Governance & Compliance Insider

In the United States, the process by which shareholders submit proposals to be voted on at a company’s annual meeting has long been a mechanism used to promote often obscure special interests and social issues. In recent years, however, as environmental, social and governance (ESG) topics have become more mainstream, the market has seen a surge in this type of proposal. In 2018, Russell 3000 companies received a record 144 proposals requesting action on social and environmental issues, making this category larger than any other. In a recent article, The Wall Street Journal reported that the increase in support for ESG-related proposals has risen from “middle single digits from 2000 until 2008 to 24% in 2018.” Another record. As we draw closer to the end of the 2019 proxy season, it is clear that the momentum in this area continues. New Fronts in Environmental Proposals In the same article, the WSJ reported on a new front involving proposals focusing on plastic waste, a trend we previously noted in our March chemical industry update. The WSJ further noted that most of the companies that had received the proposal about plastic waste agreed to implement the request in order to avoid including it in their proxy statements. Proposals are often withdrawn when companies and proponents reach a compromise approach. This is a tactic that has risen in popularity in recent years as ESG topics have garnered more support from the broader shareholder base. In another article, the WSJ highlighted this trend, explaining that about 49% of environment-related shareholder proposals were withdrawn last year, compared with 33% two years prior and that “roughly 45% of shareholder proposals related to social issues, including income inequality, political-spending disclosure and animal testing, were withdrawn last year, up from 34% two years earlier.” Another development involves proposals related to climate change. This category itself is not new, and in fact these proposals have dominated in recent years, even gaining majority approval in some cases. This year, however, some companies found a degree of success via the no-action letter process. At least two companies obtained permission from the SEC to exclude a proposal that (if passed) would have required them to disclose how their operations align with the greenhouse gas reduction targets under the Paris Climate Accord. The SEC explained in one of the no-action letters: “the Proposal would micromanage the Company by seeking to impose specific methods for implementing complex policies in place of the ongoing judgments of management as overseen by its board of directors.” This success, however, is limited. The SEC declined to issue no-action letters on other types of climate change proposals, and more carefully crafted proposals are likely to survive review next year. The Future of ESG-related Shareholder Proposals The SEC announced last fall it was conducting a review of the proxy system. The shareholder proposal process was included as one of the areas due for an overhaul. While it remains unclear what form changes may take, it is possible the SEC will issue guidance after this proxy season. Proposed rulemaking could also follow. One anticipated rule change would be to raise the stock ownership threshold required for submitting a shareholder proposal (currently, a de minimis $2,000 in shares). Another would be to increase resubmission thresholds. Such steps will certainly make a dent in the number of overall proposals, particularly from shareholders who don’t have a financially meaningful stake in a company. However, many ESG proposals—such as the new ones about plastic waste—are backed by non-governmental organizations who either have meaningful resources themselves or who partner with larger shareholders. As such, absent some broader change to the shareholder proposal process (such as expanding the bases on which companies can seek to exclude proposals), we don’t expect the popularity of ESG-related shareholder proposals to diminish anytime soon.

On February 11, 2019, the Staff of the Division of Corporation Finance granted no-action relief permitting Johnson & Johnson to omit a shareholder proposal from its proxy statement.  The shareholder proposal requested mandatory arbitration of shareholder claims arising under the federal securities laws. The Staff relied on Rule 14a-8(i)(2), which permits exclusion of a proposal that, if implemented, would cause the company to violate any state, federal or foreign law to which it is subject.  Johnson & Johnson argued that the proposal, if implemented, would result in a violation of both federal and state law, but the SEC granted no-action relief specifically on the basis of state law.  Among the company's submissions, the Staff recognized of the legal authority of the New Jersey Attorney General, who issued an opinion that implementation of the proposal would result in a New Jersey state law violation. The decision was sufficiently significant that SEC Chair Jay Clayton issued an accompanying statement, noting that mandatory arbitration provisions have garnered a great deal of attention, and that it is a complex matter requiring careful consideration. Chairman Clayton supported the Staff's recommendation, citing the New Jersey Attorney General's submission.  Chairman Clayton also agreed with the Staff's decision not to address the legality of mandatory shareholder arbitration under federal securities laws, and he expressed the view that any SEC policy decision on this subject should be made by the Commission instead of the Staff. Rule 14a-8(i)(2) permits the exclusion of shareholder proposals that would result in a violation of any state, federal or foreign law, including but not limited to corporate and securities laws.  Other examples where the Rule 14a-8(i)(2) exception has been successfully invoked include a written consent proposal that violated state laws requiring unanimous shareholder written consent (Lowe's Companies (March 10, 2011)) and a proposal to amend governing documents to require that at least 50% of board nominees shall be minorities (Safeway Inc. (March 28, 2005)). As with Rule 14a-8(i)(1), which permits exclusion of proposals that are not proper subjects for shareholder action, the company must provide a supporting opinion of counsel when the basis for exclusion is a matter of state or foreign law, and in cases involving Delaware law, the Staff may request a legal interpretation from the Delaware Supreme Court.  The Staff will permit proponents to convert mandatory proposals into precatory proposals if the mandatory nature of the proposal creates the potential violation.

