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Client Alert

Supreme Court Holds that Pure Omissions are Not Actionable under Rule 10b-5

April 18, 2024

by Michael Rowe, Nicholas K. Tygesson, and Jack Huerter

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The Supreme Court recently issued a significant decision regarding the reach of SEC Rule 10b-5. In Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners, L.P., the Court addressed whether the failure to disclose information required by Item 303 of SEC Regulation S-K, which affirmatively requires disclosure of certain known trends and uncertainties, can support a private action under Rule 10b-5 where the alleged omission does not render any statements made misleading. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court answered that question with a resounding “no,” holding that “pure omissions are not actionable under Rule 10b-5.” Rather, a Rule 10b-5 claim must always be based on a statement that is itself false or misleading or rendered misleading by omission.

The case arose from the alleged failure of defendant Macquarie to disclose the potential harm that a United Nation’s International Maritime Organization regulation, IMO 2020, could have on its business. Macquarie owns a subsidiary that operates large bulk liquid storage terminals for liquid commodities, including a fuel oil with a typical sulfur content of 3%. The UN regulation, adopted in 2016, capped the sulfur content of fuel oil used in shipping at 0.5% by 2020, which significantly limited the marketability of the fuel oil and the need for its storage. In the years that followed, the company did not discuss IMO 2020 in its public filings. In February 2018, the company announced during an earnings call that it had missed its projections and experienced a decline in the amount of storage contracted for at its subsidiary, including as a result of the decline in the fuel oil market. The company’s stock price dropped by 41%.

Following the stock drop, investors filed suit in the Southern District of New York asserting a Rule 10b-5 claim for securities fraud. The suit included a claim that Macquarie had omitted information it had a duty to disclose under Item 303, which requires disclosure of “any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that are reasonably likely to have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.” 17 C.F.R § 229.303(b)(2)(ii). On appeal from the District Court’s dismissal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that a violation of Item 303, which the plaintiff had adequately alleged, could form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 claim—which, while consistent with Second Circuit precedent, was in conflict with decisions from other circuits.

In a succinct opinion that hewed closely to the regulation’s text, the Court rejected the Second Circuit’s approach and held that Rule 10b-5 “does not proscribe pure omissions” even where a statute or regulation creates an affirmative duty to disclose. Implementing Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to “make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.” 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5(b) (emphasis added). Placing great weight on the use of the phrase “statements made,” the Court concluded that the rule only requires disclosure of “information necessary to ensure that statements already made are clear and complete,” i.e., to avoid misleading half-truths, and thus does not extend to pure omissions. Even though a reasonable investor would know that Item 303 requires disclosure of all known trends and uncertainties, and thus failure to disclose such an item would lead (or mislead) investors into believing that there were no such trends or uncertainties, Rule 10b-5’s focus on specific statements governs its application.

The Court then contrasted the text of Rule 10b-5 with that of Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. In Section 11(a), Congress imposed liability for a registration statement that “contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” 15 U. S. C. §77k(a). Unlike Rule 10b-5, the plain language of Section 11(a) expressly and separately proscribes untrue statements, pure omissions, and misleading half-truths—which the Court found “telling.”

The Court also addressed the oft-quoted maxim from Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U. S. 224, 239, n. 17 (1988), that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.” The Second Circuit had in fact previously cited that passage to support its rule that silence, in the presence of a duty to disclose, can form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 claim. See, e.g., Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993). In Macquarie, the Court elaborated on it, noting that "[e]ven a duty to disclose, however, does not automatically render silence misleading under Rule 10b-5(b).”

The Court’s decision is undoubtedly a positive development for defendants in private securities litigation. Pure-omissions theories, whether reliant on Item 303 or another statute or regulation, are no longer viable in Rule 10b-5 cases. Moreover, Macquarie calls into question cases permitting pure-omission claims in other areas of the securities law, e.g., in cases brought under Section 12(a)(2) or Rule 14a-9, where the relevant language likewise focuses on the statements made.

That said, as the opinion itself makes clear, the Court’s ruling has its limits. Most notably, omissions are still actionable under Rule 10b-5 if the omitted fact was necessary to avoid creating a misleading half-truth. In fact, the plaintiff’s counsel in Macquarie itself, following the Supreme Court’s opinion, has been quoted as saying “[t]here is going to be no impact on our case, because the Supreme Court has given us a road map to plead a half-truth, which we have.” Expect plaintiffs’ counsel in other securities fraud actions to make increasing use of misleading half-truth theories—already commonplace—to avoid the Court’s Macquarie ruling. In addition, the Court emphasized that the SEC still has the authority to investigate and prosecute violations of its regulations, including Item 303, and that pure-omission theories are still viable under Section 11(a). 

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.