.

Client Alert

The Court of Federal Claims and the Trump Administration’s Contract and Grant Terminations: A Primer for Federal Grantees and Contractors

November 18, 2025

by Alex Hontos, Eric Weisenburger, Chris DeLong, and Matthew Gillespie

Download as a PDF

Share this page

The Trump Administration’s unprecedented terminations of federal contracts and grants have affected organizations seeking options and remedies. Universities, academic research institutions, federal contractors, and state and local governments have been particularly impacted. But seeking judicial redress is not straight-forward; courts considering such challenges have identified jurisdictional problems when seeking relief from a federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act. Enter the United States Court of Federal Claims.

This briefing paper introduces Dorsey clients to the Court of Federal Claims, a specialized and lesser-known federal court that will be increasingly important and relevant as the battle over federal grants and contracts continues through the Second Trump Administration. 

What is the Court of Federal Claims?

The Court of Federal Claims (“COFC”)—in its current form—was created by the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992.[1]  But the COFC’s history long precedes its current iteration.  In 1855, Congress created the Court of Claims to “relieve the pressure on Congress” to handle “private bills,” meaning claims against the federal government, which were then the responsibility of Congress. The Court of Claims lacked authority to render final judgments, however, and instead merely made recommendations to Congress.[2]

In 1863, during the height of the Civil War, the Court of Claims’ recommendations regarding claims against the government became too voluminous for Congress to handle, so Congress empowered the Court of Claims to issue final judgments against the United States.[3] The Court of Claims’ jurisdiction was refined a few decades later through the Tucker Act in 1887,[4] which remains the statutory basis for the Court of Federal Claims today.[5] The Court of Claims’ remit was refined again in 1925 by Act of Congress that reorganized the Court of Claims into a trial division and appellate division.[6]  The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 abolished the Court of Claims, folded its appellate division into the newly created United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and established the United States Claims Court.[7]  In 1992, the Federal Courts Administration Act renamed the United States Claims Court to the United States Court of Federal Claims.[8] 

The COFC is an “Article I court,” referring to Article I of the United States Constitution which governs the legislative branch.[9]  As an Article I court, the COFC is a “legislative” court that hears cases only under specific circumstances delineated by statute (discussed below).[10]  COFC judges are appointed by the President, with the consent of the Senate, for a fifteen-year term.[11]  There are sixteen active COFC judgeships.[12]  Currently, there are also five active senior judges and no vacancies. Among the judges, ten were appointed by President Trump, five by President Biden, and one by President Obama.[13] Judgments of the COFC are appealable to the Federal Circuit, which is an “Article III court.”[14] 

Sovereign Immunity and COFC Jurisdiction

As an Article I court, the COFC is not a court of general jurisdiction like federal district courts. Instead, the COFC can hear only those matters within its statutory grant of jurisdiction.  And there is only one defendant for lawsuits brought in the COFC: the United States.[15] 

Sovereign immunity generally bars claims against the United States.  The Tucker Act, however, resolves this bar for certain claims.[16]  In passing the Tucker Act, Congress waived sovereign immunity with respect to certain money-damage actions and prescribed the jurisdictional boundaries of the COFC.[17]  The Tucker Act provides, in relevant part:

(a)(1) The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort . . .

(2) To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the judgment, the court may, as an incident of and collateral to any such judgment, issue orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records, and such orders may be issued to any appropriate official of the United States . . . .[18]

Thus, the Tucker Act provides the COFC jurisdiction to hear “actions pursuant to contracts with the United States, actions to recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, and actions brought pursuant to money-mandating statutes, regulations, executive orders, or constitutional provisions.”[19]   But “the Court of Federal Claims’ limited jurisdiction does not include tort claims, criminal-law claims, or non-money-mandating constitutional provisions.”[20]   

Important in the context of recent litigation, the Federal Circuit has held the COFC, as an Article I court, “lacks the general federal question jurisdiction of the district courts, which would allow it to review the agency’s actions and to grant relief pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1994).”[21]  And when a “plaintiff has another suit for or in respect to [a] claim pending against the United States” in another court, the Court of Federal Claims “has no jurisdiction over [that] claim” while the other suit is pending.[22] 

Cases in the COFC do not follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”).  Instead, the COFC has its own rules,[23] which in some instances differ from the FRCP.  For example, because the only defendant in the COFC is the United States, COFC Rule 4 does not detail the process for a “Summons” like FRCP 4 but rather addresses “Serving a Complaint on the United States.”[24]

Statute of Limitations

The general statute of limitations for monetary claims against the federal government is six years.[25] But certain claims have other potential time-bars.  For example, some contract claims are governed by the Contract Disputes Act and must first be submitted to and adjudicated by a contracting officer, whose decisions generally must be challenged in the COFC within one year.[26]  As another example, bid protest actions based on ambiguities or errors identified in the government’s solicitation (rather than errors in the evaluation-and-award process) generally must be brought before the deadline to submit offers in response to the solicitation.[27]

