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Melissa Moyle structures and negotiates commercial real estate transactions — from landlord and tenant matters to cross-border corporate deals — so that property companies, private equity investors and financial institutions can move with confidence in the U.K. market.

Melissa brings experience across the full lifecycle of commercial real estate in the U.K., advising clients at every stage from initial acquisition to disposal, financing and strategic exit. Whether a client is entering a new lease, restructuring an existing one or acquiring a portfolio asset, Melissa provides clear, practical guidance on the legal and commercial issues that matter most.

Melissa advises on the complete range of commercial real estate work, including landlord and tenant matters, development, acquisitions and disposals, property investment and property finance. She also frequently advises on the real estate dimensions of U.K. and cross-border corporate transactions, making her a natural fit for clients whose real estate needs arise in the context of a broader deal.

Her clients include property companies, corporates, private equity investors and financial institutions. Melissa understands the different priorities and risk tolerances that each type of client brings to a transaction and she structures her advice accordingly.

Melissa is a member of Dorsey & Whitney's London Real Estate Group.

Select Experience

Representative Experience

  • Advising a global spirits manufacturer on the lease of its UK flagship retail premises in central London.
  • Advised Datatec Plc on their new London headquarters.
  • Advised an international client on a 320,000 sq ft warehouse facility at St Modwen Park.
  • Advised Graphite Capital Management LLP on all real estate aspects of their relocation to new London headquarters.

Education

  • College of Law, London (LPC, 2000)
  • Trinity College, Dublin (LLB (Ling. Germ), 1998)

Bar Admissions

  • England & Wales

Languages

  • German

Insights

Client Alert

The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022: New Rules for Overseas Entities Owning Land in the UK

January 9, 2023

The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 (“Act”) introduces new measures to tackle illicit wealth in the UK property market.  The Act is comprised of three parts and Part 1 of the Act (“Part 1”), which became effective on 1 August 2022, is the focus of this update. Part 1 requires any Overseas Entity which owns or acquires property in the UK to be entered on a new Register of Overseas Entities (“Register”) held at Companies House.  An overseas entity is a legal entity (corporate body, partnership or other entity) governed by the law of a country or territory outside the UK (“Overseas Entities”). Overseas Entities are required to take reasonable steps to: identify any registerable beneficial owners; and ·obtain the required information in respect of each registrable, beneficial owner and in respect of any registrable beneficial owner who is a trustee, the trust. Required information includes personal information (where an individual), the basis for being a beneficial owner, and whether an individual is a “designated person” for the purposes of certain sanctions and anti-money laundering legislation. The Act defines registerable beneficial owners as an individual, legal entity, government or public authority with (directly or indirectly): more than 25% of the shares or voting rights in the Overseas Entity. the right to appoint or remove a majority of the board of directors of the Overseas Entity. those who actually do, or hold the right to, exert significant influence or control, over the Overseas Entity. The Overseas Entity must then submit an application of registration with the Register to Companies House containing a specific statement which best describes its beneficial ownership, together with details of its beneficial owner(s) as required by the Act.  As part of the application the Overseas Entity must serve an information notice on each beneficial owner to confirm their details and subsequently ensure the information in the application is independently verified by a UK-based agent. Overseas Entities are also subject to an annual “update period” beginning with the date of an Overseas Entity’s entry on the Register.  Every twelve months, within 14 days after the end of each update period, the Overseas Entity must update the registrar as to its beneficial ownership and confirm ongoing compliance with the Act. The Act will apply retrospectively to Overseas Entities that acquired property interests of (a) freeholds or leases of seven years or more in England and Wales (b) freeholds or leases of twenty-one years or more in Northern Ireland and (c) freeholds or leases of more than twenty years in Scotland (a “Qualifying Estate”): ·on or after 1 January 1999 in England & Wales; or ·on or after 8 December 2014 in Scotland; or ·on or after 1 August 2022 in Northern Ireland. An Overseas Entity must also apply to be added to the Register where: (1) it wishes to sell, grant a lease of more than seven years, or grant a legal charge of a Qualifying Estate it already owns when the related application to the Land Registry will be submitted on or after 1 February 2023; or (2) it wishes to buy or become the tenant of a Qualifying Estate where its application to the Land Registry has been submitted on or after 5 September 2022. As a transitional measure, Overseas Entities that own a Qualifying Estate in England & Wales or Scotland will have a six-month window ending on 31 January 2023 to become registered. Where an Overseas Entity has made a disposition of a Qualifying Estate between 28 February 2022 and 31 January 2023, the Overseas Entity must disclose the details of such dispositions to Companies House.  Key Points to Note: The Act prevents an Overseas Entity from acquiring or dealing with a Qualifying Estate if they are not registered on the Register. In England & Wales those Overseas Entities that purchased a Qualifying Estate on or after 1 January 1999 must become registered by 31 January 2023 or they will be committing a criminal offence under the Act. Entry upon the Register at Companies House is now necessary for Overseas Entities to acquire ownership of UK property. Failure to do so will prevent an Overseas Entity from being registered as the new owner of a property at the Land Registry. The Land Registry will also place a restriction on the title to a Qualifying Estate which will prevent the Qualifying Estate from being transferred, charged or let in the future unless registration at Companies House as an Overseas Entity is maintained. It is possible for any member of the public to inspect the register or request a copy of any material on the register, subject to certain personal information which will be kept confidential. Failure to comply with the Act is a criminal offence punishable by fines and imprisonment. Compliance should therefore be taken very seriously. Authors:  Jane Last

