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The Sky May Be the Limit: Local Drone Regulation and Federal Preemption

September 28, 2017

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Just over one year ago, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) promulgated regulations governing the commercial use of drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), weighing less than 55 pounds. These small UAS (sUAS) regulations cleared the way for American businesses to benefit from the many commercial uses for drones. But one question unresolved by the sUAS regulations was the extent to which federal law preempts state and local laws governing drone use. Recently, in a case of first impression, a federal district court held federal law preempts certain provisions of a city ordinance attempting to regulate drone operations. The decision is important because it further defines federal preemption and the authority that states and municipalities have to regulate drones.

The case, Singer v. City of Newton, involves an ordinance enacted by the City of Newtown, Massachusetts. Singer, No. 7-10071-WGY (D. Mass. filed Sept. 21, 2017). Michael Singer, the plaintiff, is a Newton resident and FAA-certified sUAS pilot who owns and operates multiple sUASs for commercial purposes in the city. The ordinance, which Newtown approved on December 12, 2016, applies to “pilotless aircraft,” which it defines as “an unmanned, powered aerial vehicle, weighing less than 55 pounds, that is operated without direct human contact from within or on the aircraft.” Violations of the ordinance are punishable by a fine of $50 following a one-time warning. Id. at 5. Singer argued federal law preempted four provisions of the ordinance: (1) a requirement that owners register all pilotless aircraft with the City of Newton; (2) a ban on operation of pilotless aircraft below an altitude of 400 feet over private property without the express permission of the property owner; (3) a ban on operation of pilotless aircraft at any altitude over public property without prior permission of the City of Newtown; and (4) a ban on operations of pilotless aircraft beyond the visual line of sight of the operator.

The court began its analysis by noting Congress may override state regulation by expressly preempting an area of law, which the court found Congress has not done with aviation. Absent express preemption, the court opined Congress could still preempt state regulation if federal regulation is so pervasive and dominant that it occupies the entire field of law, known as “field preemption,” or if state law obstructs the objectives if federal regulation, known as “conflict preemption.” According to the court, the FAA’s sUAS rule explicitly contemplated state or local regulation of pilotless aircraft in certain areas, such as protection of privacy. The court rejected plaintiff’s assertions that the federal government has preempted the entire field of aviation. But the court also rejected the City of Newton’s argument that the FAA had carved out an area for state and local regulation. Instead, the court found whether a state or local sUAS regulation is enforceable depends upon the principles of conflicts preemption.

Applying conflict preemption principles, the court held federal law preempted the four provisions of the ordinance that plaintiff challenged. Federal law preempted the ordinance’s requirement that owners register all pilotless aircraft with the City of Newton because the FAA also implements a mandatory registration of certain drones. The City argued that it could require drone registration because the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held earlier this year in Taylor v. Huerta that the FAA could not require registration of model aircraft. But the Singer court found the FAA expressly stated federal registration was the exclusive means for registering UAS in navigable airspace, thereby preempting Newton’s ordinance.

Federal law also preempted the ordinance’s ban on sUAS operations below 400 feet over private property and ban on sUAS operations at any altitude over public property. The court found the ban on operations over public property at any altitude was preempted because the ban reached into navigable airspace, which was within the FAA’s exclusive regulatory purview. Moreover, the court held that the ordinance’s provisions worked in tandem to create “an essential ban on drone use within the limits of Newton,” thwarting the FAA’s objectives in the sUAS rule and congressional intent that the FAA integrate drones into the national airspace.

In addition, federal law preempted the ordinance’s ban on operations of pilotless aircraft beyond the visual line of sight of the operator. Aviation safety, the court held, is an area of exclusive federal regulation. And the court observed the FAA’s sUAS regulations govern visual line of sight operations for pilotless aircraft, rendering the Newton ordinance an impermissible intervention into the FAA’s regulation of aircraft safety.

Finally, the court let stand the remaining provisions of the ordinance because plaintiff did not challenge those provisions. Among the unchallenged provisions were a ban on operations of pilotless aircraft in “a manner that interferes with any manned aircraft” or to “conduct surveillance or invade any place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” The court concluded its opinion by stating that nothing prevented the City from redrafting its ordinance to avoid conflict preemption.