Permissible Remedies at COFC

The COFC’s principal remedy is a money judgment—think damages associated with a breach of contract.[28] “The United States Court of Federal Claims does not have general authority to issue injunctive relief.”[29]  Despite COFC’s lack of “general authority” to grant equitable relief, however, the COFC has limited authority to issue equitable relief “as an incident of and collateral to any such [money] judgment.”[30] For example, COFC can order the government to correct its records.[31] 

Litigation in the COFC

For administrative challenges leading up to a COFC action, the federal agency whose decisions or actions gave rise to the claim is often represented by their own agency’s counsel.  Once the action is filed in the COFC, however, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) steps in to represent the agency. Each case and set of facts is different, but new counsel coming into the case can be beneficial for informal resolution between the parties because DOJ attorneys will often take a fresh look at the issues in dispute.  The DOJ section that represents the United States at the COFC—the “National Courts Section” of the Civil Division—has historically had a reputation as pragmatic and apolitical.  Further, because DOJ represents the United States in litigation, DOJ gets to settle a case or dispute, even over the objection of the agency. 

In addition, funds to settle claims and lawsuits at COFC can come from a different funding source than, for example, the funding supporting the contract or grant in dispute.  Instead, the United States Judgment Fund “pays court judgments and compromise settlements of lawsuits against the [federal] government.”[32]

Examples of Tucker Act Cases at COFC

The COFC, and its predecessor courts, have heard a wide variety of cases brought under the Tucker Act in the nearly 140 years since its passage.  Some relatively recent and significant examples have shaped the scope of the COFC’s jurisdiction to hear grant and contract claims. While the bulk of the COFC’s cases involve contracts governed by the Contract Disputes Act—a law that does not cover terminated federal grants or even all contracts with the United States—there are numerous examples of non-CDA contract disputes that have resulted in recovery against the United States for breach.

First, in Thermalon Industries, Ltd. v. United States, the COFC held that federal grants qualify as the type of contract for which a plaintiff can sue for wrongful termination in the COFC.[33]  There, the COFC explained that the National Science Foundation (“NSF”) awarded a grant to Thermalon and, after work began, the NSF audited Thermalon’s invoices and disallowed certain costs Thermalon submitted.[34]  Thermalon stopped work and the NSF terminated the grant.[35] Thermalon sought relief from the NSF, which the NSF denied, so Thermalon filed suit in the COFC.[36]  The NSF moved to dismiss, arguing the Tucker Act did not confer jurisdiction because Thermalon’s grant was not a contract.[37] The COFC denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that the Tucker Act covers more than just “situations that involve the government ‘stepping off the throne and engaging in [the] purchase and sale of goods’ in the market place.”[38]  Ultimately, the COFC determined that “contracts enforceable under the Tucker Act result only if there is a mutual intent to contract, including an offer, acceptance, and consideration,” and that “the government always has the choice when designing a grant scheme to select a scheme that does or does not involve contracts.”[39]  Since Thermalon, the law is clear that instruments with the United States that have the traditional indicia of contracts are contracts for purposes of COFC jurisdiction.[40] 

Second, in the “Winstar” cases, the COFC held (and the Supreme Court affirmed) that even the United States’ exercise of a sovereign power can support a breach-of-contract claim.  In those cases, financial institutions sued in the COFC for breaches of contracts that had promised regulatory relief.[41] The financial institution plaintiffs had agreed to purchase savings-and-loan institutions during an industry crisis in the 1980s in exchange for, among other things, reduced regulatory burdens, such as lower reserve requirements.[42]  The contracts provided that if those regulatory benefits were reversed, the United States would owe damages.[43]  Years after the contracts were signed, Congress enacted legislation that prohibited some of the very incentives the financial institutions had contracted to obtain. The COFC awarded the financial institutions damages for breach of contract.[44]  The Federal Circuit (en banc) and United States Supreme Court affirmed the damages awards, explaining that although the federal government cannot agree in a contract that it will not exercise a sovereign power (such as enacting legislation), it can agree that it will pay costs caused by exercising that power, and the COFC has jurisdiction to hear such cases.[45]  Following this decision, more than 100 separate—but similar—cases were filed in the COFC, the last of which was finally resolved in 2015.[46]