Court of Appeal provides clarity as to the question of whether a tenant has a ‘Covid defence’ to a landlord’s claim for rent arrears: Bank of New York Mellon (International) Ltd v Cine-UK Ltd; London Trocadero (2015) LLP v Picturehouse Cinemas Ltd and others [2022] EWCA Civ 1021

August 18, 2022

  The case concerned the combined appeals of Bank of New York Mellon (International) Ltd v Cine-UK Ltd and others [2021] EWHC 1013 (QB) (the “Hengrove case”) and London Trocadero (2015) LLP v Picturehouse Cinemas Ltd and others [2021] EWHC 2591 (Ch) (the “Trocadero case”), in which the tenants sought unsuccessfully to resist their respective landlords' claims for rent for periods when the COVID-19 pandemic meant the demised premises could not be used as a cinema. The Trocadero case involved two leases, dating from 1994 and 2014 respectively, the latter of which followed a reorganisation of the tenants and incorporated all the terms, requirements, covenants and conditions of the 1994 lease for an annual peppercorn rent. No distinction was made between the two leases by the parties or the Court at first instance or upon appeal. In each case, summary judgment was successfully granted in favour of the landlords on the basis that the tenants had no defence to the claim of rent. The tenants subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal against those orders. In both appeals the tenants sought to argue that in respect of the periods when it was unlawful to operate a cinema from the demised premises, the tenants were relieved from the obligation to pay rent for the following reasons: It was fundamental to the basis of the leases that the premises would be capable of lawful use. The effect of the Government regulations making it illegal to use the premises as a cinema caused a failure of that basis, and the tenants would therefore have a claim in unjust enrichment in respect of any rent or other sums paid in the illegal periods. It was an implied term that the tenant should be relieved of the obligation to pay rent where the tenant could not lawfully use the premises as a cinema. In the Trocadero case, it was also an implied term that rents would be payable only when the premises could be used as a cinema with attendance commensurate with the levels anticipated at the time the Trocadero leases were entered. In the Hengrove case, the tenant had an additional ground that it was relieved from the obligation to pay upon a true construction of the rent cesser provision in the lease. A rent cesser provision is a clause in a lease that provides for the suspension of a tenant’s obligation to pay rent under certain circumstances (e.g. where the whole or part of a premises is damaged or destroyed).  In the Hengrove case, the tenant argued that the term “damage” within the lease’s rent cesser provision should be interpreted to include not only physical damage, but also financial / non-physical damage of the nature caused by the pandemic restrictions. At First Instance the Court Found: Hengrove Case The rent cesser clause would only relieve the tenant from the obligation to pay rent in the event that the occupation or use of the property was impeded due to physical damage or destruction affecting the fabric of the building. The most persuasive point in the court’s reaching this view being that the tenant’s construction of the clause (extending beyond physical damage) did not fit the words used whether taken alone or in the context of the lease as a whole. There should not be a term implied into the lease that there should be an equivalent rent cesser in the circumstances, where: (i) COVID and the COVID Regulations were unprecedented, and unforeseen, but had forced the closure of the premises; and (ii) the Landlord had chosen to insure so that the Insured Risks extended to such matters, and had done so at the expense of the Tenants, and in the context where the Leases (and the Insurance) provided for cover to include loss of Rent. This was particularly the case given that (1) the lease was a lengthy standard form professional document which went into great detail about a range of circumstances, with express provisions as to rent cesser limited to physical deterioration, but did not include the term contended for, and (2) the implied term was not necessary to give the lease business efficacy and worked well without it. The tenant had not established that the effect of it not being able to operate from the premises in accordance with the Permitted Use resulted in a partial failure of consideration which relieved it from its liability to pay rent. Trocadero Case The Trocadero tenants advanced similar arguments to the Hengrove tenant which were also rejected by the Court. The Trocadero tenant also advanced the argument of failure of basis leading to unjust enrichment. This argument being that the leases had been temporarily frustrated during the lockdown periods at which time the premises could not be used as a cinema (the argued “basis” on which the parties entered into the leases), resulting in rents not being payable during this time. The Court held that this failed due to fact that, taking into account the terms of the leases, the use of the premises was not “fundamental to the basis” on which the parties entered into