1	UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
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3	X :
4	TJGEM LLC, :
5	Appellant, :
6	v. : No. 14-7036
7	REPUBLIC OF GHANA, ET AL.,
8	Appellees. :
9	: X
10	Wednesday, May 6, 2015
11	Washington, D.C.
12	The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument
13	pursuant to notice.
14	BEFORE:
15	CIRCUIT JUDGES ROGERS, GRIFFITH, AND WILKINS
16	
17	APPEARANCES:
18	ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
19	MICHAEL A. LASLEY, ESQ.
20	ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES:
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22	JUAN C. BASOMBRIO, ESQ.
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	Juan C. Basombrio, Esq. On Behalf of the Appellees	10

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THE CLERK: Case number 14-7036, TJGEM LLC,

Appellant v. Republic of Ghana, et al. Mr. Lasley for the

Appellant; Mr. Basombrio for the Appellees.

JUDGE ROGERS: Good morning.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL A. LASLEY, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

MR. LASLEY: Good morning. Michael Lasley on behalf of the Appellant. I think we start with the situation that the Supreme Court in the landmark opinions of Bell Atlantic and Ashcroft mandated the trial court must look at the factual matters and reasonable inferences, and cannot ignore or negate those if they support the Plaintiff's possible claims of relief. The Congress enacted the FSIA traditional commercial exception to the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity, and specifically the unambiguous language in examples of 1603(d) and (e) and the clauses of 1605(a)(2) define and dictate what is meant by a commercial acts, activities, and substantial contact with the United States. The commercial --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Are you alleging that there was a direct effect of the Defendant's actions in the United States? In your brief you say there were direct effects, I didn't see any support for that. What is the direct effect?

MR. LASLEY: Well, if you look at the

circumstances of the RICO claim, which the Court, trial 2 court did not really consider, the Southway case decides the circumstances of the interrelationship of RICO predicate 3 4 acts --5 JUDGE GRIFFITH: What's -- no, let me -- what's the direct effect of the commercial activity you're 6 7 alleging, the direct effect in the United States? MR. LASLEY: In the United States, if the loan had 8 9 been granted, the applications for a loan it's in violation not only the protocols and rules of the bank, but the 10 foreign practice, the foreign practice act, and the basis of 11 12 the loan as we allege is the, from the Appellees was the 13 conspiracy, RICO conspiracy and predicate act. Those --14 JUDGE ROGERS: So, you're saying that the loan 15 would have been paid off with funds that were deposited 16 somewhere in the United States? 17 MR. LASLEY: The loan would have been granted in 18 the United States as to direct effect, but --19 JUDGE ROGERS: I know, but what is the direct 20 effect? Are you arguing that it's the money that would have been deposited? 21 22 MR. LASLEY: I'm arguing that the loan itself, of U.S. --23 24 JUDGE ROGERS: So, the loan itself, all right. 25 So, what we know from your pleadings is that, what, there

was a meeting at the Export-Import Bank, and a letter of interest? MR. LASLEY: That's part of, but not only the 3 4 misappropriation of the Appellant's work product and trade 5 secrets was all a part of the circumstances of direct effect, and also --6 7 JUDGE ROGERS: What do we know about the memorandum of understanding? 9 MR. LASLEY: Well, the Appellees never presented it. What we do know about it --10 11 JUDGE ROGERS: What did you tell the District 12 Court about it? 13 MR. LASLEY: Well, we told the District Court in our pleadings, we didn't have a hearing on the matter, but 14 15 in our pleadings we told the District Court that the memorandum of understanding was the essence of the whole 16 17 case. 18 JUDGE ROGERS: What does it say? 19 MR. LASLEY: Well, they never presented, we never 20 had a copy of the memorandum of understanding. What it says based on the actions of the Appellant officials, Ghana 21 22 officials when they went to the bank, they went to the bank with the purpose of trying to get the bank to consider the 23 loan that the Appellant had filed a letter, got a letter of 24

