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Lies Without Consequences? The Federal Circuit Seems to Think So, When it Comes to Incontestability.

October 24, 2023 – The TMCA

by Bruce R. Ewing

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For 48 years, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office has held that if a trademark registrant files a fraudulent declaration under Section 15 of the Lanham Act to make its registration incontestable, the registration is cancelled in its entirety, full stop. But on October 18, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit put an end to that, holding that the TTAB lacks the statutory authority to cancel a registration in its entirety due to a fraudulent incontestability filing. As to what the penalty for such a fraudulent filing is or could be, well, the Federal Circuit threw out a few ideas, but it seems it will be for TTAB to figure that out.

How did we get to this point? Picture it: West Hollywood, 1964. A young Serbian immigrant, Dobrivoje Tanasijević, who adopted the name Dan Tana not long after arriving in the United States, opens his eponymous Italian eatery. By the 1970s, Dan Tana’s has become a legendary showbiz hotspot, celebrated on The Tonight Show and frequented by all the boldface names of the day, from John Wayne to Linda Ronstadt. The restaurant becomes so popular that the lead character in the hit ABC television show Vega$, played by Robert Urich, is given the name “Dan Tanna” by the show’s producer and restaurant habitué, Aaron Spelling. The restaurant continues to flourish today on Santa Monica Boulevard, under new ownership following Mr. Tana’s sale of the place in 2009.

Prior to the sale, in 2005, Mr. Tana tried to register his DAN TANA’S trademark with the PTO, but registration was refused because an Atlanta-area restaurant operated by Great Concepts LLC, had registered DANTANNA’S for restaurant services in 2003. An aggrieved Mr. Tana sought to cancel this registration, and he also sued Great Concepts for trademark infringement in 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia; the cancellation proceeding was suspended during the pendency of the federal court action. Unfortunately for Mr. Tana, he lost the federal case before the district court in 2009, and then on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in July 2010. The cancellation proceeding was dismissed in December 2010.

End of story, right? Wrong. On March 8, 2010, Great Concepts’ counsel filed with the PTO a combined declaration of use and incontestability under Sections 8 and 15 of the Lanham Act to maintain the DANTANNA’S registration (under Section 8) and to make the registration incontestable (under Section 15). In that declaration, the attorney swore, under penalty of perjury, as required for the registration to achieve incontestable status under Section 15, that “there is no proceeding involving said rights pending and not disposed of either in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts.” The problem: this statement was obviously false, because both Mr. Tana’s appeal and his cancellation proceeding were pending when the declaration was filed.

Notwithstanding this glaring untruth, nothing happened until 2015, when Mr. Tana’s successor, Chutter, Inc., petitioned to cancel Great Concepts’ registration based on the untrue 2010 incontestability filing. The TTAB did just that, holding that, under Crown Wallcovering Corp. v. Wall Paper Mfrs. Ltd., 188 USPQ 141, 144 (TTAB 1975), when an incontestability filing is made fraudulently, the proper remedy is cancellation of the registration in its entirety. The TTAB had little trouble concluding that fraud had indeed occurred, given the concededly false statement contained in the Great Concepts declaration. The Board also noted that: (i) the attorney who filed the declaration was Great Concepts’ counsel in both the then-pending federal litigation and cancellation proceeding, so he clearly knew the declaration was false; (ii) the attorney’s claim that he was not aware of the legal requirements for a Section 15 declaration was no excuse; (iii) nor was his claim that a paralegal prepared the declaration, which he failed to read carefully; and (iv) Great Concepts and its counsel were aware of the false filing no later than February 2014 but failed to correct it with the PTO.

Great Concepts appealed the TTAB decision to the Federal Circuit, and that appeal succeeded last week, in a 2-1 precedential decision. Why? The majority opinion offered a variety of reasons, starting with the text of the Lanham Act. Section 14 of the Lanham Act allows for cancellation “at any time” if the “registration was obtained fraudulently” (emphasis in majority opinion). According to the Great Concepts majority, the plain meaning of the statute covers fraud occurring in the context of initial filings made in support of an application to register a mark, and Section 8 filings to maintain the protections afforded by a registration. But, per the majority, a Section 15 incontestability filing is only optional and not made to “obtain” or even to “maintain” a registration, but to enhance the rights afforded to a registrant. In addition, Lanham Act Section 33(b) provides that an accused infringer can defend against claims brought by the owner of an incontestable registration by asserting that the owner’s incontestability filings were made fraudulently, but that Section says nothing about cancellation, just loss of incontestable status. Thus, the majority concluded that the Board has no statutory authority to cancel a registration when a fraudulent incontestability filing is made. In light of this holding, the Court did not reach the issue of whether Great Concepts had actually engaged in any fraud, and it remanded to the Board the question of what consequences, if any, should result from the false incontestability filing.