the leases. The Judge reiterated that the question of whether something was “fundamental to the basis” was to be answered by taking into account the specific terms of the leases and the allocation of risk between the parties. The Court subsequently held that the alleged failure of basis would interfere with the agreed express allocation of risk between the parties and would be inconsistent with the terms of the leases. Upon Appeal The Court of Appeal: Rejected the rent cesser defence in the Hengrove case. The Court held that the rent cesser provision operated only where there was physical damage or destruction to the property by an Insured Risk (as defined within the lease). This was the correct construction of the provision taken as a whole within the lease. The Court also confirmed that the high court had been right to conclude the insurance taken out by the landlord was to insure against financial loss to the landlord’s business as a property owner, where the tenant was not legally obliged to pay the rent (such as where the rent cesser provision applied) and not where the tenant had chosen not to pay.    Rejected the proposed implied terms. In the appeal judgment it was emphasised that where the underlying contracts are detailed documents prepared by lawyers, the scope for implied terms is limited. The Court concluded that both leases worked ‘perfectly well’ without the implied term(s), and allocated the risk that the premises could not be used for their intended purpose to the tenant, so that the tenant was obliged to continue to pay rent where the rent cesser provisions were not available. The Court concluded further that there was nothing unworkable or incoherent about the allocation of risk. And further, that none of the alleged implied terms could be implied into the leases because they were inconsistent with the express terms of the leases, in the sense that they sought to reallocate the allocation of risk set out in the bargain which the parties made. It also concluded that none of the proposed implied terms satisfied the business efficacy or obviousness tests required to be fulfilled in order for an implied term to be considered valid. Business Efficacy test: will only be satisfied where, without the implied term, the contract would lack commercial or practical coherence. The Court concluded that the leases worked well without the implied terms, and that the proposed term(s) sought to imply into the respective leases a broader cesser of rent provision than the express terms of the leases permitted. Both leases allocated the risk that the premises cannot be used for their intended purpose to the tenant, so that the tenant is obliged to continue to pay rent where the cesser of rent provisions were not applicable Obviousness test: the term which it is sought to imply has to be precisely expressed and must be so obvious to go without saying. The Court emphasised that it was clear that the parties to the leases had turned their minds to what would happen if the premises could not be used by the tenant and that, within the detailed lease documents, had chosen not to make more extensive cesser of rent provisions. This made it doubtful a term to the contrary was obviously implied into the contract. The second implied term alleged in the Trocadero case was also unworkable as there was no evidence or material available from which the Court could assess anticipated cinema attendance levels, and the Court added, even where expert evidence might have been provided, it might well have been disputed – ‘an impossible scenario for the implication of a term’. Rejected the ‘failure of basis’ (unjust enrichment claim). The Court clarified that as both appeals concerned subsisting contracts, the limitations on the application of the law of unjust enrichment identified in by Carr LJ in Dargamo Holdings Limited v Avonwick Holding Limited [2021] EWCA Civ 1149 applied.That being, (i) a claim in unjust enrichment could not contradict the terms of the contract and (ii) for a failure of consideration to be made out despite the existence and performance of a valid contract, it was necessary to identify a ‘gap’ in the contract. The judge held that there was no “gap” in the leases which required filling by the law of unjust enrichment. The Court emphasised that the leases contained a carefully worked out contractual regime for the allocation of risk and the “proposed failure of basis” would subvert that regime and contradict the terms of the contracts in a way in which the law does not permit. The Court further clarified that, in the Hengrove and Trocadero cases, it was clear that the consideration for the obligation to pay rent was the demise of the premises for, in each case, a 35 year term, giving the tenant exclusive possession. Conclusions The Courts have now made clear that it is the tenant who bears the financial burden in such circumstances and that difficulties faced by tenants during the pandemic will not be accommodated at the expense of developing or departing from existing principles or specific legislation. The decision is welcome news to landlords who may have been concerned about limited routes to rent arrears recovery during the Covid-19 moratoriums.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.