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Client Alert

CTA Compliance Obligations for CTA Participants: Reporting Companies, Beneficial Owners, and Third-Party Preparers

May 9, 2024

by Joseph Lynyak, Erin Bryan, and Matthew Dickerson

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In an evolving (and somewhat disjointed) process, FinCEN has been providing guidance to persons and entities that are responsible for filing required beneficial ownership information (“BOI”) reports to FinCEN, as well as to “beneficial owners” when providing BOI to a reporting company to enable the reporting company to file a BOI report (a “BOI Report”) with FinCEN. This guidance has primarily been promulgated though FinCEN’s Small Business Compliance Guide[1] and its Beneficial Ownership Information—Frequently Asked Questions (the “FAQs”).[2]

Although the Corporate Transparency Act (the “CTA”)[3] and FinCEN’s implementing regulations (the “BOI Regulations”)[4] address the obligations of a reporting company to file initial reports and updated reports as necessary (to reflect changes or errors in previously filed reports), a fulsome discussion of the technical duty of participants when complying with the CTA reporting process (as interpreted by FinCEN) is less clear under the BOI Regulations.[5] For example:

  • What degree of due diligence by a reporting company is necessary to determine whether the BOI it receives is complete and accurate?
  • Does a beneficial owner or company applicant have an affirmative obligation to provide complete and accurate BOI when requested by a reporting company?
  • To what degree may a third party rely upon BOI provided by a reporting company for purposes of assisting in the preparation and filing of BOI Reports?

This lack of clarity regarding the compliance obligations of CTA participants (e.g., to provide accurate information and to verify the same) creates heightened risk for CTA participants because FinCEN has emphasized that non-compliance creates both civil and criminal liability.[6]

FinCEN has primarily utilized the FAQs to provide CTA participants with its views on compliance with the various duties and obligations of CTA participants.

In this eUpdate we discuss: (a) FinCEN’s views of the duties and obligations of CTA participants; and (b) risk management alternatives to be considered by CTA participants to mitigate possible liability. In that regard, below we identify pertinent FinCEN guidance in the FAQs regarding CTA compliance obligations, and apply that guidance to the following CTA participants:

  • Reporting companies;[7]
  • Beneficial owners;[8]
  • Third parties filing a BOI Report for a reporting company; and
  • Company applicants.[9]

FinCEN FAQs Regarding Compliance Obligation

The FAQs establish a baseline of responsibility for a reporting company to file timely and accurate reports, and state:

FAQ No. K. 4—Is a reporting company responsible for ensuring the accuracy of the information that it reports to FinCEN, even if the reporting company obtains that information from another party?

Yes. It is the responsibility of the reporting company to identify its beneficial owners and company applicants, and to report those individuals to FinCEN. At the time the filing is made, each reporting company is required to certify that its report or application is true, correct, and complete. Accordingly, FinCEN expects that reporting companies will take care to verify the information they receive from their beneficial owners and company applicants before reporting it to FinCEN. (Emphasis added.)

Importantly, FAQ No. K. 4 states that a reporting company is required to certify that its BOI Report “is true, correct, and complete.” Stated another way, the certification that a report is true, correct, and complete imposes on a reporting person some degree of inquiry (i.e., due diligence) that information in a filed BOI Report has been verified in some reasonable manner.

This compliance duty is expanded in FAQ No. K. 3, which expands on the obligation of CTA participants to provide complete and accurate information:

FAQ No. K. 3—Who can be held liable for violating BOI reporting requirements?

Both individuals and corporate entities can be held liable for willful violations. This can include not only an individual who actually files (or attempts to file) false information with FinCEN, but also anyone who willfully provides the filer with false information to report. Both individuals and corporate entities may also be liable for willfully failing to report complete or updated beneficial ownership information; in such circumstances, individuals can be held liable if they either cause the failure or are a senior officer at the company at the time of the failure.

i. Can an individual who files a report on behalf of a reporting company be held liable?

Yes. An individual who willfully files a false or fraudulent beneficial ownership information report on a company’s behalf may be subject to the same civil and criminal penalties as the reporting company and its senior officers.

ii. Can a beneficial owner or company applicant be held liable for refusing to provide required information to a reporting company? 

