Appellate

On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States issued four decisions:

Watson v. Republican National Committee, No. 24-1260: This election-law dispute addresses whether federal statutes setting a uniform Election Day for congressional and presidential elections require absentee ballots to be received by Election Day. Mississippi allows certain voters, including some students and senior citizens, to vote by absentee ballot, and counts absentee ballots that are postmarked by Election Day and received within 5 business days after the election. The Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, and other plaintiffs sued Mississippi election officials, arguing that federal law preempts Mississippi’s receipt-deadline rule because the federal election-day statutes require both ballot casting and ballot receipt to occur by Election Day. The district court granted summary judgment to Mississippi, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Mississippi’s law was preempted because federal law requires ballots to be received by Election Day. In a decision authored by Justice Barrett, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the federal election-day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by Election Day but received up to 5 days later. The Court reasoned that an “election” occurs when voters make their choices, not when election officials receive ballots, and that other federal statutes governing absentee voting assume that States may set their own ballot-receipt deadlines. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch and in large part by Justice Kavanaugh, dissented, arguing that the federal Election Day requirement is best understood to require receipt of ballots by Election Day.

View the Court's decision.

Chatrie v. United States, No. 25-112: This Fourth Amendment dispute addresses whether police conduct a search when they use a geofence warrant to obtain cell-phone location data from Google about devices located near a crime scene. After a credit union robbery in Virginia, officers obtained a warrant requiring Google to provide anonymized location history data for phones located within a 150-meter radius of the credit union around the time of the robbery, followed by additional location information and identifying information for a narrowed group of users. Google ultimately identified three users, including Okello Chatrie, whose location data placed him near the credit union around the time of the robbery, and Chatrie was later charged with robbery and firearms offenses. Chatrie moved to suppress the Google data, arguing that the geofence warrant violated the Fourth Amendment; the district court agreed that the warrant was constitutionally defective but denied suppression under the good-faith exception, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed after dividing evenly en banc on whether obtaining the data was a search. In a decision authored by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie’s location history data because individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in detailed cell-phone location information, even when that information is held by a third-party technology company. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Sotomayor, concurred to emphasize the need for careful application of the warrant requirements at later stages of geofence searches; Justce Gorsuch concurred in the judgment but would analyze the issue through the Fourth Amendment’s protection of “papers” and “effects” rather than the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. Justice Alito, joined in part by Justices Thomas and Barrett, dissented, arguing that the Court should not have reached the question presented and that Chatrie had no Fourth Amendment right in the Google-generated location information; Justice Barrett also dissented separately, agreeing that Chatrie lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in location data he voluntarily disclosed to Google.

View the Court's decision.

Trump v. Cook, No. 25A312: This separation-of-powers and administrative-law dispute addresses the President’s authority to remove a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and the process required before doing so. In August 2025, President Trump attempted to remove Federal Reserve Governor Lisa Cook after the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency publicly accused her of mortgage fraud; Cook’s term was otherwise set to run until 2038. Cook sued, arguing that the Federal Reserve Act permits removal of Governors only “for cause” and that the President had not provided the notice and opportunity to respond required before terminating a protected officer. The district court entered a preliminary injunction preventing Cook’s removal, and the court of appeals declined to stay that order. In a decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court denied the Government’s stay application, holding that the Government had not shown it was likely to prevail on its arguments that the President’s “for cause” determination was unreviewable, that the asserted allegations were sufficient cause as a matter of law, or that Cook had received adequate process. The Court emphasized the Federal Reserve’s unique historical status and independence from ordinary political control, and held that Cook was entitled at minimum to notice of the evidence against her, an opportunity to respond, and a final decision only after that response. Justices Kavanaugh and Jackson filed concurring opinions, while Justices Thomas, Alito joined by Gorsuch, and Barrett dissented. The dissents argued that the Court should have granted the stay and allowed Cook’s removal to take effect while litigation continued. Justice Thomas would have held that Cook lacked a protected property interest in her office, that the President had adequate “cause” to remove her, and that courts lacked power to enjoin the President’s removal decision. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Gorsuch, argued more narrowly that the Court should not have resolved broad and novel questions on an underdeveloped emergency-docket record. Justice Barrett separately dissented on similar institutional grounds, arguing that the Court went too far by deciding difficult issues—including the constitutional status of Federal Reserve independence—that were not properly before it.

