, and there remains considerable change and uncertainty as these cases develop. However, recent trends suggest that courts are engaging in critical and nuanced evaluations of these claims in the context of popular online advertising and communications technologies.

 

What technologies are the focus of Plaintiffs’ claims?

The key technologies at issue in these cases are online advertising services, social media “pixels,” “chatbots,” and “session-replay” technologies commonly used by businesses with consumer-facing online services.

  • Online advertising, such as display advertising, retargeting, or remarketing services often involve the use of consumer profiles that are accessed and distributed among myriad companies involved in the ad personalization and bidding process.
  • Social media pixels and other integrations allow companies to connect their website with social media services to obtain insights about consumer demographics and other marketing data and to run targeted marketing campaigns on popular social media sites.
  • Chatbots are third party tools that companies add to their sites that allow customers to seek support, find products, and ask questions.
  • Session replay technologies involve the recording of user interactions on sites for usage, debugging, and similar analytical purposes, but which may involve creating a record of user data entered in form fields, or similar information.

In each case, third party providers operate these technologies and are granted access to data relating to the customer’s activity on and other interactions with the business’s online services and, in some cases, communications with the business. In the case of social media pixels, social media companies may have access to information such as the products or content that the user viewed, shopping carts, purchases, and other information revealed by ‘tags’ that companies place on their services. Social media sites then link this information to a user’s social media profile or other information the platform holds about the user, which the business can then use to obtain insights about consumer behavior and to target advertising to similar users on social media sites.

What claims are plaintiffs bringing?

To challenge companies’ use of these technologies, plaintiffs are looking to the past, bringing challenges under state and federal wiretap acts (telephone privacy), under state constitutional or common law privacy (e.g., invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion), and the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”), a relatively obscure 1987 law passed in response to the disclosure of supreme court nominee Robert Bork’s video rental history. Each of these laws permit private claims and provide for statutory damages, which may allow private individuals to bring claims without proof of actual damages.

The federal Wiretap Act (18 USC § 2511) provides a cause of action against “any person who … intentionally intercepts … or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept any wire, oral or electronic communication.” Similarly, California’s Invasion of Privacy Act (Cal. Pen. Code § 631(a)) “CIPA”) provides a cause of action against a person who “attempts to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication” including anyone “who aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with any person or persons” to engage in such conduct. However, both CIPA and the federal wiretap act allow such conduct with the consent of all parties to the communication.

In addition to the wiretap claims, plaintiffs have brought claims under state constitutional or common law for invasion of privacy. For example, in California a person has a cause of action where another person ‘intentionally intrudes into a place, conversation, or matter as to which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and the intrusion is highly offensive to a reasonable person.’

The VPPA (18 USC § 2710) provides a cause of action against a “video tape service provider who knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider” without authorization. While the VPPA was originally intended to address videotape rental services, the VPPA also applies to “any person engaged in the business … or deliver or prerecorded video … tapes or similar audio visual material.”

For each of these claims, plaintiffs fundamentally allege that behavioral and interaction data collected by online services reveals private information, communications, or other information protected by law. For example, in cases where defendants use online advertising or social media pixels, plaintiffs allege that these services allow the website operators, or their advertisers or social media partners, to collect detailed, private information relating to their demographics, preferences, and behaviors. For businesses with video offerings, plaintiffs further allege that the disclosure of information relating to the videos, e.g., the title, violates the VPPA. Similarly, on sites that use chatbots or session replay technologies, plaintiffs often allege these technologies result in the disclosure of protected communications.

The outcome of these claims tend to turn on several of key facts:

In all cases:

Did the plaintiff provide consent?

  • The quintessential defense to each of these claims is the plaintiff’s consent to the collection or disclosure of the information at issue. However, there remains some dispute over the elements of consent required in each case. Important open questions include the means and extent to which a plaintiff was notified of the alleged conduct (e.g., via a standalone notice or general privacy policy), or whether the plaintiff affirmatively opted-in, acknowledged the use, or if legal notices were available for review when the plaintiff used a service.

Was there actual harm?

  • Despite statutory damage provisions, there remain open questions as to whether plaintiffs can bring claims in cases where there is no injury in fact or no allegation of legally cognizable harms. The Supreme Court’s landmark Spokeo and TransUnion cases continue to develop alongside many of these claims.