Yes. As described above, an enforcement action can be brought against an individual who willfully causes a reporting company’s failure to submit complete or updated beneficial ownership information to FinCEN. This would include a beneficial owner or company applicant who willfully fails to provide required information to a reporting company. (Emphasis added.)

As stated in FAQ No. K. 3, FinCEN views every CTA participant’s duty (including senior officers of a reporting company) as not merely passive in nature, but as requiring an affirmative duty to respond with accurate and complete information when requested.

Of the greatest liability concern to a reporting company is the possible reluctance of a beneficial owner to cooperate by supplying accurate and complete BOI—either to a reporting company or to a third party that is assisting in the preparation and filing of a BOI Report. While liability is created for a beneficial owner to cooperate with a reporting company, FAQ No. K. 5 places an affirmative compliance duty on a reporting company (as well as third parties assisting in the preparation and filing of a BOI Report) to require that BOI be provided. As stated in FAQ No. K. 5:

FAQ No. K. 5. What should a reporting company do if a beneficial owner or company applicant withholds information?

While FinCEN recognizes that much of the information required to be reported about beneficial owners and company applicants will be provided to reporting companies by those individuals, reporting companies are responsible for ensuring that they submit complete and accurate beneficial ownership information to FinCEN….

Existing reporting companies should engage with their beneficial owners to advise them of this requirement, obtain required information, and revise or consider putting in place mechanisms to ensure that beneficial owners will keep reporting companies apprised of changes in reported information, if necessary. Beneficial owners and company applicants should also be aware that they may face penalties if they willfully cause a reporting company to fail to report complete or updated beneficial ownership information.

Persons considering creating or registering legal entities that will be reporting companies should take steps to ensure that they have access to the beneficial ownership information required to be reported to FinCEN, and that they have mechanisms in place to ensure that the reporting company is kept apprised of changes in that information. (Emphasis added.)

In FAQ No. K. 2, FinCEN emphasizes both the civil and criminal exposure for violations:

FAQ No. K. 2. What penalties do individuals face for violating BOI reporting requirements?

As specified in the [CTA], a person who willfully violates the BOI reporting requirements may be subject to civil penalties of up to $500 for each day that the violation continues.…[10] A person who willfully violates the BOI reporting requirements may also be subject to criminal penalties of up to two years imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000. Potential violations include willfully failing to file a beneficial ownership information report, willfully filing false beneficial ownership information, or willfully failing to correct or update previously reported beneficial ownership information.

Risk Management Considerations and Approaches

Compliance failures in FinCEN’s new BOI disclosure scheme could be extraordinarily damaging not only to reporting companies and other corporate CTA participants, but also to individuals because violations of the BOI Regulations and the guidance contained in the FAQs potentially bring with it civil and criminal liability for CTA participants that are individuals. Among other things, the disruptive nature of an alleged violation in the area of anti-money laundering compliance is so severe that contesting alleged violations may not be practical—both because of the monetary cost to defend against alleged violations, as well as the potential loss of reputation to a targeted person or entity.[11]

It is suggested that CTA participants consider adopting policies and procedures that are directed to both internal and external CTA compliance. While it appears that FinCEN will continue to clarify what constitutes a reasonable compliance scheme, the following approaches might be considered:

The Reporting Company—A reporting company should consider both educating its beneficial owners of their respective duties to timely supply accurate and complete BOI, as well as assigning responsibility internally to assemble and file accurate BOI Reports to FinCEN.

In regard to beneficial owners, communications to a beneficial owner might include mandatory instructions to an investor in order for the reporting company to demonstrate that its interaction with a beneficial owner was reasonable when obtaining BOI. In addition, a reporting company should consider obtaining a certification from a beneficial owner that: (a) all BOI provided is complete and accurate; (b) the reporting company can rely upon all BOI received from the beneficial owner; and (c) the beneficial owner acknowledges its obligation to notify the reporting company of all BOI changes that require the filing of an amended BOI Report.