In its decision, the majority rejected a series of arguments advanced by Chutter, and the dissent, as to why its holding was erroneous. First, the majority held that, notwithstanding 47 years of Board precedent to the contrary, the Lanham Act says what it says and if Congress wants to make cancellation of a registration in its entirety a remedy for a false incontestability filing, it can do so. The majority also noted that McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition has long agreed with the majority’s statutory reading, so it’s not like their holding was some sort of outlier, although the majority acknowledged that Gilson disagrees with McCarthy on this point. The majority also distinguished prior Federal Circuit cases suggesting agreement with the Board’s now overturned holdings, stating that these cases never directly presented the question decided in Great Concepts.

Second, the majority held that the PTO’s administrative decision to allow registrants to make Section 8 (maintenance) and Section15 (incontestability) filings together, in the same document, did not cause Great Concepts’ Section 8 filing to be fraudulent. The majority held that the PTO in practice treats these combined filings separately, with separate filing fees, such that the PTO’s efforts to make post-registration filings more efficient and simpler for registrants did not and could not trump the Lanham Act’s text.

Third, the majority rejected the policy-based arguments on which the dissent focused, rejecting the characterization of its holding as one making fraudulent incontestability filings a “costless offense.” After all, the majority said, the Board could take away a registration’s incontestable status as a penalty for a false Section 15 filing. Or, it could sanction the attorney who signed the declaration, even referring them to the PTO’s Office of Enrollment and Discipline, and maybe even for criminal prosecution (!) The majority defended its holding by stating that:

Our ruling that a Section 14 cancellation of a registration is not an available remedy for a fraudulent Section 15 declaration – a conclusion we reach because Congress chose not to empower the Board with the ability to impose that specific consequence – is a ruling that this one remedy is unavailable, leaving the Board, we expect, with sufficient mechanisms to adequately deter fraud.

To the dissent, all of this was just words, and it argued the majority was “excus[ing] fraud” and violating the “pact” with the general public when it comes to the grant and protection of intellectual property rights. It also scoffed at the majority’s seemingly preferred remedy – the loss of incontestable status – as a “no harm, no foul” solution that was wholly inadequate to deter fraud, particularly in this case, where there was “substantial evidence” showing that Great Concepts and its counsel had perpetrated a fraud on the PTO. Indeed, the dissent claimed that the majority had constructed “a milepost in the trademark administrative continuum, at which point (Section 15) fraudulent wrongdoing is greenlighted. The majority does not provide a principled rationale for such a milepost.”

Apart from the adverse policy consequences weighing against the majority’s holding, the dissent’s view was that a Section 15 filing is part of a broader array of trademark maintenance filings that include Section 8 filings to maintain a registration and Section 9 filings to renew a registration. As a result, whenever a registrant fraudulently “obtains” any of the rights afforded to a registrant by virtue of owning a registration, cancellation of the registration is an available remedy. The fact that the PTO allows combined Section 8 and 15 filings to be made together, in one document, which states explicitly that willful false statements “may jeopardize the validity of this document” (emphasis added by dissent), confirms the interrelated aspects of these various filings, according to the dissent. So too does the fact that a Section 15 filing “may also be used as the affidavit or declaration required by section 8” (emphasis added by dissent, citing 37 CFR § 2.168).

In closing, the dissent criticized the majority for suggesting alternative penalties the Board might consider on remand, and instead invited the Board to clarify whether it considers Section 15 filings to be part of the trademark registration maintenance process.

As to what happens next in this case, your guess is as good as mine. An en banc review is a possibility, but given the remand to the TTAB for additional proceedings, the case may not be ripe for Supreme Court review. If there are no further, immediate appellate proceedings, the TTAB will have to decide whether to accept the dissent’s invitation to address whether a Section 15 filing qualifies as one that maintains a trademark registration. The Board will also have to consider what sort of sanctions, if any, are available when a fraudulent incontestability filing is made. Loss of incontestability? If so, forever, or could a new, fraud-free Section 15 filing be made? Sanctions on the offending attorney? If so, of what kind? What if the Section 15 declaration was filed by a non-attorney or the registrant itself? And does the Great Concepts decision make it more likely that registrants will run the risk of making false incontestability filings, because there is no clear penalty for such an act? Or not? Stay tuned for future updates on this esoteric, but important, issue.

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The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

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EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

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SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.