Third, in a line of cases known as the “Spent Nuclear Fuel” cases, the COFC maintained plaintiffs’ right to seek monetary relief when forced to incur costs based on an agency’s failure to meet contractual obligations.  In these cases, electric utilities brought claims for breaches of contracts in which the utilities agreed to dispose of spent nuclear fuel (“SNF”) produced at the utilities’ power plants.[47]  Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, in which the federal government recognized that it must provide for “permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste,” and that the “generators and owners” of the waste must have the primary responsibility to pay for disposal of it and for the interim costs of storage pending disposal.[48]  The Act mandated that the utilities contract with the Department of Energy (“DOE”) and required disposal of waste to begin no later than January 31, 1998.[49] But in 1994, DOE announced the repository to dispose of SNF would not be available until 2010 and that DOE had no obligation to provide for disposal by the deadline.[50] 

The utilities brought actions for judicial review of DOE’s decision in the D.C. Circuit, which held DOE did have an obligation to begin disposing of the waste by the January 31, 1998 deadline.[51]  Nevertheless, DOE informed certain utilities that it would not accept waste by the deadline, so the utilities went back to the D.C. Circuit seeking writs of mandamus to force DOE to comply with the deadline.[52]  But the D.C. Circuit held instead that the utilities could pursue contractual remedies—sue for damages caused by the breach of the contracts with DOE.[53]  The utilities then filed breach-of-contract actions against DOE in the COFC seeking money damages for the costs to be incurred with extended storage of SNF and alleged an unconstitutional taking of property (the interim storage facilities) by failing to dispose of SNF.[54]  The government moved to dismiss on the ground that the utilities had failed to exhaust administrative remedies required by the contract when filing contractual claims.[55]  The utilities moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for their breach-of-contract claims.  Id. The COFC denied the government’s motion to dismiss because there was no applicable administrative dispute process for specific breach claims.[56] The court also granted partial summary judgment for the utilities on liability, explaining that it was undisputed that DOE had failed to begin accepting, transporting, and disposing of the SNF.[57]  The Federal Circuit affirmed.[58] 

Fourth, the COFC hears breaches of settlement agreements.  As one example, a former employee of the United States Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) alleged OPM violated confidentiality provisions in his settlement agreement and brought a claim for money damages.[59]  The COFC concluded it had jurisdiction over such claims under the Tucker Act, but dismissed the claim because it had already been litigated before the Merit Systems Protection Board.[60]  The Federal Circuit affirmed that the Tucker Act conferred the COFC jurisdiction over this breach claim and reversed dismissal under the doctrine of res judicata.[61] 

New Questions Over the Scope of APA Jurisdiction and Remedies in Recent Actions

Under the Second Trump Administration, federal district courts have faced a deluge of new lawsuits from states and organizations seeking injunctions to pause terminations of grants, contracts, or other federal programs.  To date, these challenges have often been brought as statutory causes of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).[62]  Some district courts have granted interim injunctive relief from which the Administration has often sought relief from the circuit courts of appeal and even the Supreme Court. For example, multiple states brought an action under the APA in federal district court seeking an injunction preventing the Department of Education from “terminating various education-related grants” and “requir[ing] the Government to pay out past-due grant obligations and to continue paying obligations as they accrue.”[63]  The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief, which was not stayed, and the Administration sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court.  In a relatively short order on the Administration’s request, the Supreme Court granted a stay of the injunction, ruling that the government was likely to succeed in its defense against the claims because the claims were, in essence, seeking “‘to enforce a contractual obligation to pay money,’” which is a claim in the remit of the Court of Federal Claims.[64] 

Since the Supreme Court’s order in Department of Education, courts have expressed increased skepticism over the scope of APA jurisdiction when reviewing challenges to grants and contracts.  In a recent example, the D.C. federal district court heard a challenge from a union and associations of scientists and academics over termination of NSF grants designed “to support underrepresented groups in STEM [Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math] fields.”[65] NSF terminated those grants following issuance of subregulatory guidance entitled “Statement of NSF Priorities” in April 2025,[66] as part of a sweeping termination of approximately 1,600 similar grants totaling over $1 billion.[67] The plaintiffs challenged termination of the grants on several bases, one of which was an APA challenge to NSF’s termination of the grants that sought injunctive relief from the court ordering NSF to reinstate the grants at issue.[68]  Relying in part of the Department of Education decision, the federal district court determined that it lacks jurisdiction to hear those APA claims, despite that the claims “do[] not overtly seek monetary relief, nor expressly invoke contractual claims,” because the rights at issue “stem from the cancelled grant agreements and [plaintiffs] seek specific performance of those agreements.”[69] 

In a similar challenge, the Supreme Court cast doubt on a grantee’s ability to obtain monetary relief or grant reinstatement through an APA challenge.  In National Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Association, a plurality of the Supreme Court explained that the APA does not allow federal district courts to adjudicate claims based on terminations of research-related grants or to order relief that amounted to an obligation to pay money damages based on such grants.[70]  In that case, the plaintiffs brought an APA action in federal district court to challenge agency-issued guidance that resulted in the National Institutes of Health terminating hundreds of grants. 