interest on. What we know about the memorandum of

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understanding, the very key point we know about the memorandum of understanding is that \$10 million was in addition to what the Appellant had filed and got the letter of interest on. We also know that there were two Inspector General investigations of the Bank Inspector General on the question of what's that \$10 million about. We argue that there was a reasonable, and to the trial court it was reasonable to infer that since there was no letter of interest, there's no interest at all of the Appellees until 2013, but in March of 2012 when they used and misappropriated the Appellant's letter of interest and other documents what we do know is that at that point the Bank knew and we knew by inference that there was no explanation for the \$10 million increase of the amount, the \$585 million that we had initially got the letter of interest on. \$10 million was never explained, they never submitted anything to the trial court to explain, to refute that inference that they were not using our particular documents, and our particular work product at that point. So, what the trial court knew is that there was an investigation, the trial court knew that there was a \$10 million difference, and that there was no way to explain it since there was no project, there was no loan application, there was no loan documents or anything before the U.S. Export-Import Bank that would indicate whether or not there was any basis other

than what we had filed with the Bank, and what we had submitted to the bank in terms of contract, project, what have you. So, the trial court knew that at the time that the Appellees Ghanadian officials went to the bank, signed the memorandum of understanding in D.C., and we believe that those was enough information to warrant some consideration, given the Bank had two investigations going on.

JUDGE ROGERS: All right.

MR. LASLEY: And it's undisputable that the Bank, that the Appellees used the information that was sent to the Bank, and exported especially the letter of interest and loan application. The most important point from the Appellant's point of view is that we were damaged because of the, we had structured an African Marshal Plan, that was the whole purpose of the development of the, and creation of the Appellant was to do that for the subsaharien countries, that was undermined and destroyed, as well as the fact that the circumstances of development work product was misappropriated use by the Appellee. Appellants never really had a --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: What's the nature of your misappropriate claim? What's the cause of action here? Is it under common law, is it under D.C. law? I don't think you've told us in the complaint.

MR. LASLEY: I think it falls under both, Your

Honor, but the --2 JUDGE GRIFFITH: But your pleading doesn't tell us that --3 4 MR. LASLEY: Well --5 JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- which I find to be a problem throughout your case. You've made it very hard for both the 6 District Court and for us to understand what your theory is. And so, what's the misappropriation claim? 9 MR. LASLEY: The misappropriation claim was based on the fact that we had developed this developer work, 10 business plan and model, and we had submitted that 11 12 information to the bank, the bank had agreed to consider it 13 at the \$585 million --14 JUDGE GRIFFITH: And your claim is that that's a 15 trade secret? 16 MR. LASLEY: That's what we claim because it was 17 particular to the Bank, and now to the Ghanadian officials 18 who then sent it to other people. We believe that that is 19 definitely a misappropriation. 20 JUDGE GRIFFITH: So, is this under D.C. Code, or under common law? What are the --21 22 MR. LASLEY: I don't have the specific D.C. Code, but I think it covers both common --23 24 JUDGE GRIFFITH: Well, you have to have, I mean, 25 for us to find a commercial activity exception there has to

be an allegation that the act performed in the United States was an element of the cause of action, how are we supposed to know that when you haven't told us --3 4 MR. LASLEY: Well, the --JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- what the cause of action is? 5 MR. LASLEY: -- the cause of action in terms of 6 7 what happened in this case I think it's clear that what we allege was factually based on what was taken from us. would submit to Your Honor that the situation was such that they knew exactly what they were doing in reference to 10 taking the property. Now, it was not --11 12 They may very well have, but you JUDGE GRIFFITH: 13 have to put it in a form that's intelligible to us, and --MR. LASLEY: Well --14 15 JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- I for one have found it very difficult to follow your complaint. 16 17 MR. LASLEY: Well, I think the complaint itself 18 focused on what occurred in terms of the --JUDGE GRIFFITH: Okay. 19 20 MR. LASLEY: -- actions of the Appellees. And I 21 think they had no right to use or to appropriate what we had 22 done. 23 JUDGE GRIFFITH: Let me ask you a question, the District Court noted that TJGEM had published in the record 24 25 all the documents that it claims were protected by the trade

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secret, is that correct?