In the case of many investments, securities offering and/or governance documents generally contain representations and warranties made by an investor, including compliance with AML laws and regulations. Although this approach may be appropriate as a starting point for a BOI compliance program, in specific circumstances separate disclosures regarding the duties of a beneficial owner may be required.

In regard to internally organizing an effective BOI compliance program, a reporting company may want to designate either an individual employee or officer to be responsible for BOI compliance within the corporate group. For example, for those reporting companies that are subject to AML compliance, responsibility for BOI compliance might be assigned to the designated AML officer.[12] Alternatively, operating divisions of a reporting company might be trained to include as a regular component of corporate organization and reporting BOI compliance and outreach to its beneficial owners.

Third Parties Assisting in the Drafting and Filing of BOI Reports—In the case of third parties assisting in the drafting of a BOI Report (e.g., a lawyer, law firm or accountant) the major compliance challenge is to adequately document that the third-party preparer is reasonably relying upon the BOI provided by the reporting company and its beneficial owners.

The applicable FinCEN verification language when filing an initial or subsequent report arguably contains language that allows a third party to rely upon BOI provided by a reporting company:

I certify that I am authorized to file this [BOI Report] on behalf of the reporting company. I further certify, on behalf of the reporting company, that the information contained in this [BOI Report] is true, correct, and complete.[13]

The language that indicates that a third-party preparer is certifying “on behalf of a reporting company” the accuracy of a filed BOI Report might possibly be viewed as inadequate in the absence of a documented communication (e.g., email or contract) between the third party and the reporting company. Specifically, any such communication or contract should specify: (a) the role of the third party; (b) the obligation of the reporting company to obtain accurate and complete BOI to be included in a BOI Report; (c) the agreement of the reporting company to defend and indemnify the third party for inaccurate or false data; and (d) role of the third party to assist or to file additional BOI Reports in the future.[14]

Beneficial Owners—Although sophisticated investors are now familiar with the intrusive nature of a financial institution’s know your customer or “KYC” obligations,[15] there is likely a large segment of individuals who may qualify as beneficial owners that may balk at any requirement to reasonably cooperate with a reporting company in regard to disclosing their respective BOI.

Reasonable cooperation is complex due to the BOI Regulations that define “beneficial ownership” under the CTA’s two-pronged approach: (a) equity ownership of 25% or more of a reporting company;[16] and (b) the exercise of “substantial control” of the reporting company.[17] In other words, even individuals with no actual ownership interest in a reporting company may nonetheless be deemed “beneficial owners” due to their ability to substantially control the reporting company.

Reporting changes in equity ownership can require the filing of several amended BOI Reports in a short period of time because equity ownership can vary significantly if several rounds of capital raises occur, as well as tracing equity ownership through several layers of corporate ownership. Similarly, the extremely broad range of what constitutes “substantial control” may easily result in the lack of understanding of contractual and other rights that result in an individual being deemed a beneficial owner through an individual’s ability to determine “important decisions” of a reporting company.[18]

While ultimately the assembly of BOI may be systematized through detailed policies and procedures shared among CTA participants, for the remainder of 2024 it is more probable that the onus for ensuring the receipt of accurate and correct BOI from beneficial owners will be on the reporting company.

Observations and Recommendations

Anecdotal evidence regarding compliance with the BOI Regulations indicates that many existing reporting companies organized or registered prior to January 1, 2024 are taking a prudent, “wait and see” approach to allow FinCEN to elaborate on the standard it will employ to determine whether BOI compliance is reasonable. For example, the FAQs employ the concept of “willfulness” when describing an actionable violation—does this mean intentionally reporting inaccurate or false BOI, or is it a lesser standard that includes merely failing to develop reasonable policies and procedures for compliance?

While FinCEN indicates in the BOI Regulations and accompanying materials that “willfulness is a legal concept that is well established in existing case law,” that legal position is an exaggeration of the clarity of the concept of willfulness. Though beyond the scope of this eUpdate, the standard of willfulness as determined by case law ranges from merely making an unknowing statement (e.g., a form of negligence) to recklessness or conduct that approaches an intent to knowingly violate the law.

While the applicable standard for willful conduct will ultimately have to be resolved by judicial interpretation, at minimum, having policies and procedures in place to file accurate and complete BOI Reports arguably insulates reporting companies and other CTA participants from liability by demonstrating reasonable conduct.

