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Michael practices in the areas of environmental law and general litigation, with a focus on environmental and administrative litigation.

Select Experience

  • Litigation counsel for coal industry in multiple NEPA and FLPMA challenges to mineral leasing and mine planning actions in Wyoming and Colorado on Forest Service and BLM-administered lands, venued in federal court and the Interior Board of Land Appeals 
  • Defended agricultural and industrial clients in toxic tort, workplace injury, and property damage litigation, as well as regulatory enforcement proceedings
  • Litigated multiple matters involving the dormant Commerce Clause, CERCLA, NEPA, CWA, and state environmental statutory and common law equivalents
  • Represented multiple waste industry clients in federal and state permitting and civil actions, to full jury verdict or judgment

Education

  • University of Virginia School of Law (J.D., 1995)
    • Virginia Law Review Editorial Board
  • University of Michigan, Institute for Public Policy Studies (M.P.P., 1987)
  • University of Michigan (B.A., Political Science, 1987)
    • with distinction

Bar Admissions

  • Minnesota

Court Admissions

  • U.S. District Courts for the Districts of Minnesota and Colorado
  • Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeal

Accolades

  • Minnesota Monthly, Top Lawyer in Administrative / Regulatory Law , 2024
  • Consistently providing pro bono legal assistance to those in need through Dorsey’s Pro Bono program
  • MSBA, North Star Lawyer, 2012-2014, 2016-2018, 2020-2022, 2024-2025
  • Minnesota Super Lawyers®, "Rising Star", 2004

Insights

Client Alert

Minnesota PFAS Reporting Update

January 7, 2026

Background In December 2025, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (“MPCA”) issued an order adopting its final set of rules governing intentionally added Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl substances (“PFAS” a/k/a “forever chemicals”) in consumer products. These administrative rules stem from the MPCA’s rulemaking authority under Amara’s law, a wide-reaching statute governing PFAS that will take effect in stages between January 1, 2025, and January 1, 2032. The first phase of Amara’s law involved an absolute prohibition on intentionally added PFAS in certain consumer products including: (1) carpets or rugs; (2) cleaning products; (3) cookware; (4) cosmetics; (5) dental floss; (6) fabric treatments; (7) juvenile products; (8) menstruation products; (9) textile furnishings; (10) ski wax; and (11) upholstered furniture. Minn. Stat. § 116.943, subd. 5. That prohibition took effect on January 1, 2025. The next phase of Amara’s law requires that producers report certain information to the state of Minnesota regarding intentionally added PFAS in consumer products. Id., subd. 2. The statute initially required producers to begin submitting their PFAS reports on January 1, 2026. The underlying statute, however, authorized the MPCA to delay the reporting period, and the final rule delayed the PFAS reporting deadline to July 1, 2026. The MPCA’s newly finalized rules principally concern this requirement to report intentionally added PFAS in consumer products. The final rules represent the culmination of a monthslong rulemaking proceeding before the MPCA. After numerous requests for comments and a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge—James Mortenson—invalidated the rules on substantive and procedural grounds in an August 2025 order. In the most recent (and final) version of the rules, the MPCA sought to address Judge Mortenson’s concerns while finalizing a workable set of PFAS reporting rules. Contents of the Final Rule The final set of rules closely resembles earlier versions of the rules, with a few adjustments in response to public comments and the Administrative Law Judge’s August order. The final