MR. LASLEY: That was after certain documents were submitted to the Court, that was after the litigation had begun, it was after the, as we claim, misappropriation occurred in use of those documents. The only persons that had the documents that we had, and that we were using and we were claiming were misappropriated was the Ghanadians before this litigation started. After litigation started those particular events occurred, but not before that, other than the Bank and the Ghanadians later, the Bank initially, the Ghanadians later, that was the extent of what we were dealing with. There was no use or giving of the documents prior to the litigation.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes. Okay.

JUDGE ROGERS: All right. Why don't we hear --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Thank you.

JUDGE ROGERS: -- from Counsel for Appellees.

MR. LASLEY: All right. Thank you very much, Your

19 Honor.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF JUAN C. BASOMBRIO, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES

MR. BASOMBRIO: Good morning. May it please the

23 Court.

JUDGE ROGERS: Good morning.

MR. BASOMBRIO: I want to mention briefly that the

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Solicitor General of Ghana, Ms. Gaisie, was here. believe that the Saudi Arabia v. Nelson case of the Supreme Court disposes of this appeal, and I want to spend a couple of minutes talking about that case. In that case the Supreme Court held that whether you come under any of the different clauses of the commercial activity exception, that claim has to be based upon the subject commercial activity. So, you have to first ask what is the commercial activity that's at issue, then you need to ask is the claim based upon that commercial activity? If it's not, there is no application of the exception. So, what happened in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson? Nelson was recruited by Saudi Arabia in the United States, and he signed a contract in the United States to go work for a hospital in Saudi Arabia. got there he was basically a whistleblower, he got arrested, he got tortured, returned to the United States, and sued Saudi Arabia. He said the commercial activity exception applies because they came to the United States, they recruited me here, even more than our case we signed a contract in the United States, and so there was commercial activity here. The Supreme Court said you're missing the point, you are not suing for breach of contract, you are not suing for what happened in the United States, you are suing because you were tortured in Saudi Arabia. So, the claim is based upon the torts inflicted on you in Saudi Arabia, not

the preceding commercial activity in the United States. This is the identical case, why is TJGEM bringing a lawsuit? Because they claim that the Mayor of Accra --3 4 JUDGE GRIFFITH: But, Mr. Basombrio, I mean, the 5 statute says it is an act performed in the United States in connection with the commercial activity of the foreign state 7 elsewhere. MR. BASOMBRIO: That's the third clause. 8 9 have involved two clauses. 10 JUDGE GRIFFITH: That's in the statute. Yes, right. Yes. 11 12 MR. BASOMBRIO: Yes, the first clause, I'm 13 discussing the first clause first --14 JUDGE GRIFFITH: Okay. Yes. 15 MR. BASOMBRIO: -- where you've got to have commercial activity in the U.S. That, the first clause of 16 17 the commercial activity exception --18 JUDGE GRIFFITH: Well, that's not the problem. 19 That's not the problem --20 JUDGE ROGERS: Problem here. 21 JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- you face, at least in my mind, 22 the problem you face is whether at this meeting where the 23 memorandum of understanding was entered into whether an act of misappropriation occurred there, because the signing of 24

that agreement was an act performed in the United States in

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connection with a commercial activity elsewhere, you agree
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   to that?
             MR. BASOMBRIO: Yes.
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              JUDGE GRIFFITH: Okay.
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             MR. BASOMBRIO: So, let me address both the first
    clause and the third clause --
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              JUDGE GRIFFITH: Okay, thank you.
             MR. BASOMBRIO: -- to be thorough. So, in terms
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   of the first clause, that would not fit because there was
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   no --
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             JUDGE GRIFFITH: I see.
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             MR. BASOMBRIO: -- commercial activity in the
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   United States.
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              JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes. Yes.
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             MR. BASOMBRIO: Now, in terms of the third clause,
    Section 1605(a)(2) still requires that the lawsuit be,
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    quote, unquote, based upon the activity in the United
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   States, which was --
             JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes, and the claim is that
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   there --
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             MR. BASOMBRIO: Right.
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              JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- a misappropriation occurred
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   here in the United States in connection --
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             MR. BASOMBRIO: No, it's not.
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             JUDGE GRIFFITH: It's not?
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MR. BASOMBRIO: The allegation, as the District Court correctly points out in its opinion, was the misappropriation occurred in Ghana, the request or a bribery occurred allegedly in Ghana. Only two things happened in the United States, an MOU was signed, and there were meetings at the Export-Import Bank regarding financing. However, even under the third clause the claims still have to be based upon those acts, and they are not suing based on those acts. TJGEM gets no relief based on the fact that an MOU was signed with --

