.

Client Alert

U.S. Department of Education’s Guidance Clarifies Discriminatory Activities Subject to Investigation and Funding Consequences

March 4, 2025

by Nisha Verma

Download as a PDF

Share this page


Following its February 14, 2025, “Dear Colleague Letter,”[i] outlining DEI programs that could result in a loss of federal funding by February 28, 2025, the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights (the “Department”) issued FAQs [ii] that provided further context for the previous letter, and in some respects adjusted its view of what activities might result in a loss of funding (“FAQs”).

See Dorsey’s eUpdate on the February 14, 2025 letter (the “original letter”).

The FAQs come after three teachers’ organizations filed a lawsuit in federal court in Maryland seeking to enjoin the Department’s actions under the original letter, arguing the letter is unconstitutionally vague and infringes on free speech rights.[iii] To date no injunction has been entered, although in a separate case, a federal court in Maryland previously enjoined portions of the administration’s DEI orders.[iv]

The Department Outlines Which Types of Cultural Events It Believes Run Afoul of Title VI

In its original letter, the Department painted DEI programs at educational institutions with a broad brush, stating that educational institutions have “toxically indoctrinated students” through DEI training, programming and discipline and through teaching that the country is based on “systemic and structural racism.” Naturally, the original letter left open questions regarding longstanding cultural programs like Black History Month. The Department’s FAQs address instances in which such cultural programs would not run afoul of its standards, but the FAQs leave the door open as to when such programs may be considered to create a hostile environment. The FAQs state that “programs focused on interests in particular cultures, heritages, and areas of the world would not in and of themselves violate Title VI, assuming they are open to all students regardless of race.” Similarly, “educational, cultural, or historical observances—such as Black History Month, International Holocaust Remembrance Day, or similar events—that celebrate or recognize historical events and contributions, and promote awareness, so long as they do not engage in racial exclusion or discrimination” would also not violate Title VI. However, such programming could be illegal if it “discourages members of all races from attending, either by excluding or discouraging students of a particular race or races,” or “by creating hostile environments based on race for students who do participate.”

The Department Acknowledges Limitations on its Control Over Curricula, But Describes How a “Racially Hostile Environment” in an Academic Program Could Give Rise to a Title VI Claim

The original letter also raised questions as to the Department’s ability to control the curriculum of educational institutions, particularly with respect to history and culture courses. It stated that certain programs “teach students that certain racial groups bear unique moral burdens that others do not. Such programs stigmatize students who belong to particular racial groups based on crude racial stereotypes. Consequently, they deny students the ability to participate fully in the life of a school.” The FAQs acknowledge that both the First Amendment and separate federal laws “prohibit the Department from exercising control over the content of school curricula.” The FAQs asserted, however, that some classroom instruction can result in a “racially hostile environment.” One example is “an elementary school that sponsors programming that acts to shame students of a particular race or ethnicity, accuse them of being oppressors in a racial hierarchy, ascribe to them less value as contributors to class discussions because of their race, or deliberately assign them intrinsic guilt based on the actions of their presumed ancestors or relatives in other areas of the world could create a racially hostile environment.” The FAQs noted, however, that the same discussions in a university would be less likely to create a hostile work environment.  The FAQs then pointed to the types of “extreme practices” at a university that could constitute a hostile work environment under Title VI:

  • “requiring students to participate in privilege walks;”
  • “segregating them by race for presentations and discussions with guest speakers;”
  • “pressuring them to participate in protests or take certain positions on racially charged issues;”
  • “investigating or sanctioning them for dissenting on racially charged issues through DEI or similar university offices;”
  • “mandating courses, orientation programs, or trainings that are designed to emphasize and focus on racial stereotypes;” and
  • “assigning them coursework that requires them to identify by race and then complete tasks differentiated by race.”

The Department Provides a Framework for Finding That a Racially Neutral Policy Had a “Racially Discriminatory Purpose”

The original letter also made clear the Department would target the use of “non-racial information” as a proxy for race, stating it would be unlawful “for an educational institution to eliminate standardized testing to achieve a desired racial balance or to increase racial diversity.”

In the FAQs, the Department provided a framework for investigating whether “covert discrimination” underlies a given program or practice.  It stated a “non-exhaustive list” would include:

  • “whether members of a particular race were treated differently than similarly situated students of other races;”
  • “the historical background or administrative history of the policy or decision;”
  • “whether there was a departure from normal procedures in making the policy or decision;”
  • “whether there was a pattern regarding policies or decisions towards members of a particular race;”
  • “statistics demonstrating a pattern of the policy or decision having a greater impact on members of a particular race;” and
  • “whether the school was aware of or could foresee the effect of the policy or decision on members of a particular race.”

The FAQs stated that a “school’s history and stated policy of using racial classifications and race-based policies to further DEI objectives, ‘equity,’ a racially-oriented vision of social justice, or similar goal” will also be probative.  The letter further indicated it would rely on the oft-cited burden-shifting analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) in evaluating indirect evidence of intentional discrimination.

What is the Current Status of the Department’s Efforts?

To date, the Department’s proposed efforts, including taking action to cease funding for institutions that it finds violate anti-discrimination laws, are continuing and are not subject to an injunction. Educational institutions should proceed with reviews of their DEI programs and policies pending further action from either the administration or the courts. As we previously recommended, that review should assess whether and to what extent an organization may continue to engage in practices that are consistent with anti-discrimination and other laws that have long been on the books.

 

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.