The Singer court’s decision is on solid legal grounds. The court correctly found there is no express preemption of the FAA regulation of sUAS. Commenters on the sUAS rule urged the FAA to include an express preemption provision in the regulations but the FAA declined, instead referring to a December 2015 memorandum from FAA’s Office of Chief Counsel discussing preemption. According to the FAA memorandum, state and local governments have a role, exercising police power, to regulate certain UAS operations. But the FAA memorandum notes federal courts carefully scrutinize state and local regulation of aircraft overflight and warns against a "patchwork quilt" of "differing restrictions could severely limit the flexibility of FAA in controlling the airspace and flight patterns, and ensuring safety and an efficient traffic flow." Legal scholars may debate whether the appropriate preemption test for the Newton ordinance was field preemption or conflict preemption. But under either test, federal courts are likely to follow Singer and invalidate state or local drone registration or overflight regulations.

Singer is unlikely to halt state and municipal attempts to regulate UAS operations. Over twenty states approved drone laws in 2015, as have major cities such as Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and Santa Clara. And some in Congress are attempting to draw a legislative line between where the FAA control of the national airspace ends and local control begins.

Unless Congress changes the law, it appears federal aviation preemption will remain broad. As Singer illustrates, federal law would likely preempt state or local laws addressing operational UAS restrictions on flight altitude or flight paths, outright flight bans, regulation of navigable airspace, and mandated UAS equipment, certification, registration, or training beyond federal requirements. However, laws traditionally related to local police power, such as land use, zoning, privacy, trespass, and law enforcement operations, are generally not subject to federal preemption. State and local governments appear to be on solid ground if they attempt to regulate UAS operations based upon considerations of land use, zoning, privacy, trespass, and law enforcement. Acceptable constraints might include requiring police to obtain a warrant before using a UAS for surveillance or prohibiting certain UAS uses, such as for voyeurism, hunting or fishing, or carrying weapons. Note the plaintiff in Singer did not challenge a provision in the Newton ordinance that banned use of pilotless aircraft to conduct surveillance or to invade any place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Singer may be the first federal preemption decision addressing drone operations but it is unlikely to be the last. As states and municipalities continue to impose restrictions on pilotless aircraft, more UAS owners and operators will argue that federal law preempts at least some of those regulations. States and municipalities will continue to struggle with federal preemption but one thing is certain: for local drone regulation, the sky may be the limit.

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Minnesota Consumer-Fraud Enforcement: Disclaimers Won’t Cure Deception, and Penalties Can Add Up