As noted in this eUpdate, while the range of complexity to comply with FinCEN’s views of the compliance obligations of CTA participants will vary significantly, it is strongly recommended that reporting companies consider some or all of the strategies discussed herein to position themselves as attempting to reasonably comply with current FinCEN guidance.

 


[3] Public Law 116-283 (January 1, 2021).

[4] 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380 et seq.

[5] For purposes of this eUpdate, the term “CTA participants” will generally refer to persons and entities responsible for complying with the filing of a BOI Report pursuant to the BOI Regulations.

[6] 31 C.F.R § 1010.380(g).

[7] 31 C.F.R. § 380(c)(1). This discussion applies generally to “domestic reporting companies” as well as to “foreign reporting companies.”

[8] 31C.F.R. § 380(d).

[9] 31C.F.R. § 380(e).

[10] The CTA’s penalty provision is adjusted upward annually to adjust for inflation, and is currently set at $591.

[11] For example, in regard to the imposition of a monetary penalty, in the case of a defective filed report that remains uncorrected for a year, the monetary penalty against an individual could exceed $180,000 (and the penalty theoretically could be accessed against multiple individuals who are CTA participants, concluding senior officers of a reporting company and individual beneficial owners).

[12] See, generally, 31 C.F.R. § 1020.210 et seq.

[14] In the case in which a third party is regularly involved either in the formation of reporting companies for a client—such as acting as a company applicant, or when performing on-going corporate housekeeping, the contact between a third-party preparer and a reporting company would likely mirror the contractual provisions between a reporting company and its investors (i.e., beneficial owners).

[15] 31 C.F.R. § 1020.210 et seq.

[16] 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(d); (d)(2).

[17] 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(d); (d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(ii).

[18] 31 C.F.R. § 1010.380(d)(1)(C).