In order to facilitate discussion on the role of proxy advisory firms at the upcoming Roundtable on the Proxy Process, which is scheduled for November 2018, the SEC staff has determined to withdraw two no action letters that provided comfort to investment advisers in relying on proxy advisory firm recommendations: In Egan-Jones Proxy Services (May 27, 2004), the staff had confirmed that by voting based on the recommendations of an independent proxy advisory firm, an investment adviser could demonstrate the absence of a conflict of interest, and the fulfillment of fiduciary duties, provided that the investment adviser should first ascertain, among other things, whether the proxy advisory firm "(a) has the capacity and competency to adequately analyze proxy issues and (b) can make such recommendations in an impartial manner and in the best interests of the adviser's clients." In Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc. (September 15, 2004), the staff had confirmed that investment advisers should evaluate the independence of proxy advisory firms based on the facts and circumstances, and that a number of ways include a thorough review of the firm's conflict procedures and the effectiveness of their implementation; case-by-case evaluation of the proxy advisory firm's relationship with issuers; or other means to ensure the integrity of the firm. The withdrawal of these no action letters opens up for discussion, and creates uncertainty around, the circumstances in which investors may rely on proxy advisory firm recommendations and when a firm may be considered independent.  The withdrawal is the latest development in the call for additional rulemaking around proxy advisory firms.  Last December, the House passed the Corporate Governance Reform and Transparency Act of 2017, which would require proxy advisory firms to register with the SEC, disclose potential conflicts of interest and codes of ethics and publicize methodologies for formulating proxy recommendations.  Then earlier this year, six members of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee sent letters to ISS and Glass Lewis requesting information regarding their eligibility for exemption from proxy rules, accuracy of reporting and potential conflicts of interest. The SEC staff has not to date signaled any changes to its guidance in Staff Legal Bulletin No.20, which among other topics, addresses considerations that an investment adviser may wish to take when it retains a proxy advisory firm, an investment adviser's ongoing duty to oversee a proxy advisory firm that it retains, and an investment adviser's duties to ascertain the material accuracy of the facts upon which a firm's recommendations are based. The impact of proxy advisory firms' recommendations on institutional investor voting is debated.  A study by Choi, Fisch and Kahan (2010) found that proxy advisory firms have modest influence on voting outcomes, with an estimate that ISS recommendations shift 6%-10% of investor voting.  Similarly, a survey by Rivel (2016) found that only 7% of institutional investors say that proxy advisory firms are the "most influential" contributors to their policies, and that generally established best practices are the primary source of their voting policies and decisions.  A study by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016) of 143 institutional investors concluded that they rely on the advice of proxy advisory firms to complement their decision making, rather than relying on them exclusively. However, investor voting decisions often are highly correlated with proxy advisory firm recommendations.  According to a report published by the Manhattan Institute in May 2018, a sample of voting records for 713 institutional investors in 2017 showed that they are significantly likely to vote in accordance with proxy advisory firm recommendations across a broad spectrum of governance issues.  For example, 95% of institutional investors vote in favor of a say on pay proposal when ISS recommends for it, while only 68% vote in favor when ISS is opposed. This correlation may suggest that proxy advisory firms have more influence than institutional investors appreciate or acknowledge.  It may also indicate that governance practitioners form a community, whether they work for investors or proxy advisory firms, and that they develop and are influenced by a common set of trends and "best practices," resulting in investor voting policies that synch with ISS or Glass Lewis voting policies.

As the 2017 proxy season winds down, one clear take-away is that shareholder proposals attempting to modify the terms of previously adopted mainstream proxy access bylaws did not fare well. Many of these proposals focused solely on the aggregation limit, seeking to increase the number of shareholders (usually 20) that are required to meet the minimum ownership threshold (usually 3% of outstanding shares) in order to nominate a director using the company’s proxy statement. Other proposals tried to amend multiple terms of the proxy access bylaw in order to make the provisions more shareholder-friendly. To date, none of these so-called “fix-it” amendments to mainstream proxy access provisions has received majority support, and the average support for all such proposals has been less than 30%. In addition, some companies were able to exclude proposals to amend the aggregation limits from their proxy statements by making a case under the SEC no-action process that the proposal had been “substantially implemented” where the company could provide specific information to support the view that it already had a meaningful proxy access right in place. Other companies facing fix-it amendments to multiple provisions were successful in excluding the proposal as “substantially implemented” where the company acted to adopt one or more of the amendments. See our prior memo here: Recent Developments in Proxy Access. Meanwhile, the trend of adopting mainstream proxy access provisions continues apace. Approximately 175 additional companies have adopted proxy access provisions since the end of the 2016 proxy season, and virtually all shareholder proposals seeking the adoption of proxy access bylaws have received majority support this year. More than 60% of companies in the S&P 500 now have some form of proxy access provision. The mainstream model adopted by a broad range of these companies allows shareholders owning 3% of shares outstanding for at least 3 years to nominate up to 20% of the board (or at least two members) with an aggregation limit of 20 shareholders to reach the ownership threshold. The ability of the mainstream model to withstand fix-it shareholder proposals this proxy season bodes well for this approach and may discourage fix-it proposals in future years.