The Supreme Court’s recent emergency orders in Department of Education and National Institutes of Health are proving to be a hurdle—though not an impossible one—when seeking relief in the federal district courts.  Though the APA path may still be available in certain fact patterns, organizational leaders should understand that there are other options—including the Court of Federal Claims—to seek redress for wrongs wrought by the decisions of policy makers in Washington, D.C.

Dorsey’s government-contracts team has appeared in many Court of Federal Claims matters and advises organizations assessing federal grant or contract terminations, seeking termination and settlement costs from federal agencies, pursuing administrative appeals, or litigating those disputes in the federal district courts or Court of Federal Claims.


[1] Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506.

[2] See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 552 (1962) (superseded by statute on other grounds).

[3] See id. at 553.

[4] 24 Stat. 505 (1887).

[5] See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 556; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1491.

[6] See Pub. L. No. 68-451, 43 Stat. 964.

[7] See Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.

[8] See Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506.

[9] See, e.g., Indus. for the Blind, Inc. v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 132, 135 (2015).

[10] See Courts: A Brief Overview, Federal Judicial Center, https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/courts-brief-overview.

[11] See 28 U.S.C. §§ 171-172.

[12] See 28 U.S.C. § 171.

[13] See Judges, United States Court of Federal Claims, https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/judges.

[14] See Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

[15] See Double Lion Uchet Express Tr. v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 415, 420 (2020) (“[I]n the Court of Federal Claims, ‘the only proper defendant . . . is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual.’” (quoting Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003))).

[16] See 28 U.S.C. § 1491.

[17] See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1976) (describing the Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity for certain claims against the United States).

[18] 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a).  The COFC also has jurisdiction to hear bid protests, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b), which are challenges to the federal government’s procurement decisions.  Dorsey has extensive expertise and experience in representing and advising organizations on myriad federal procurement issues.

[19] Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

[20] Chisum v. United States, No. 2025-1562, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 25967, 2025 WL 2836408, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 7, 2025).

[21] Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

[22] United States v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307, 311 (2011); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1500.

[23] Rules of the Unites States Court of Federal Claims (2024), available at https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/cfc/files/rcfc_complete.pdf.

[24] Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 with Ct. Fed. Cl. R. 4.

[25] See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”).

[26] See 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103-7104. 

[27] See generally Blue & Gold, Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

[28] See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). 

[29] Sergent’s Mech. Sys. v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 41, 46 (2021) (citing Richardson v. Morris, 409 U.S. 464, 465 (1973) (“[T]he [Tucker] Act has long been construed as authorizing only actions for money judgments and not suits for equitable relief against the United States.”)).

[30] 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2). 

[31] Id.

[32] Judgment Fund, Bureau of the Fiscal Service,  https://fiscal.treasury.gov/judgment-fund/; see also 31 U.S.C. § 1304.

[33] 34 Fed. Cl. 411 (1995). 

[34] Id. at 414.

[35] Id. 

[36] Id.

[37] Id. 

[38] Id. at 417 (quoting Kania v. United States, 650 F.2d 264 (Ct. Cl. 1981)). 

[39] Thermalon, 34 Fed. Cl. at 421. 

[40] Hometown Fin., Inc. v. United States, 409 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (identifying “(1) mutuality of intent to contract; (2) offer and acceptance; (3) consideration; and (4) a government representative having actual authority to bind the United States”).

[41] See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 

[42] See id. 

[43] See id. 

[44] See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (1990). 

[45] See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 881.

[46] Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences, 13 No. 2 FDIC Banking Review 26, 33 (2000).

[47] See Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

[48] See id. at 1337 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 10131(a)(4)). 

[49] Id.

[50] See id. at 1338. 

[51] See Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

[52] See Northern States Power Co. v. Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

[53] Id. 

[54] See Maine Yankee Atomic Power, 225 F.3d at 1337. 

[55] See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 223, 225 (1999). 

[56] Id. at 235.

[57] See id.  

[58] Maine Yankee Atomic Power, 225 F.3d at 1337.

[59] See Cunningham v. United States, 748 F.3d 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

[60] See  Cunningham v. United States, 108 Fed. Cl. 208, 221 (2012).

[61] Cunningham, 748 F.3d at 1174.

[62] See 5 USC § 551 et seq.

[63] See Dep’t of Education v. California, et al., 604 U.S. 650, 650 (2025). 

[64] Id. at 651.

[65] Am. Ass’n of Physics Tchrs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., No. 25-cv-1923, 4, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176901, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2025).

[66] Id. at *2.

[67] Id. at *2-3. 

[68] See id. at *3. 

[69] Id. at *7. 

[70] 606 U.S. __, __, 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025).

Firm Highlights

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.