rule clarifies that the upcoming PFAS reports must contain the following: (1) a description of the product; (2) the specific PFAS substances used in the product; (3) the concentration of the PFAS substances; (4) the function of the PFAS substances; (5) information about the manufacturer and its authorized representatives and contact information. Most controversially, the MPCA retained a comprehensive due-diligence requirement that compels reporters to examine supply chain (among other things) to ensure an accurate and complete PFAS report. MPCA retained this due-diligence requirement despite numerous public comments that it was onerous, impractical, and expensive. Finally, the rule also: (1) clarifies the fees associated with the required reports; (2) identifies which parties are responsible for reporting; (3) requires periodic report updates; (4) identifies procedures for securing waivers or extensions of the reporting requirement; (5) contains procedures for protecting trade secrets; and (6) identifies exempt parties. Other PFAS Requirements The next prohibition in Amara’s law takes effect on January 1, 2032. After that date, Minnesota law will prohibit the sale of any product containing intentionally added PFAS unless the MPCA determines that PFAS constitutes a “currently unavoidable use.” Minn. Stat. § 116.943, subd. 5. The MPCA has yet to promulgate rules governing what comprises a “currently unavoidable use” under that statutory provision. In the interim, companies should assess whether their business requires that they seek a determination that their current PFAS use constitutes an “unavoidable use.” Moreover, Amara’s law is not the only statute governing PFAS in Minnesota. For example, the Minnesota legislature has passed specific statutes governing PFAS in pesticides (Minn. Stat. § 18B.03), fertilizer products (Minn. Stat. § 18C.111), and food packaging. See Minn. Stat. § 325F.075. Regulated parties should assess their compliance with every applicable statute, not only Amara’s law. Moreover, on the federal level, companies should also be aware of the upcoming reporting period for PFAS under the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”). Under PFAS regulations promulgated by the Biden Administration, importers and manufacturers of products containing PFAS must submit reports to the EPA regarding PFAS in their products. In May of 2025, the Environmental Protection Agency extended the reporting deadlines under TSCA, and the reporting period now runs from April 13, 2026, through October 13, 2026. See Perfluoroalkyl and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) Data Reporting and Recordkeeping Under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA); Change to Submission Period, 90 Fed. Reg. 20236 (May 13, 2025) (linked here). In addition to TSCA, the EPA also recently announced that it would retain the Biden Administration’s designation of PFAS as a hazardous substance under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). Litigation Implications Minnesota courts have already seen numerous suits alleging PFAS contamination. Most notably in 2018, the State of Minnesota settled a suit with 3M for $850 million, in which the state alleged that 3M contaminated drinking water and natural resources in the Twin Cities. Other smaller companies, however, have also reached settlements with the state. In 2023, for instance, the MPCA and DNR settled a $1.37 million suit with Douglas Corporation for alleged PFAS pollution in lakes in St. Louis Park and Minneapolis. Local municipalities and tribes have also sued PFAS users for PFAS contamination in their water supplies. With the upcoming PFAS reporting period under Amara’s law, the state will soon possess a comprehensive list of products containing intentionally added PFAS, and that information will be available to potential plaintiffs under the State’s public records laws.      

