The Supreme Court of the United States announced decisions in three cases this morning:
American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock, No. 11-1179: A Montana state law provides that a “corporation may not make . . . an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.” The state supreme court rejected petitioners’ claim that this statute violates the First Amendment, and the question was whether Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which the Supreme Court struck down a similar federal law as violative of the First Amendment, applies to the Montana state law. Stating that “[t]here can be no serious doubt that it does,” the Court today reversed the state supreme court in a per curiam decision.
The Court’s opinion is available
here.
Miller v. Alabama, Nos. 10-9646 & 10-9647: In each of two separate cases, a 14-year-old was convicted of murder and sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The lower courts upheld the sentences against Eighth Amendment challenges. Today, the Court reversed the lower courts, holding that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”
The Court’s opinion is available
here.
Arizona v. United States, No. 11-182: A state statute was enacted to address issues related to the large number of unlawful aliens in the state. The United States sought to enjoin the law as preempted. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction preventing four of its provisions from taking effect: Section 3,which makes failure to comply with federal alien-registration requirements a state misdemeanor; §5(C), which makes it a misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in the State; §6, which authorizes state and local officers to arrest without a warrant a person “the officer has probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that makes the person removable from the United States”; and §2(B), which requires officers conducting a stop, detention, or arrest to make efforts, in some circumstances, to verify the person’s immigration status with the Federal Government. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the United States had established a likelihood of success on its preemption claims. Today, the Court affirmed in part, holding that sections 3, 5(C), and 6 are preempted, and reversed and remanded in part, holding that it was improper to enjoin §2(B) before the state courts had an opportunity to construe it and without some showing that §2(B)’s enforcement in fact conflicts with federal immigration law and its objectives.
The Court’s opinion is available
here.
The Court also granted review in ten cases (some of which involved multiple petitions):
Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Defense Center, Nos. 11-338 & 11-347: May a citizen bypass judicial review of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permitting rule under 33 U.S.C. § 1369 and instead challenge the validity of the rule in a citizen suit to enforce the Clean Water Act, and did the Ninth Circuit err when it held that stormwater from logging roads is industrial stormwater under the CWA, even though the Environmental Protection Agency has determined that it is not industrial stormwater?
Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, No. 11-460: When water flows from one portion of a river that is navigable water of the United States, through a concrete channel or other engineered improvement in the river constructed for flood and stormwater control as part of a municipal separate storm sewer system, into a lower portion of the same river, can there be a “discharge” from an “outfall” under the Clean Water Act, notwithstanding this Court’s holding in South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 105 (2004), that transfer of water within a single body of water cannot constitute a “discharge” for purposes of the Act?
Vance v. Ball State University, No. 11-556: Whether Title VII’s “supervisor” liability rule applies to harassment by those whom the employer vests with authority to direct and oversee their victim’s daily work or is limited to those harassers who have the power to “hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline” their victim.
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, No. 11-864: Whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis.
Already, LLC v. Nike, No. 11-982: Whether a federal district court is divested of Article III jurisdiction over a party’s challenge to the validity of a federally registered trademark if the registrant promises not to assert its mark against the party’s then-existing commercial activities.
Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, No. 11-1059: Whether a case becomes moot, and thus beyond the judicial power of Article III, when the lone plaintiff receives an offer from the defendants to satisfy all of the plaintiff ’s claims.
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc., Nos. 11-1160, 11-1231, & 11-1285: Whether the Georgia legislature, by vesting a local government entity with general corporate powers to acquire and lease out hospitals and other property, has “clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed” a “state policy to displace competition” in the market for hospital services, and whether such a state policy, even if clearly articulated, would be sufficient to validate the anticompetitive conduct in this case, given that the local government entity neither actively participated in negotiating the terms of the hospital sale nor has any practical means of overseeing the hospital’s operation.
Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical, No. 11-1231: Is the 180-day statutory time limit for filing an appeal with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board from a final Medicare payment determination made by a fiscal intermediary, 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3), subject to equitable tolling?
US Airways Inc. v. McCutchen, No. 11-1285: Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit correctly hold--in conflict with several other circuits—that Section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act authorizes courts to use equitable principles to rewrite contractual language and refuse to order participants to reimburse their plan for benefits paid, even where the plan's terms give it an absolute right to full reimbursement?
Henderson v. United States, No. 11-9307: What sort of error can be corrected under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) and when must the “obviousness” of plain error be judged – at the time of the error or at the time of the appellate decision.