Firm Highlights

Insights

Energy Law: Month in Review - September 2026

Welcome to Dorsey’s Energy Law: Month in Review. We provide this update to our clients to identify significant developments in the previous month. Please reach out to any of the authors, listed above, to discuss these issues. Regulatory Developments Massachusetts Ratchets Up State and Local Regulation of AI Data Centers In early September, Governor Maura Healey of Massachusetts signed an executive order requiring that artificial intelligence data centers secure the approval of local communities as a precondition to proceeding with a given project. According to the terms of the order, data center developers will need to secure a “community benefits agreement” as a precondition to receiving permits from numerous state agencies, including the Department of Environmental Protection, the Energy Facilities Siting Board, and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act Office. Beyond requiring community benefits agreements, the order also mandates that developers mitigate utility costs to consumers, prohibits the use of nondisclosure agreements, and requires various state agencies to develop measures to limit data center impacts on the environment. North Carolina Regulators Decline Approval of Duke Energy Gas Turbine On September 18, 2026, North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) denied Duke Energy’s application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity required to construct a gas-fueled combustion turbine at its Smith Energy Complex in North Carolina. The NCUC objected strongly to the $584 million price tag and noted that Duke appeared to be constructing the facility “based on anticipated data center customer additions.” The NCUC rejected that anticipated growth as “insufficiently reliable for the Commission to act at this point.” In rejecting Duke’s application, the NCUC also noted that Duke had signed the White House Ratepayer Protection Pledge, in which it represented that it would not shift data center costs to consumers. The NCUC observed that the record did not demonstrate how Duke “intends to adhere to its commitments under the Ratepayer Protection Pledge with regard to the Proposed Facility.” Notably, commission staff had actually supported the construction of the turbine, citing concerns about Duke’s reserve margins. The NCUC noted that it “understands the Public Staff’s expressed concerns,” but those concerns were outweighed by the NCUC’s reservations, including questions of demand. Department of Energy Approves Funds for Grid Improvement The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) recently announced that it would fund 31 grid-improvement projects in 26 states. The funding initiative is part of the DOE’s “SPARK” initiative. The funding will include $1.9 billion in federal funding from DOE and $3.35 billion in recipient cost-sharing funding. The funds will go to projects designed to improve grid reliability and lower electricity costs. Recipients plan to reconductor over 1,500 miles of transmission lines and will deploy grid-enhancing technologies across approximately 21,000 miles. DOE stated that this initiative will make available over 23 additional gigawatts of electricity. Texas Moderates Rules Governing Data Center Interconnection The Texas Public Utility Commission adopted new regulations governing large-load interconnections. The rules impose a flat study fee of $100,000 for all proposed interconnections, which departs from the initial proposal to impose study fees using a tiered system based on project size. Additionally, the final rule eliminates the PUC’s previous proposal to impose a non-refundable interconnection fee of $50,000 per MW of contracted peak demand. The final rule also moderates the initially proposed regulations governing Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) notifications for large-load customers’ non-utilized capacity. The proposed rules would have required notifying ERCOT within 30 days of missing a scheduled energization milestone by six months. The final rules, however, do not require informing ERCOT unless a scheduled energization milestone is missed by 24 months. FERC Denies TransAlta 202(c) Cost-Recovery Plan The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) recently rejected TransAlta’s plan to recover $19.9 million in expenses stemming from a DOE order in which DOE prohibited TransAlta from retiring its coal-powered Centralia power plant. TransAlta had previously intended to retire the facility at the end of 2025. TransAlta’s cost recovery plan proposed spending an additional $23 million on repairs to continue operating the unit. FERC’s main objection had to do with geographic scope. TransAlta’s recovery plan called for recovering costs from California Independent System Operator (CAISO) and the Southwest Power Pool (SPP), but the DOE’s order requiring operation of the plant was designed to ensure reliability in the Northwest assessment area (Montana, Oregon, Washington, and parts of northern California and northern Idaho). Accordingly, FERC was unwilling to allow cost recovery from CAISO and SPP when the order that precipitated the additional costs only related to the Northwest assessment area. FERC informed TransAlta that it would only approve cost recovery from load-serving entities in the Northwest assessment area. FERC’s decision comes amid a rush of DOE emergency orders requiring the continued operation of coal-fired generating units. Litigation Appeals Court Upholds Washington Hydropower Plant With Caveats In a September 21, 2026, opinion, the Washington Court of Appeals largely upheld a Clean Water Act water quality certification by the Washington Department of Ecology for the Goldendale Energy Storage Project, a proposed pumped-water storage hydropower system adjacent to, but off-stream from, the Columbia River. A nonprofit (Columbia Riverkeeper) and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation appealed the certification, contending that it failed to impose necessary conditions and monitoring requirements to protect the water quality of the Columbia River. Most saliently, the plaintiffs argued that the project had the potential to leak 100 acre-feet of water per year into tributaries of the Columbia River. The Court of Appeals broadly rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s conclusion that “the project was designed not to leak.” That said, the Court of Appeals did reverse on one narrow issue. Specifically, the court determined that the state’s conclusion that “leakage from the project’s tunnels would be monitored and reported” was not supported by the evidence because the certification “does not explicitly require monitoring and reporting to determine whether there is any leakage.” Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the state to impose monitoring and reporting requirements but otherwise affirmed the certification. Legislative Developments California Legislates Restrictions on Data Center Energy Use and Grid Costs On September 21, 2026, California Governor Gavin Newsom signed seven bills broadly regulating data centers in the state. SB 1168 directed the California Public Utilities Commission to assess the energy used by data centers. It also requires the PUC to pass costs of transmission and distribution upgrades and load increases on to data centers, rather than customers. SB 886 and SB 887 compel data centers to pay for infrastructure upgrade and generation costs, and wildfire mitigation costs, in addition to imposing environmental review. The statutes additionally increase local oversight of data centers. AB 1577 imposes a monthly reporting requirement that requires data centers to supply energy consumption and efficiency data to the California Energy Commission. AB 2383 contains incentives for data centers to use onsite clean energy generation. Finally, AB 2469 and AB 2619 require data center developments to assess water supply and develop a water scarcity plan. The statutes also mandate statewide water reporting as a precondition to obtaining and renewing business licenses.