Client Alert

Supreme Court Clarifies and Streamlines NEPA Requirements

May 30, 2025

Yesterday the Supreme Court issued a decision that has the practical effect of reducing the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA,[1] and making it more likely that agency environmental reviews will be upheld, particularly as applied to energy, natural resource, major infrastructure, and transportation projects. Yesterday’s Supreme Court Decision The decision, Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County,[2] concerned a railway in Utah that would make it easier to develop oil resources in remote parts of Utah. In 2021, the federal Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) completed an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) and approved the project. The STB declined to examine the environmental effects, including greenhouse gas emissions, tied to additional oil development upstream and refining downstream. The STB concluded that these effects would arise from separate projects regulated by other agencies and therefore did not need to be analyzed. The D.C. Circuit reversed the agency’s approval in 2023, concluding that such effects needed to be analyzed because they were reasonably foreseeable impacts of the railway. Yesterday, the Supreme Court agreed 8-0 that the D.C. Circuit was wrong. Writing for the Court, Justice Kavanaugh concluded that the D.C. Circuit made two errors: (1) the court failed to give the “substantial judicial deference required in NEPA cases” to the STB’s determinations on the scope of the EIS, and (2) NEPA does not require the STB to examine the “upstream” effects of oil development or the “downstream” effects of oil usage because those impacts would be regulated by other agencies and are remote in time and place from the railway. In contrast to its 2024 decision in Loper Bright that courts should not defer to agency interpretations of a statute,[3] the Court scolded judges for “micromanaging” agencies in the context of NEPA reviews. The opinion distinguished NEPA from other environmental statutes with more specific requirements to explain its holding in light of Loper Bright, stating that NEPA grants agencies discretionary authority to implement broad obligations. Justice Kagan wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, which agreed that the STB’s review was sufficient in scope because the upstream and downstream effects fell outside of the agency’s specific statutory authority. Noting that the STB does not have any authority over future oil development or refinement, the concurrence stated that agencies should only analyze impacts that their decision would be “at least in part” responsible for. These justices would therefore have reversed the D.C. Circuit without getting into the other policy issues. Although declining to discuss the issue of scoping any further, Justice Kagan also agreed with the need for agency deference, referencing her own dissent in Loper Bright on the value of agency expertise. The Seven Counties Decision Should Lead to Fewer Reversals of Agency Decisions Yesterday’s majority opinion in Seven County will be very beneficial to agency environmental reviews. The analysis of upstream and downstream effects has been a major area of litigation and judicial disagreement in recent years, particularly in the context of climate change. This decision will allow agencies to set clearer boundaries on which effects to analyze and reduce the scope of their analysis. Second, the High Court’s emphasis on the need for deferential judicial review of agency actions is likely to give agencies greater confidence in making decisions and making them less likely to be overturned. This decision lessens the impact of the Supreme Court’s curtailment of deference to agency interpretations of statutes in last Term’s Loper Bright decision.[4] Notably, the majority opinion declared that agency approvals should not be overturned even if the EIS is deficient in scope unless there is other evidence that the agency would disapprove of the project if it considered additional factors. In a potentially important footnote, the Court noted that the 2023 BUILDER Act[5] limits EIS’s to 150 pages, reinforcing the legitimacy and ability of agencies to do shorter, quicker, and simpler EIS documents. Interplay with Other Current NEPA Developments The Seven County decision occurs in a regulatory environment generally in turmoil. In recent weeks, the Administration has: Rescinded the long-standing Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA regulations; [6] Declared that high priority resource and energy projects should undergo extremely accelerated NEPA review, with EIS’s completed in as little as a month; [7] and, Eliminated various tools and policy considerations like the Social Cost of Carbon[8] and Environmental Justice[9] from NEPA analyses. All of these decisions are or are likely to be litigated. Whatever the outcome of those cases, the Administration and project proponents clearly benefit from Seven Counties. Because of the Court’s emphasis on the need to defer to agency determinations of the proper scope of their review, an agency is more likely to have its decisions upheld against challenges that the agency did not check all the NEPA boxes. The biggest project beneficiaries of this decision will likely to be large energy, natural resource, infrastructure, and transportation projects. This is because these types of projects tend to generate significant upstream and downstream environmental effects, spur or relate to numerous separate projects, and generate intense opposition. This has for decades made permitting such projects very challenging under NEPA. Permitting may now be easier at the federal level, although still not truly simple. NEPA remains a very fact-dependent process, governed by a “rule of reason,” and there will remain projects where courts will find that agencies did not act reasonably in excluding certain effects from analysis. This is especially true where agencies employ extremely fast NEPA reviews currently endorsed by the Trump Administration for high priority projects. Although the Court’s decision in Seven Counties should result in increased deference to agency decisions, challengers will still be able question whether an agency’s decision not to consider certain impacts was arbitrary, especially in the context of highly abbreviated review periods.   [1] 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. [2] The decision is available through supremecourt.gov. [3] 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), available through supremecourt.gov. [4] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024), available through supremecourt.gov. [5] “Building United States Infrastructure through Limited Delays and Efficient Reviews Act of2023.” Pub. L. 118–5, Div. C, Tit. III, §321, 137 Stat. 38–39. [6] 90 FR 10610, available through the Federal Register. [7] Dept. Interior, Department of the Interior Implements Emergency Permitting Procedures to Strengthen Domestic Energy Supply (Apr. 23, 2025), U.S. Department of the Interior. [8] See, e.g. Executive Order 14148, Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions (Jan. 20, 2025), available through the Federal Register (rescinding Executive Order 13990 and eliminating the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases). [9] Id. See also Executive Order 14151, Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Program and Preferencing (Jan. 20, 2025), available through the Federal Register.

Firm Highlights