JUDGE GRIFFITH: Well, let me ask you, let's imagine it were the case, and this is perhaps a hypothetical --

MR. BASOMBRIO: Yes.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- okay? So, don't say that's not my case. But let's just imagine that a memorandum of understanding was signed here in the United States, and that as part of that trade secrets were given to the Export-Import Bank, that confidential information that had been developed is part of the proposal that was to be made in Ghana was brought to the United States and given to the Bank unlawfully then, under those circumstances wouldn't you have an act performed in the United States in connection with the commercial activity elsewhere?

MR. BASOMBRIO: That's not what happened here.

JUDGE GRIFFITH: That's right. Yes. But if that 1 is --2 MR. BASOMBRIO: So, I mean, I --3 4 JUDGE GRIFFITH: -- what happened, if under those 5 circumstances we'd find the exception fits, right? MR. BASOMBRIO: Well, perhaps. As a lawyer I 6 7 would look at all the facts around your hypothetical. JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes. Why do you say that's not 8 9 what happened here? Because I think that's what the allegation is. 10 MR. BASOMBRIO: No, the allegation is that the 11 information was provided in Ghana, and was --12 13 JUDGE GRIFFITH: I see. MR. BASOMBRIO: -- misappropriated in Ghana. 14 15 that's the finding of fact of the District Court. So, now 16 on appeal TJGEM had the burden to show that there was an 17 abuse of discretion in making that finding of fact, and 18 they've never done that. That's not de novo, de novo review 19 is on the law, but on the facts it's going to be abuse of 20 discretion, and I believe that the finding stands. 21 So, there are basically two reasons, the one we 22 have discussed that none of what happened in the United States is an element of the claim, it's not what the claim 23 is based upon; the other reason is that the alleged torts by 24

the Mayor, which by the way, Ghana disputes, but it didn't

have to disprove in a motion to dismiss, those are not considered to be commercial activity in any event by the Republic of Ghana under the *Phaneuf* case from the Ninth Circuit. The D.C. Circuit hasn't had the opportunity as of yet to adopt *Phaneuf*, but every other circuit has followed that, and the reason why we require actual authority of a foreign government official is because that's what we require of the United States. When you enter into a contract with the United States it's buyer beware, and you have to make sure that the agent has actual authority.

JUDGE ROGERS: So, could I just follow up for a moment on Judge Griffith's hypothetical with you?

MR. BASOMBRIO: Yes.

JUDGE ROGERS: We have held that on a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1) the District Court should allow sufficient discovery to enable an understanding of what are the underlying facts for the complaint. So, here in this case all we know that I have found about the MOU is in that website article. We know nothing about the details of that, and as I understand Counsel's argument even today it's simply that the inference in the Plaintiff's favor arises as a result of sort of the sequence of events, the timing, but we know nothing about the content of the MOU. Why in this case was the District Court not obligated to allow some jurisdictional discovery on that issue?

MR. BASOMBRIO: I think there are two reasons, 1 2 one, when a foreign sovereign is sued the case is a little 3 different than the normal 12(b)(1) motion, because the FSIA is intended to create a presumption of immunity, and then the Plaintiff has to come forward with evidence, and so it protects the foreign sovereign from the normal procedure. A Plaintiff has a much higher burden to come forward with evidence from the start before they file the lawsuit. Here, they filed a 250-page complaint with 1,000 pages of exhibits, and I think --10 11 JUDGE GRIFFITH: We know. 12 MR. BASOMBRIO: -- the District Court was --13 JUDGE GRIFFITH: We know. 14 MR. BASOMBRIO: -- correct in saying --15 JUDGE GRIFFITH: Yes. MR. BASOMBRIO: -- you know, enough is enough, and 16 17 we had over 1,000 pages of pleadings. And, you know, will 18 all due respect to Opposing Counsel, the District Court to 19 some extent had to throw its hands up and say, you know, we 20 really don't know what you're alleging, what are you claims, 21 what are your causes of action? This is just a rambling 22 thing. And Plaintiffs are not supposed to dump a stack of papers on a District Judge --23 24 JUDGE GRIFFITH: Right. 25 MR. BASOMBRIO: -- and say you figure it out.

