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Anna is passionate about building strong, trust-driven relationships so that clients feel supported throughout every stage of litigation.

Anna is an associate in Dorsey’s Trial group. She uses her unique background to make complex litigation matters manageable for her clients. She is equally comfortable with statistics-heavy analysis and text-driven interpretation. Before coming to Dorsey, Anna was an eighth-grade science teacher. From this experience, she gained valuable skills in simplifying challenging concepts and communicating effectively with a wide array of audiences.

Anna maintains an active pro bono practice, including Constitutional rights claims and tenant rights.

Education

  • Marquette University Law School (J.D., 2025)
    • cum laude
  • St. Mary’s University of Minnesota (M.A., Teaching, 2022)
  • Case Western Reserve University (B.A., Economics and English, 2020)

Bar Admissions

  • Wisconsin
  • Minnesota

Professional Affiliations

  • Former board member, Wisconsin Young Lawyers Division
  • Member, HCBA New Lawyers Section
  • Member, MSBA New Lawyers Section
  • Member, MSBA Antitrust Law Section
  • Member, MSBA Civil Litigation Section

Accolades

  • MSBA, North Star Lawyer, 2025
  • Consistently providing pro bono legal assistance to those in need through Dorsey’s Pro Bono program
  • CALI, Excellence for the Future Award, Torts
  • CALI, Excellence for the Future Award, Nonprofit Law and Leadership
  • CALI, Excellence for the Future Award, AI Writing, 2025

Insights

Blog Post

Seventh Circuit Weighs Whether FCA Penalties Require Proof the Government Was Harmed

November 13, 2026

Client Alert

Court Declares Unlawful Federal Grant Terminations Based on Changes to “Program Goals or Agency Priorities”

July 27, 2026

In an important decision for recipients of federal funding, a federal court held that federal agencies may not terminate previously awarded grants merely because a new administration adopts new program goals or policy priorities, declaring unlawful a key authority for the federal government’s recent mass grant terminations. Background Twenty states, three governors, and the District of Columbia brought an action against an array of federal agencies asserting a pre-enforcement Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) challenge to the administration’s interpretation of the government’s grant-termination authority under the Uniform Guidance, specifically 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a)(4) (the “Termination Clause”), which provides: The Federal award may be terminated in part or its entirety as follows: . . . The Federal agency or pass-through entity pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Federal award, including, to the extent authorized by law, if an award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities.1 In so doing, the plaintiffs challenged the key provision, found in many federal grants and cooperative agreements, that the Administration has relied upon to terminate billions of dollars of agreements over the last year-and-a-half. Notably, the plaintiffs did not seek reinstatement of grants previously terminated under this authority (perhaps an acknowledgment of the legal headwinds related to the Court of Federal Claims’ jurisdiction over such actions). In their challenge, plaintiffs argued the Termination Clause was not, in effect, a termination for convenience, as the federal government could not redefine the “program goals or agency priorities” for a grant mid-performance. The Court's Decision On July 17, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that “the Termination Clause does not permit agencies to terminate grants based on program goals and agency priorities identified after grants were awarded.” In reaching its holding, the court relied on the text and structure of the broader regulatory scheme, which the court found requires agencies to establish clear program goals, disclose funding priorities, and communicate performance expectations before issuing an award. The court also relied on OMB's explanation accompanying its rulemaking for the Termination Clause. The court reasoned that allowing an agency to replace those priorities after the award would undermine the Uniform Guidance’s notice requirements. The court also found that the government’s interpretation raised concerns under the Spending Clause. Under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,2 conditions attached to federal funding to States must be sufficiently clear to allow a recipient to make an informed decision whether to accept the funds. According to the court, a grantee cannot knowingly accept a funding condition if the agency may later change the goals against which the award will be measured. Significantly, the ruling does not prevent agencies from changing their priorities for future funding opportunities. Nor does it prohibit termination for noncompliance or on other grounds authorized by the award terms, statute, or regulation. Rather, it limits agencies’ ability to terminate an otherwise compliant award solely because the agency adopted different “program goals or agency priorities” after making the award—this of course was the basis for most of the billions of dollars in research and climate grants terminated by the Trump Administration over the past 18 months. What This Means for Federal Grant Recipients If the decision withstands appeal, one of the key tools used by federal agencies to terminate previously awarded grants will be unavailable as a basis to terminate future grants—at least for now (more on that below). The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on their declaratory judgment claim confirming future terminations of grants relying on a change in agency priorities since the award decision, will be suspect and subject to attack as violating the court’s order—indeed, the declaration in the court’s decision arguably protects all parties and non-parties from such a fate. And while the decision does not directly affect the rights of grant recipients and subrecipients who already had grants terminated under the Termination Clause, as the court declined to reinstate any terminated grants, it may be useful to those recipients if they challenge terminated grants as having been unlawful in separate litigation under the Tucker Act in the Court of Federal Claims. And because the relief is awarded under the APA, the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA proscribing so-called universal injunctions may mean that the decision has wider impact. Institutions should carefully preserve and review the notice of funding opportunity, assistance listing, award terms, approved scope of work, stated program goals, performance measures, and agency communications. Those documents may help establish the priorities governing the award when it was made and whether a later termination rests on noncompliance, an authorized award condition, or a newly adopted policy position. The court’s order may be appealed, and institutions should continue to monitor further developments. Although the decision provides important guidance under the current Uniform Guidance, institutions should continue to monitor OMB's proposed revisions to the grant termination provisions. If adopted, those revisions could expand agencies' authority to terminate federal awards and change the regulatory framework that formed the basis for the court's decision, potentially limiting its application to grants awarded under the revised regulations. In the meantime, the opinion provides important support for colleges and universities administering federal grants by limiting agencies' ability to terminate existing awards based solely on policy priorities adopted after the awards were made. 1 The plaintiffs also challenged an earlier version of the regulation, which had omitted the clause “pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Federal Award[.]" See 2 C.F.R. § 200.340(a)(4) (2021). 2 451 U.S. 1 (1981).

Firm Highlights

Insights

Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.