Misleading advertising claims can lead to costly consequences. In State of Minnesota ex rel. Ellison v. Wall & Associates, Inc., No. A25-2064, 2026 WL 3118291 (Minn. App. Oct. 19, 2026), the Minnesota Court of Appeals recently affirmed a bench trial verdict against a tax-relief company and two executives for violations of the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (“MCFA”) and the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“MDTPA”). The decision, which affirmed a substantial restitution and civil penalty judgment, underscores the broad power of the Minnesota Attorney General to act against deceptive sales practices. The decision also offers practical lessons for businesses seeking to reduce liability risks in consumer-facing communications. Background Wall & Associates (“W&A”), a Virginia-based tax-relief company, marketed assistance to taxpayers seeking relief from outstanding federal and state tax liabilities, often with offers in compromise—agreements to settle tax liabilities for less than the amount owed. In its extensive advertising campaigns, W&A represented that its average client received a 90% reduction in their tax debt, that it was a local company with Minnesota offices, that it provided legal services, and that it would “Solve ALL Tax Problems.” In reality, W&A’s promises bore little resemblance to what many clients received. Most of W&A’s clients saw just a 9.5% reduction in federal tax debt and 1.2% in state tax debt. W&A had no permanent Minnesota offices. And W&A provided neither legal representation nor assistance with filing tax returns—those services required referrals to separate firms for an additional fee. All the while, W&A clients paid upfront and recurring fees, including during periods when W&A did no work on their cases. Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison sued W&A, its founder and owner Ernest Kenneth Wall, and its president and CEO Patrick Mark Yates, alleging violations of, among other laws, the MCFA and the MDTPA. Following a 12-day bench trial, the district court determined that W&A violated the MCFA and MDTPA through its false and embellished advertising. The district court also held Wall and Yates individually liable for those violations because they directed, participated in, and acquiesced in the violations. The district court ordered injunctive relief, $2.7 million in restitution (with Wall and Yates jointly and severally liable for $1.3 million), and civil penalties of $786,517 against W&A, $415,500 against Wall, and $207,750 against Yates. The district court also awarded over $2.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the state. W&A, Wall, and Yates appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on October 19, 2026. Although W&A, Wall, and Yates challenged the judgment on numerous grounds, several highlights of the decision provide important takeaways for consumer-facing businesses. Individual Reliance Is Not Required for Statutory Liability W&A argued that Attorney General Ellison had to prove a causal nexus between each violation of the MCFA and MDTPA and the injury to a particular consumer to establish liability. In W&A’s view, this required proof that each injured consumer had personally relied on W&A’s false representation. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument based on the MCFA’s and MDTPA’s plain language, which requires no proof of actual deception or confusion by consumers. The Court of Appeals finally pointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc., which held that when a defendant’s misrepresentations are directed at and affected “a broad group of consumers, proof of direct individual reliance is not required to establish a causal nexus between MCFA violations and the harm suffered by consumers.” 935 N.W.2d 124, 135 (Minn. 2019). The Court of Appeals affirmed, however, that a causal nexus is necessary to support an award of damages under the MCFA and MDTPA. In making that determination, district courts look to various factors, including whether the misrepresentations were “longstanding, pervasive, and widespread in communications directed to consumers,” whether the seller intended and understood that consumers would rely on the misrepresentations, and whether the information was of a kind on which consumers would typically rely. The Court of Appeals’ decision continues Minnesota School of Business’s broad interpretation of liability under the MCFA and the MDTPA. Coordinated marketing campaigns to a “broad group of consumers” may expose businesses to MCFA and MDTPA liability without customer-by-customer proof of injury. That said, a causal nexus remains an element of an MCFA and MDTPA claim, and businesses involved in litigation should build a clear record at trial and on appeal showing how each of the relevant factors bears on the causal-nexus inquiry. Contractual Disclaimers Are Not an Automatic Defense to a Misleading Pitch W&A next argued that disclaimers in its client contracts prevented consumers from claiming they had been misled by its advertising. Reiterating that individual reliance is not required under the MCFA and MDTPA, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual disclaimer does not necessarily defeat a claim based on a conflicting oral representation. And on the facts of this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that W&A’s contractual disclaimers were insufficient given the extensive misrepresentations by W&A and the unequal bargaining power between it and its customers. This holding confirms that contractual disclaimers are not a cure-all for misleading advertising or sales practices. Businesses should review the entire customer journey, including pre-contract representations, as those representations may survive a contractual disclaimer to the contrary. And if faced with litigation, businesses should build a strong record, both at trial and on appeal, showing why any disclaimer is effective in context. The State Has Broad Authority to Seek Restitution W&A also challenged Attorney General Ellison’s authority to seek restitution under the state’s parens patriae authority to protect residents’ collective interests, arguing that injury to only 228 Minnesotans did not affect a sufficiently substantial segment of the population. The Court of Appeals rejected a simple headcount approach, instead explaining that the state had a legitimate interest in protecting residents’ economic well-being as a whole. In any event, the Court of Appeals held that if restitution was not appropriate under the state’s parens patriae authority, then it would still be appropriate under the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31. The decision reinforces that the broader and more sustained the deceptive advertising, the stronger the case for restitution to protect Minnesotans’ economic interests. Civil Penalties Accrue Per Violation, Not Per Defendant The Court of Appeals finally rejected W&A’s claim that the Attorney General’s enforcement powers under Minn. Stat. § 8.31 permit only civil penalties of up to $25,000 for each defendant. Rather, the Court of Appeals explained that penalties are limited to $25,000 per violation. Multiple violations can therefore produce substantially greater penalties. The Court of Appeals also rejected the argument that restitution made penalties unnecessary: repaying consumers does not eliminate the need to address gains from deceptive conduct and deter future violations. Final Takeaways Align every consumer-facing communication. Broad and extensive marketing campaigns can expose businesses to stronger enforcement standards under the MCFA and MDTPA, making it critical that consumer communications remain accurate and consistent from the first advertisement through the final sale. Plan for layered enforcement exposure. Penalties under the MCFA and MDTPA can add up quickly: W&A, Wall, and Yates ultimately faced more than $6 million in civil penalties, restitution, and attorneys’ fees. The decision continues a line of Minnesota cases recognizing the Attorney General’s broad consumer-protection authority. Details matter. Although the Attorney General’s enforcement power is broad, it is not boundless. As the Court of Appeals explained, issues of causation, the effectiveness of contractual disclaimers, and the availability of restitution and civil penalties all turn on the specific facts of the case. Effective advocacy at trial and on appeal is critical to developing the facts relevant to liability and damages.