Insights

EPA Limits Title V Re-Litigation of NSR Permits

Overview On September 25, 2026, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) published a final rule that significantly limits the ability of third parties to use the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Title V permitting process to revisit New Source Review (“NSR”) permitting decisions years after those decisions were made. The rule establishes that NSR permitting determinations generally must be challenged during the original permitting proceeding, thereby providing regulated sources with greater permitting certainty and finality for major capital projects. Published in the Federal Register titled Clarifying the Scope of “Applicable Requirements” Under State Operating Permit Programs and the Federal Operating Permit Program (Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2023-0401), the rule amends 40 C.F.R. Parts 70 and 71 to codify EPA’s interpretation regarding when requirements established under other CAA programs may be reviewed, modified, or implemented through the Title V operating permit program. The rule becomes effective 30 days after publication. The rule addresses two principal issues: (1) the relationship between NSR preconstruction permitting and Title V operating permits, and (2) the treatment of the General Duty Clause under CAA section 112(r)(1). Most significantly, the rule provides greater certainty for sources navigating the NSR permitting process. EPA’s amendments are intended to ensure that NSR permitting decisions made through an approved public process are generally not revisited later through Title V permit proceedings. The rule responds to a circuit split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In Environmental Integrity Project v. EPA, 969 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2020), the Fifth Circuit upheld EPA’s interpretation, concluding that it was consistent with the text, structure, and purpose of Title V. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Sierra Club v. EPA, 964 F.3d 882 (10th Cir. 2020), finding that the then-existing regulatory definition of “applicable requirement” did not support EPA’s position. By amending the regulatory language on which the Tenth Circuit relied and codifying the interpretation approved by the Fifth Circuit, EPA has established a nationwide framework governing the interaction between NSR and Title V. NSR and Title V: EPA Establishes a Uniform Nationwide Framework At the core of the rule is EPA’s effort to define the respective roles of NSR and Title V. The rule codifies the approach EPA has applied since 2017: once a source obtains an NSR permit under an EPA-approved permitting program, and that permit was issued following public notice with an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes the NSR-related “applicable requirements” of the State Implementation Plan (“SIP”) or Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) for Title V purposes. Under this framework, Title V is not a vehicle for re-examining underlying NSR permitting decisions. EPA does not intend to use the Title V process to revisit applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology determinations, permit conditions, or other issues resolved through the NSR permitting process. This principle applies regardless of the stage of the Title V proceeding; whether the NSR permit was issued pursuant to a SIP or FIP; the type of NSR issue involved; or whether the NSR permit is incorporated into Title V sequentially or concurrently. Limited Exceptions EPA recognizes several circumstances in which NSR issues may still be reviewed through the Title V program: No NSR permit was issued at all; The permit was issued without public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review; or The issue involves substantive overlap between Title V and NSR requirements, such as the adequacy of monitoring provisions. As a result, the rule does not insulate unpermitted projects or foreclose review of matters that independently arise under Title V. Key Regulatory Amendments The rule revises the definition of “applicable requirement” in 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.2 and 71.2. Paragraph (1): Where an NSR permit is issued with public notice and an opportunity for comment and judicial review, the permit establishes and defines the applicable SIP or FIP requirements for Title V purposes. Paragraph (2): All NSR permit terms, including terms contained in minor NSR permits, constitute applicable requirements that must be incorporated into Title V permits. Paragraph (4): CAA section 112(r)(1) (the General Duty Clause) is expressly excluded from the definition of “applicable requirement,” while section 112(r)(7) Risk Management Program requirements remain included. EPA also amended 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.8 and 70.12 to clarify that alleged defects in requirements established outside the Title V process generally do not provide a basis for EPA objection to a Title V permit or for a Title V citizen petition. General Duty Clause Exclusion The rule also codifies EPA’s longstanding position that the General Duty Clause in CAA section 112(r)(1) is not an “applicable requirement” for Title V purposes. EPA points to several considerations supporting that conclusion, including the distinction between the General Duty Clause and Title V permit terms, the provision’s origins in the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause, and the different enforcement structures applicable to the General Duty Clause and Title V permit requirements. Importantly, excluding section 112(r)(1) from the definition of “applicable requirement” does not eliminate EPA’s authority to enforce the General Duty Clause independently of the Title V program. The final rule instead clarifies that the General Duty Clause need not—and should not—be incorporated into Title V permits as an applicable requirement. Practical Implications for Regulated Sources Greater Finality for NSR Permits  For projects requiring PSD, nonattainment NSR, or minor NSR permits, the permitting process becomes the primary forum for resolving disputes regarding applicability determinations, emissions calculations, control technology requirements, offsets, and permit conditions. Once an NSR permit is issued through a qualifying public process, regulated sources should face substantially reduced risk that those same issues will be challenged years later through Title V permit proceedings. Reduced Risk of Collateral Permit Challenges Stakeholders have sometimes sought to use Title V permit issuance, renewal, revision, or citizen-petition proceedings to challenge underlying NSR determinations. The final rule makes clear that Title V is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging whether an applicable requirement was correctly established in the first instance. This should reduce the risk of permit delays and uncertainty associated with collateral challenges to previously issued NSR permits. The rule does not, however, eliminate all Title V challenges relating to an NSR permit. Challenges concerning the Title V permit itself—including whether it appropriately incorporates applicable requirements or contains adequate compliance provisions—remain possible. Increased Importance of the Initial NSR Proceeding Because Title V generally will not provide a second opportunity to challenge the substantive validity of an NSR determination, the administrative record developed during the NSR process becomes increasingly important. Permit applicants should ensure that applicability analyses, emissions calculations, control technology evaluations, modeling demonstrations, and supporting technical documentation are thoroughly developed during the original permitting proceeding. For significant projects, applicants may therefore have an additional incentive to identify and resolve potential permitting issues before the NSR permit is issued rather than assuming that unresolved issues can be addressed during a subsequent Title V proceeding. Potential Incentive for Broader Public Participation EPA also notes that permitting authorities may choose to provide public notice and an opportunity for comment for a broader range of NSR permits because permits issued through a qualifying public process receive the benefit of the finality framework established by the rule. Some permitting authorities may conclude that greater public participation at the NSR stage is preferable to uncertainty during subsequent Title V proceedings. Conclusion The final rule is principally a permitting-certainty measure. For sources that obtain NSR permits through a public process, EPA has substantially limited the ability of third parties to revisit underlying NSR determinations through the Title V program. As a result, regulated entities should benefit from greater finality regarding key permitting decisions, reduced risk of collateral permit challenges, and increased certainty when planning and implementing capital projects.