On January 6, 2017, the SEC Staff granted no-action relief that would allow companies to exclude shareholder proposals preventing management or the board from accessing preliminary voting results on uncontested matters prior to the annual meeting, including a running tally of votes for and against, and using that information to solicit votes. See, The Boeing Company, Ferro Corporation, Honeywell International Inc., L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc., NiSource Inc., and Praxair, Inc. Under the shareholder proposals, this enhanced confidential voting requirement would apply to management or board-sponsored resolutions seeking approval of executive pay or for other purposes, including votes mandated under applicable stock exchange rules; proposals required by law, or the company’s bylaws, such as say-on-pay votes; and Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals included in the proxy. The proposals would not apply to director elections, or contested proxy solicitations, except at the board’s discretion, and they would not prevent companies from monitoring voting for purposes of achieving a quorum.  In its no-action letters, the companies cited a history of relief granted for shareholder proposals that seek to restrict management’s access to preliminary voting results, to manage the conduct of annual shareholder meetings, and to restrict a company’s solicitation of its shareholders. The Staff concluded that the companies may rely on the “ordinary business” basis for exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(7), and noted that each proposal “relates to the monitoring of preliminary voting results with respect to matters that may relate to [the company’s] ordinary business.”  The Staff does not conclude that the monitoring of preliminary voting results and the solicitation of votes per se are part of ordinary business operations, which leaves open the question of whether the proposals would survive if they were limited to matters that the Staff deems unrelated to the company’s ordinary business.  This series of no-action letters represents the latest volley in the debate over the disparity between boards and management versus shareholder proponents, in terms of their ability to access voting information and to communicate with shareholders on proposals. As described in the 1998 amendments to Rule 14a-8, the underlying policy of the “ordinary business” basis for exclusion is “to confine the resolution of ordinary business problems to management and board of directors, since it is impracticable for shareholders to decide how to solve such problems at an annual shareholders meeting.” There are two frequently cited considerations for evaluating whether an activity is within the ken of “ordinary business”: (1) whether the tasks are “so fundamental to management’s ability to run a company on a day-to-day basis that they could not, as a practical matter, be subject to direct shareholder oversight,” and (2) whether the proposals seek to “micro-manage” the company by “probing too deeply into matters of a complex nature upon which shareholders, as a group, would not be in a position to make an informed judgment.”

As the 2017 proxy season begins to unfold, proxy access continues to be a focus of shareholder proposals. Last year, companies that had already adopted mainstream proxy access bylaws, or that were planning to put mainstream proxy access bylaws up for a shareholder vote, were largely successful in being able to exclude shareholder proposals to adopt proxy access bylaws on the grounds that such proposals had already been “substantially implemented.” This year, companies have received a wave of new shareholder proposals seeking to amend their existing proxy access bylaws. Until recently, the SEC staff had generally denied requests to exclude such proposals. In two recent no-action letters, however, the staff has provided relief where the company adopted several of the requested amendments. In addition, for the first time in the United States, a shareholder attempted to use a proxy access bylaw to nominate a director candidate and to have that candidate included in the company’s proxy statement. Read more about these recent developments in our full summary here: https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2016/12/recent-developments-in-proxy-access

On November 10, 2016, GAMCO Asset Management filed a Schedule 13D/A and 14N announcing that it had used the proxy access bylaw at National Fuel Gas to nominate a director candidate for election to NFG’s board at the upcoming 2017 annual meeting of shareholders.  This nomination appears to be the first use of proxy access bylaws by a shareholder to nominate a director in the United States.  NFG adopted its proxy access bylaw in March of 2016.  Given the recent trend of companies adopting bylaws to grant proxy access to shareholders (approximately 40% of S&P 500 companies) and recent decisions by the Staff of the SEC Division of Corporate Finance to allow "fix-it" shareholder proposals to modify secondary features of proxy access bylaws (see, for example, H&R Block’s Rule 14a-8 No-Action Letter), we expect that more companies will be granting proxy access to shareholder nominees in the coming years. Companies should review their director nomination process and shareholder access bylaws as part of their preparations for annual report and proxy season to be prepared to adequately address potential shareholder nominations.