Governance & Compliance Insider

ISS released its annual update of frequently asked questions on its US Compensation Policies on December 20, 2018 (preliminary updates had been released in November). The updates are effective for shareholder meetings occurring on or after February 1, 2019. There are nine new or materially updated questions, which are summarized below: #19 Will any of the quantitative pay-for-performance screens change in 2019?  No.  The screens will continue to use GAAP/accounting performance measures, but ISS will display Economic Value Added (EVA) measures on a phased-in basis over the 2019 proxy season and will continue to explore their future use to add insight to financial performance.  (EVA can measure a company's residual wealth by deducting its cost of capital from its operating profit, adjusted for taxes on a cash basis.) #21 Given the use of TSR in ISS' quantitative screen, does ISS prefer companies use TSR as an incentive program metric?  While it recognizes investors' preference for objective and transparent metrics, ISS does not endorse or prefer the use of total shareholder return (TSR) or any specific metric in executive incentive programs. #42 How does ISS analyze "front-loaded" awards intended to cover future years?  ISS is unlikely to support grants that cover more than four years (ie, the grant date plus three future years), and for these types of grants, commitments not to grant additional awards over the covered period should be firm.  Usual pay-for-performance considerations will be more closely scrutinized. #47 Which problematic practices are mostly likely to result in an adverse recommendation?  Additional problematic pay practices that are likely to result in adverse vote recommendations on compensation committee members and/or say on pay proposals now include: (1) excessive termination payments (not just change in control payments) exceeding three times base pay and annual bonus, and (2) a "good reason" termination definition that presents windfall risks. #48 How does ISS evaluate "Good Reason" termination definitions?  ISS will scrutinize "Good Reason" definitions to ensure that the circumstances are reasonably viewed as an adverse constructive termination, and to determine whether there is a potential windfall risk.  Circumstances reflecting potential performance failures, such as bankruptcy or delisting, will be considered problematic. #50 If a company becomes a "smaller reporting company" under the SEC's revised definition, how will ISS assess reduction in compensation disclosure?  ISS notes that smaller reporting companies (SRCs) are still required to hold say on pay votes, and so while they may use scaled compensation disclosure requirements, SRCs should continue to provide sufficient disclosure to enable investors to make an informed say on pay vote.  This means that SRCs should think carefully before eliminating CD&As, and at minimum, ensure that there is sufficient narrative for shareholders to meaningfully assess compensation philosophy and practices. #59 How would ISS view any compensation program changes made in light of the removal of 162(m) deductions?  While shifts away from performance-based compensation to discretionary or fixed pay elements did not make the list of problematic pay practices most likely to result in an adverse recommendation, ISS will still consider these shifts to be problematic pay practices and will view them negatively. #67 How does ISS apply its policy around "excessive" levels of non-employee director pay?   If ISS determines that a NED’s pay is a quantitative pay outlier (see FAQ below), it will perform a qualitative evaluation of the company’s disclosed rationale to determine if concerns are adequately mitigated.  The updated FAQs list a number of circumstances that will typically mitigate concern around high non-employee director (NED) pay, including onboarding grants, special payments related to corporate transactions or special circumstances, and payments for specialized scientific expertise as may be necessary in certain industries.  As a reminder, last year, ISS had announced a policy to recommend against board members responsible for approving NED pay when there is a recurring pattern of excessive pay magnitude without a compelling rationale in two or more consecutive years.  ISS subsequently updated its methodology to identify pay outliers, and in consideration of the updates, ISS had postponed issuing adverse recommendations until meetings occurring on or after February 1, 2020. #68 What is ISS' methodology to identify non-employee director pay outliers?  The updated FAQs clarify that the methodology identifies pay outliers above the top 2-3% (vs the top 5%) of all comparable directors within the same two-digit GICS group and index grouping (eg, S&P 500).  The revised methodology acknowledges that there are pay premiums for non-executive chairs and lead independent directors, and in limited instances, the methodology also makes allowances for narrow distributions of NED pay, where there is not a pronounced difference in pay between the top 2-3% of directors and the median director.