Insights

The Supreme Court Update - October 8, 2026

On September 29, 2026, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in one case: Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D., No. 26-426: This case concerns the Trump Administration’s “third-country removal” procedures, where immigrants are deported to countries not listed in the removal orders. In granting certiorari, the Court granted the Government’s application to stay a lower court decision halting the practice, which will allow third-country removals to continue pending resolution of the case. The issues presented are: (1) Whether the district court had jurisdiction over respondents’ claims; (2) whether the district court had authority to enter class-wide declaratory relief and APA vacatur under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1); (3) whether the Government’s guidance on third-country removals is unlawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b), the due process clause, or FARRA/CAT and its implementing regulations; and (4) such other questions that the Government determines are appropriate for the proper disposition of the case. On October 1, 2026, the Court granted certiorari in three additional cases: Rhoney v. Barbosa da Cunha, No. 26-104: Immigration officials detained Ricardo Aparecido Barbosa da Cunha—a Brazilian citizen who had lived in the United States for approximately twenty years after entering without inspection—and denied him a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The Second Circuit held that his detention was instead governed by § 1226(a), which permits release on bond, because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-detention requirement applies only to noncitizens apprehended while entering the country or shortly thereafter. The question presented is: Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention pending removal proceedings of aliens who, like Barbosa da Cunha, are present in the United States without having been admitted. Missionaries of St. John the Baptist, Inc. v. Frederic, No. 25-113: A Catholic religious organization sought to build a shrine to the Virgin Mary on land the organization owned adjacent to its church in Park Hills, Kentucky. Local zoning restrictions prohibited the proposed construction. The question presented is: Whether a land-use regulation that prohibits a religious institution from building a religious structure on its own property constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious exercise under the Substantial Burden Provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Marschner v. Marschner, No. 25-1349: Under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (“USFSPA”), a veteran’s longevity-based retirement pay can be divided in a divorce, but retirement pay based on disability and retirement pay that was waived to receive disability pay are indivisible. The question presented is: Does the USFSPA require state courts to refuse enforcement of indemnification provisions in a divorce settlement agreement?