Now, the second reason is it's because it really doesn't matter, they are not suing for a breach of the MOU, and there's plenty of authority that we have cited that indicates that the based upon language is the limiting language.

Let me just make a quick point about *Pimentel* and the other Defendants. Under the Supreme Court's decision in *Pimentel*, and we have gone through the Rule 19 analysis, clearly AMA and the Republic of Ghana were necessary or required parties.

JUDGE ROGERS: Could I just interrupt and ask you to go back on one issue? The complaint does refer to other officials of the Government of Ghana.

MR. BASOMBRIO: Yes.

JUDGE ROGERS: And makes the argument that those officials had actual authority to act on behalf of the Government, at least one of them, and even that I'll get the name wrong, but the man who was assisting the Mayor claims that there was authority to negotiate on behalf of the Government. And so, is your response as to both of those that still given the presumption the --

MR. BASOMBRIO: Our responses that we submitted the declaration of a Ghanaian professor, our expert witness --

JUDGE ROGERS: Yes.

MR. BASOMBRIO: -- who disputed that and cited the 1 2 provisions of Ghanaian procurement law --3 JUDGE ROGERS: Yes. 4 MR. BASOMBRIO: -- and that was never disputed. 5 JUDGE ROGERS: I see. All right. Thank you. MR. BASOMBRIO: And just on Pimentel, I won't 6 reargue that, again, but it extends the benefit of immunity 7 to the rest of the Defendants. 8 9 JUDGE ROGERS: Thank you. 10 MR. BASOMBRIO: Thank you. JUDGE ROGERS: Counsel for Appellant, if you'd 11 12 like a minute. 13 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL A. LASLEY, ESQ. ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT 14 15 MR. LASLEY: Yes. As the Court just mentioned, the circumstances of Vandepoozie (phonetic sp.) he had the 16 17 authority as the CEO of the AMA, in fact, he was tasked with 18 the authority to negotiate and recommend infrastructure develops and projects. The notion that he was the only 19 20 person involved was one of the errors of the trial court, he was involved, as well as Samuel. Exhibit No. 10 attached to 21 the complaint noted the letter of 12-20-2011 where Samuel 22 Ayeh-Dartey, who is the Metro Coordinating Director of the 23 AMA, indicated that he had indeed the authority to negotiate 24

along with Vandepoozie and other people involved in this

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matter. But there's no reason to conclude that there's no distinction between negotiation powers and scope of your authority as a CEO, and as well as Samuel's role in the Metropolitan Assembly, and not having the power to let contracts, and that I think was what the issue was in that regard.

So, we would submit that the notion that that's not the case is also undermined by the notion of Exhibit 51 where the Mayor talks about how he was appointed in a Modern Ghana News report to deal with the issues of metro problems in Accra, and he was authorized by the President Mills at that point. So, we would submit that there's a notion that he had no power and the other people didn't have any power, there was a difference between the power to, and the responsibility to work on issues of the sewage system in Accra, and the reason to, power to let a contract, which is totally different. The contract was not decided until 2013, was not granted. The Ex-Im Bank in the exhibit that was submitted, I believe it was Exhibit 55 that was attached to the complaint, indicated that indeed the circumstances of the let of the contract and the loan was to the end user, AMA.

JUDGE ROGERS: All right. Thank you.

MR. LASLEY: Thank you.

JUDGE ROGERS: We'll take the case under

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    advisement.
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              MR. LASLEY: Thank you.
              MR. BASOMBRIO: Thank you.
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              (Whereupon, at 10:00 a.m., the proceedings were
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    concluded.)
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DIGITALLY SIGNED CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcription of the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Caula Un Der word

Paula Underwood

August 18, 2016

DEPOSITION SERVICES, INC.