View the Court's decision.

Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332: This separation-of-powers dispute addresses whether Congress may protect Federal Trade Commission Commissioners from removal by the President except for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Soon after taking office in January 2025, President Trump removed FTC Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya without invoking any statutory cause, stating instead that their continued service was inconsistent with his Administration’s priorities and that he was acting under Article II. Slaughter sued, arguing that her removal violated the FTC Act and was barred by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), the decision that upheld for-cause removal protection for FTC Commissioners. The district court granted summary judgment to Slaughter and enjoined interference with her duties. The D.C. Circuit denied the Government’s request for a stay pending appeal. In a decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FTC’s for-cause removal provision is unconstitutional because the FTC exercises executive power and therefore its Commissioners must be removable by the President at will. The Court concluded that Humphrey’s Executor no longer supplies a valid rule for modern independent agencies exercising executive authority, and overruled it to the extent it preserved removal restrictions for such officers. Justice Gorsuch concurred, while Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented, arguing that the decision disregards precedent and threatens Congress’s longstanding authority to create independent expert agencies.

View the Court's decision.

The Supreme Court also granted certiorari in six cases: 

RiseandShine Corp. v. Pepsico, Inc., No. 24-1016: RiseandShine Corp., d/b/a Rise Brewing, sued PepsiCo under the Lanham Act, alleging that PepsiCo’s “Mtn Dew Rise” beverage infringed Rise Brewing’s RISE marks for canned nitro-brewed coffee by creating a likelihood of consumer confusion. In examining whether a trademark infringer’s use is “likely to cause confusion” under 15 U.S.C. § 1114, courts examine various factors, including the trademark’s strength. The question presented is: Whether trademark strength is a question of fact in a likelihood-of-confusion analysis under 15 U.S.C. § 1114.

Hoffman v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., No. 25-159: Under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717f, private companies may condemn land to build certain natural gas infrastructure. Landowners are entitled to just compensation for the property taken, but the Act does not specify whether state or federal law controls the calculation of just compensation. The question presented is: In private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act, should just compensation be determined by reference to state law.

International Partners, et al. v. Ferguson, No. 25-840: Parents and advocacy organizations challenged Washington laws that allegedly permit runaway minors to receive gender-identity-related treatment without parental notice or consent, arguing that the laws interfere with parents’ constitutional authority to direct the care and upbringing of their children. The question presented is: Whether parents have standing to challenge a law or policy that deliberately displaces their decision-making role as to gender-identity-related treatment of their children, and in so doing creates present and likely future impediments to their ability to parent their children as they deem best for them.

Wassily v. Blanche, No. 25-842: This immigration case will address the following question: whether noncitizens whose asylum status was terminated after criminal convictions are no longer eligible to seek an adjustment to lawful permanent resident status. 

Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota, et al., No. 25-1017: This case presents a dispute over Arizona’s voter registration laws requiring applicants to provide “satisfactory evidence” of U.S. citizenship and requiring cancellation of registrations where voter-roll reviews confirm that a registrant is not a U.S. citizen. The questions presented are: (1) Does the National Voter Registration Act or a federal consent decree prohibit Arizona from requiring voter-registration applicants to produce “satisfactory evidence” of U.S. citizenship when registering with a state registration form; and (2) Does the National Voter Registration Act prohibit Arizona from implementing a program within 90 days of a federal election to cancel the registrations of voters who are not U.S. citizens.

Montoya Palacios v. Liggins, et al., No. 25-1223: This case concerns whether a party that successfully brings a petition for habeas corpus challenging immigration detention is entitled to attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. The question presented is: Whether the Equal Access to Justice Act’s limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity in “any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort),” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), unambiguously and unequivocally encompasses petitions for writs of habeas corpus challenging immigration detention.