A recent SEC consent order against The Dow Chemical Company reminds companies that when evaluating whether or not to disclose a payment or benefit to an executive as a perk in a proxy statement, the fact that the item has a tangential business purpose, or is convenient for the company, is insufficient grounds to exclude the item as a perk.  In order to be excluded as a perk, the item must be "integrally and directly" related to the performance of the executive's duties.  Examples of items that typically should be classified as perks include country club memberships for mixed business and personal use, commuting expenses, and personal guests who join a business flight on the corporate jet. While companies may perceive individual perks as insignificant or as justifiable business expenses, these items can be significant in the aggregate, in hindsight and through a regulatory lens.  The consistent failure to disclose perks over a period of years may result in Commission sanctions and negative publicity, particularly for larger public companies and for companies who for a variety of reasons are the subject of closer Commission scrutiny. As background, on July 2, 2018, the SEC entered into a consent order against Dow, settling claims that from 2011 through 2015, the company did not adequately evaluate and disclose approximately $3 million in executive perks as "other compensation" in its proxy statements.  These authorized but undisclosed perks included personal use of the Dow aircraft and other expenses.  The consent order notes that though Dow applied procedures regarding the evaluation and disclosure of its executives' perks, it did not follow the Commission's standard regarding disclosure of perks, which provides that: • An item is not a perquisite or personal benefit if it is integrally and directly related to the performance of the executive’s duties. • Otherwise an item is a perquisite or personal benefit if it confers a direct or indirect benefit that has a personal aspect without regard to whether it may be provided for some business reason or for the convenience of the company, unless it is generally available on a non-discriminatory basis to all employees. Instead, the consent order finds, Dow incorrectly applied a standard whereby a business purpose related to the executive’s job was sufficient to determine that a benefit would not be a perquisite that required disclosure. Notably, the consent order also sanctions Dow for its disclosure controls.  According to the order, Dow did not adequately train employees in key roles, including those tasked with drafting the CD&A section of the proxy statement and compiling the executive compensation tables, to ensure that the proper standard was applied for perks disclosure.  Dow also had inadequate processes and procedures to ensure proper reporting of perks.  In addition to a $1.75 million penalty, the consent order requires Dow to hire an independent consultant for one year to review and make recommendations on Dow's policies, procedures, controls and training related to the evaluation of whether payments and other expense reimbursements should be disclosed as perks under securities laws.  

