The Supreme Court of the United States announced decisions in two cases this morning:
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., No. 10-1042: A provision of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) prohibits giving and accepting “any portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service . . . other than for services actually performed.” Petitioners alleged that respondent had violated RESPA by charging them fees for which no services were provided in return. The district court ruled for respondent because the allegedly unearned fees were not split with another party, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Today the Court affirmed as well, holding that in order to establish a violation of the RESPA provision at issue, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a charge for settlement services was divided between two or more persons.
The Court’s opinion is available
here.
Blueford v. Arkansas, No. 10-1320: The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against being tried twice for the same offense, but it does not bar a second trial if the first ends in a mistrial. In this case, Arkansas charged petitioner with capital murder for the death of a one-year old child, and the charges included lesser offenses of first-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. The jury reported during deliberations that it was unanimous against guilt on charges of capital murder and first-degree murder, was deadlocked on manslaughter, and had not voted on negligent homicide. The trial court told the jury to continue to deliberate. The jury did so but still could not reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. When Arkansas subsequently sought to retry petitioner, he moved to dismiss the capital and first-degree murder charges on double jeopardy grounds. The trial court denied the motion, and the state supreme court affirmed on interlocutory appeal. The Court today also affirmed that denial, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar retrying the charges of capital and first-degree murder, because the jury’s report prior to the end of deliberations lacked the sort of finality necessary to amount to an acquittal on those charges.
The Court’s opinion is available
here.