Insights

SEC Proposes Expansion of Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Rule

On September 30, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) proposed amendments to Rule 205-3 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), which provides an exemption from the general prohibition under Section 205(a)(1) of the Advisers Act on registered investment advisers receiving performance-based compensation (the “Proposal”) so long as performance-based compensation is limited to “qualified clients”.1 Most notably for private fund sponsors, the Proposal would expand the definition of “qualified client” to include any investors that satisfy the “accredited investor” definition under Regulation D. The Proposal may also have implications for private fund managers that rely on exemptions from investment adviser registration under state law because certain state-level investment adviser registration exemptions incorporate or otherwise reference the federal qualified client definition. Expansion of the Qualified Client Definition Under the current Rule 205-3, an investor generally may qualify as a qualified client if, among other alternatives, the investor has at least $1.4 million under management with the adviser or has a net worth exceeding $2.7 million. These thresholds are higher than the financial thresholds applicable to many accredited investors under Regulation D. As a result, an investor may currently qualify as an accredited investor for purposes of investing in a private offering without qualifying as a qualified client for purposes of paying performance-based compensation. The Proposal would expand the qualified client definition to include any natural person or legal entity investor that satisfies the accredited investor definition under Regulation D. The Proposal would also remove the assets under management and net worth thresholds under the current Rule 205-3 qualified client test. For private funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, this change could reduce the need to apply a separate qualified client standard to investors that already qualify as accredited investors. Dorsey Observations and Next Steps If adopted as proposed, the expanded qualified client definition could be particularly significant for private fund managers. Most private fund offerings are already limited to accredited investors under Regulation D. However, the Proposal could expand the pool of prospective investors available to emerging private fund managers while reducing the regulatory burden associated with complying with Rule 205-3. The Proposal could also benefit advisers operating below the SEC registration threshold that rely on a state private fund adviser exemption. A number of states have adopted exemptions modeled on the North American Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) private fund adviser exemption, which may condition relief for advisers to certain funds relying on Section 3(c)(1) on each beneficial owner satisfying the federal qualified client definition. However, state requirements vary, and any effect of the Proposal would depend on the text of the applicable state exemption and how it incorporates Rule 205-3. Many emerging private fund managers may have a larger network of accredited investor relationships than qualified client relationships during the early stages of their investment advisory business. Currently, under Rule 205-3, private fund managers may receive performance-based compensation from investors who do not satisfy the qualified client definition if those investors were admitted to their private funds prior to registration with the SEC. Following registration with the SEC, however, managers may continue to permit investors that are not qualified clients to invest in future private funds but may not receive performance-based compensation from those investors with respect to such investments. In addition, because the net worth and assets under management thresholds for qualified client status are adjusted for inflation every five years, the pool of qualified client investors may diminish over time as previously eligible investors no longer satisfy the applicable thresholds. The Proposal could provide the dual benefit of greater flexibility for private fund managers to establish and maintain relationships with accredited investors as their businesses scale and they become registered with the SEC, and greater flexibility for certain accredited investors to participate in investment strategies that historically have been restricted to much larger institutional investors. Unless and until the Proposal is adopted, investment advisers should continue to comply with the existing qualified client requirements. If the Proposal is adopted, private fund sponsors should consider whether corresponding changes are appropriate for their subscription documents, investor questionnaires, and other offering materials. Advisers that are state-registered or rely on a state-level exemption should also consult the laws and regulations of each relevant jurisdiction before changing investor eligibility standards or performance-based compensation practices, because adoption of the federal amendments may not automatically modify state requirements. Comments on the Proposal will be due 60 days after publication in the Federal Register. 1 Investment Adviser Performance-Based Compensation Modernization, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-7022 (Sept. 30, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-28#33-11443proposed.