Human nature being what it is, the law, in its wisdom, does not presume that directors will be competent judges of the fair treatment of their company where fairness must be at their own personal expense.[1] According to the Delaware Supreme Court in In re Investors Bancorp, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, when equity awards are granted to directors under a stockholder-approved equity incentive plan that gives directors discretion to determine the size of the awards, the awards are subject to the “entire fairness” standard of review. This decision may expand stockholder litigation in the area of director compensation. When reading the recent opinion issued by the Delaware Supreme Court in In re Investors Bancorp, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, it is tempting to regard the dispute as a perfect example of “pigs get fat, hogs get slaughtered” and minimize the issues raised by the case. After all, on the heels of stockholder approval of an equity compensation plan, the 12-person Bancorp Board awarded themselves over $51 million in equity grants from plan; the non-employee directors each received grants valued at approximately $2 million (as compared to average awards of approximately $176,000 for non-employee directors at peer companies). Your company’s board, you tell yourself confidently, would never act in such a manner. However, even the most prudent of Boards needs to consider the implications from the In re Investors Bancorp decision. But first, let’s step back and look at a bit of background in the case: In June 2015, stockholders approved Bancorp’s Equity Incentive Plan (the “EIP”), which reserved 30,881,296 common shares for various types of equity grants for the Company’s 1,800 officers, employees, non-employee directors, and service providers, of which up to 30% were available to be granted to non-employee directors. Two weeks following stockholder approval of the EIP, the Board approved the grants noted above. Disclosure of the equity grants resulted in three stockholder complaints being filed in the Court of Chancery alleging breach of fiduciary duties by the directors for awarding themselves excessive compensation. The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint because the EIP contained “meaningful, specific limits on awards to all director beneficiaries.” In other words, because stockholders approved the EIP, which the Court of Chancery noted contained meaningful limits, the ratification defense came into play, which allowed the Board’s actions to be reviewed under the business judgement standard. In December, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery’s decision and determined that the “entire fairness” standard applied. The Delaware Supreme Court noted that because director compensation determinations are inherently self-interested, those decisions will be reviewed under the business judgment rule only where fully-informed stockholders approve (i) specific compensation decisions or (ii) self-executing plans (plans with fixed criteria). However, if a stockholder-approved equity incentive plan gives directors discretion within general parameters when compensating themselves, then the “entire fairness” standard is appropriate. As the Supreme Court noted: We think, however, when it comes to the discretion directors exercise following stockholder approval of an equity incentive plan, ratification cannot be used to foreclose the Court of Chancery from reviewing those further discretionary actions when a breach of fiduciary duty claim has been properly alleged. As the Court of Chancery emphasized in Sample, using an expression coined many years ago, director action is “twice-tested,” first for legal authorization, and second by equity. When stockholders approve the general parameters of an equity compensation plan and allow directors to exercise their “broad legal authority” under the plan, they do so “precisely because they know that that authority must be exercised consistently with equitable principles of fiduciary duty.” The stockholders have granted the directors the legal authority to make awards. But, the directors’ exercise of that authority must be done consistent with their fiduciary duties. Given that the actual awards are self-interested decisions not approved by the stockholders, if the directors acted inequitably when making the awards, their “inequitable action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible” under the general authority granted by the stockholders. So, what does this mean for Boards and Compensation Committees? If designing a new equity incentive plan, or amending an existing plan, consider whether self-executing awards to non-employee directors are appropriate or desired. If self-executing awards are not desired, determine if the plan contains significant and meaningful limitations on awards, as this might assist with the defense against a claim that the Board violated its fiduciary duties. If equity awards to directors are unusual in size compared to prior awards, consider making the awards subject to stockholder ratification at the next stockholders’ meeting. Have the Board and Compensation Committee pay close attention to compensation at peer companies and its own historical pay practices. Significant deviations from either may be more likely to trigger stockholder litigation under the new standards.   [1] Footnote 2 to Investors Bancorp opinion, citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 (1952)

At last Friday's ABA annual meeting, Bill Hinman (with the standard disclaimer that he is speaking for himself and not on behalf of the SEC) confirmed that the SEC will not be delaying implementation of the CEO pay ratio rule, which will require most public companies to report the pay ratio in their 2018 proxy statements, for the first fiscal year beginning on or after Jan. 1, 2017.  (Foreign private issuers, MJDS filers, emerging growth companies and smaller reporting companies are exempt from the rule.)  Bill Hinman is the Director of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance. Director Hinman also mentioned that the Division will be issuing additional guidance on the CEO pay ratio rule in the near future.  This earlier blog entry includes a summary of the SEC's previous guidance on implementing the CEO pay ratio rule. In a recent Compensation Standards survey, Liz Dunshee reported on trending practices in pay ratio preparation.

The SEC's semi-annual update of its rulemaking docket was released on July 20. Overall, the SEC has cut its rulemaking agenda by about half under the Trump administration. A number of long-anticipated Dodd-Frank rulemakings on executive compensation disclosure are missing from the docket: Pay Versus Performance Listing Standards for Recovery of Erroneously Awarded Compensation (Clawbacks) Disclosure of Hedging by Employees, Officers and Directors Incentive Compensation at Financial Institutions. Likewise, the Universal Proxy rulemaking was missing. Still on the docket of proposed rulemakings: Amendments to the XBRL Program Business and Financial Disclosures required by Regulation S-K Guide 3 Bank Holding Company Disclosure Reporting of Proxy Votes on Executive Compensation and Other Matters Concept Release on Possible Revisions to Audit Committee Disclosures Rulemaking to Simplify Regulation S-K Provisions Governing Non-Financial Disclosures