For wiretap claims:

Does the technology involve the disclosure of communications content?

  • Generally, wiretap claims require the defendant to have intercepted the content of a communication, not merely information relating to the communication (e.g., number dialed, time, etc.). Wiretap laws such as CIPA also cover interception of the meaning of a communication. In the case of behavioral advertising or social media, there is considerable debate as to whether browsing metadata that reveals demographic information, usage history, or information regarding products viewed or purchased reflects a “communication.” Similarly, in cases of session replay technologies, it may be unclear whether actual communications, or mere interaction data were collected, especially where services offer redaction tools that enable operators to exclude communications content, but the redactions are not visible to the public (or in a manner sufficiently apparent at the pleading stage).

Is the party a third party?

  • Where a defendant or their agent is a party to communication, those parties generally cannot be liable under wiretap laws. Therefore, in cases where a service provider is required to provide services only on behalf of a business (i.e., subject to a services agreement and data protection agreement), parties may be able to avoid liability and dismiss claims under wiretap acts under this exception. However, where social media companies or advertisers can use data for their own purposes, it is debatable (and highly context dependent) whether the social media platform could be deemed a party to the communication.

For invasion of privacy claims:

Does the plaintiff have a reasonable expectation of privacy?

  • Foundational to all invasion of privacy claims is the defendant’s reasonable expectation that the information or communication was private. As with wiretap cases, where a business collets only general commercial information or metadata about a communication—but no actual communication—courts are less likely to find that the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Where the volume or nature of data reveals only common, or readily observable behavior, courts are also less likely to find a reasonable expectation of privacy. However, where a business collects detailed search histories or other data that collectively reflects the substance of a communication or significant amounts of information about a person, some courts have found that plaintiffs may have a reasonable expectation that such information would remain private. A defendant’s conduct can also give rise to expectations of privacy, e.g., though the provision of opt-out options, or affirmative statements that certain data would not be collected.

Was the conduct highly offensive?

  • In additional to the plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the defendant’s conduct must be “highly offensive.” There is considerable debate over this element, as courts often must consider vague, and sometimes evolving, social norms. However, in cases where information collected is general commercial information or otherwise non-sensitive, courts often find that such conduct was not offensive enough to support a claim, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s reasonable belief that the information would remain private.

For VPPA claims:

Is the business is a video tape service provider?

  • The VPPA applies only to video tape service providers that are “engaged in the rental, sale, or delivery of prerecorded video cassette tape or similar audio visual materials.” While courts have expanded this to online streaming services and other online video platforms, courts have found that a party may not be a ‘service provider’ where they merely deliver video content (for no fee) or where the video offering is only ancillary to the business (e.g., a video on a marketing website for a consumer products company). Similarly, courts have found that providers offering live content or livestreams are not video service providers.

Is the plaintiff a “consumer”?

  • A consumer for purposes of VPPA is a “renter, purchaser, or subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” Recent VPPA cases have scrutinized the nexus between plaintiffs’ relationships with the business and the video content at issue. In cases where video is neither core to the business nor the subscription or purchase transaction, courts have found that an individual is not a consumer for VPPA purposes. However, where exclusive video content or similar offerings are made to subscribers as part of a purchase, courts are more likely to find a sufficient nexus between the video content and a subscription or other commercial transaction.

Is the disclosed data “personally identifiable”?

  • The VPPA defines personal information “as information that identifies a person as having requested specific video material from the video tape service provider.” This definition is narrower than definitions under modern consumer privacy laws that extend to data that that is identifiable or linked or linkable to a person. Some data from social media services is known to link directly to user profiles that readily identify individuals, and as such may be personally identifiable. However, data that is not directly identifiable, such as anonymous user IDs (isolated from data sufficient to link to a known ID), IP addresses, and the like may not be personally identifiable for purposes of the VPPA.

How should businesses respond?

In response to the wave of cases, businesses should take steps to ensure that they review and evaluate the implementation of common web technologies, in particular those involving social media, advertising, session replay technologies, and video content. Dorsey’s team of privacy lawyers can provide advice and assistance with measures to mitigate the risks of litigation under these novel claims.

Dorsey’s privacy team will continue to monitor these cases and report on updates as courts consider these cases and critical facts continue to develop.

Firm Highlights

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.