For U.S. and Canadian companies with annual meetings to be held between September 16, 2017, and January 31, 2018, the window for alerting Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) about changes to self-selected peer groups used for executive compensation benchmarking closes this Friday, July 21st, at 8:00 pm EDT. Information on self-selected peer groups may influence ISS as it constructs the peer groups that it uses in its pay for performance analysis in its voting reports. According to the ISS press release, companies that have made no changes to their previous proxy-disclosed executive compensation benchmarking peers, or companies that do not wish to provide this information in advance, do not need to participate. For companies that do not submit changes, the proxy-disclosed peers from the company’s last proxy filing will automatically be factored into ISS’ peer group construction process. More information on ISS’ peer group selection process, including a link to the form for submitting peer group changes, is available here.

This week, during his opening remarks at the 2017 National Conference of the Society for Corporate Governance, SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar remarked on prospects for repealing or delaying the CEO pay ratio rule. Under the rule, most public companies must disclose the median of the annual total compensation of all employees (including non-U.S., part-time, temporary and seasonal workers), except for the CEO; the annual total compensation of the CEO; and the ratio of the two amounts, as calculated under proxy rules. The disclosure must be prepared for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2017, which would be disclosed in 2018 proxy statements. Emerging growth companies, smaller reporting companies and foreign issuers are not subject to the rule. Commissioner Piwowar expressed his support for repealing the rule, which would require Congressional action. In terms of delaying effectiveness of the rule, he stated that public commentary would determine whether that alternative is feasible in light of the associated costs and benefits of implementing the rule. Though the latest comment period on the rule has ended, he urged interested parties to continue to submit comment letters describing specific reasons why the rule is burdensome, as well as proposed fixes. During the latest comment period, the SEC received approximately 180 unique comments, with 150 of those comments in favor of the rule. Given the approaching 2018 proxy season, we advise companies not to count on a repeal or delay of the rule. Companies should continue preparing for the CEO pay ratio disclosure, and keep in mind that there is significant latitude for how the ratio may be calculated, in accordance with Item 402(u) of Regulation S-K and related guidance in C&DIs 128C.01-128C.05. In particular: The median employee, which must be identified once every three years absent a significant change, may be identified from a survey of the entire employee population, a statistical sample or other reasonable method. A de minimis exemption allows companies to exclude non-U.S. employees who account for 5% or less of their employees, including employees whose inclusion would result in a violation of foreign privacy data laws. If certain employees are excluded, then all employees from that jurisdiction must be excluded. Companies may use a consistently applied compensation measure (“CACM”) other than annual total compensation to identify the median employee, as long as the CACM reasonably reflects the annual compensation of employees. For example, total cash compensation could be a CACM unless the company also distributed annual equity awards widely among its employees. Companies may select a determination date within three months prior to the end of their fiscal year, in order to determine employee population from which to identify the median. In applying the CACM to identify the median employee, companies are not required to use a compensation period that includes the determination date. Nor are they required to use a full annual period. As an example, the SEC states that a company may use annual total compensation from its prior fiscal year so long as there has not been a change in the registrant’s employee population or employee compensation arrangements that would result in a significant change of its pay distribution to its workforce. Workers whose compensation is determined by an unaffiliated third party may be excluded from the pay ratio calculation. This population may include leased workers, independent contractors who determine their own compensation, and even workers whose minimum level of compensation is set by the company. Companies should consider testing alternative methodologies in order to assess the quality and consistency of results. While there is considerable latitude to design a pay ratio methodology, companies should let reason be their guide and be prepared to explain the decisions that they make. Companies are required to describe in their proxy statements the methodology used, as well as any material assumptions, adjustments and estimates. Not surprisingly, CEO pay ratios have varied significantly depending on the companies surveyed and the methodology. The AFL-CIO’s annual report on CEO pay calculated a CEO-to-worker-pay ratio of 347-to-1 for 2016, based on the average total compensation package for 400 of the S&P 500 CEOs of $13.1 million last year, and the average annual cash income only (excluding fringe benefits) for America’s 100,525,000 rank-and-file workers of $37,632. In contrast, a 2016 Mercer study found the ratio among respondents to be less than 200-to-1.