The Supreme Court of the United States announced decisions in three cases today:

EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., No. 12-1182: Respondents in this action, consisting of a group of state and local governments, as well as industry and labor groups, petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of EPA’s “Transport Rule” —EPA's rule interpreting the Good Neighbor Provision in the Clean Air Act. The Good Neighbor Provision addresses the problem of the influx of out-of-state air pollution into downwind States by prohibiting in-state sources “from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly” to downwind States’ “nonattainment . . . , or interfere with maintenance,” of any EPA-promulgated national air quality standard.” 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(D)(i). The Transport Rule, in turn, calls for consideration of costs, among other factors, when determining the emission reductions an upwind State must make to improve air quality in polluted downwind areas. The D.C. Circuit vacated the Transport Rule, holding that the Good Neighbor Provision requires EPA to consider only each upwind State’s physically proportionate responsibility for each downwind State’s air quality problem. Today, the Court reversed, holding that under an application of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Good Neighbor Provision does not command the Court of Appeals’ cost-blind construction, and that EPA reasonably interpreted the provision.

The Court's decision is available here.

Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., No. 12-1184: Section 285 of the Patent Act provides that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. §285. Under the Federal Circuit’s standard, “a case may be deemed exceptional” under that statutory provision only “when there has been some material inappropriate conduct,” or when the litigation is both “brought in subjective bad faith” and “objectively baseless.” Petitioner Octane moved for attorney’s fees under Section 285 after prevailing on summary judgment over respondent ICON’s patent infringement claim. The District Court denied the motion under the Federal Circuit’s framework, and the Federal Circuit affirmed. The Court today reversed, holding that the framework established by the Federal Circuit is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.

The Court's decision is available here.

Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., No. 12-1163: This case also addresses Section 285 of the Patent Act’s provision that “[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” 35 U.S.C. §285. Petitioner Highmark Inc. moved for fees under this provision, and the District Court granted the motion, finding the case “exceptional.” The Federal Circuit reviewed the determination de novo and reversed in part. Today, the Court vacated and remanded, holding that, on the basis of the Court’s opinion in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., an appellate court should review all aspects of a district court’s Section 285 determination for abuse of discretion.

The Court's decision is available here.

On Monday, April 21, the Court granted certiorari in two cases:

Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 13-684: Under the Truth in Lending Act, does a borrower exercise his right to rescind a transaction in satisfaction of the requirements of Section 1635 by "notifying the creditor" in writing within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held, or must a borrower file a lawsuit within three years of the consummation of the transaction, as the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have held?

Yates v. United States, No. 13-7451: The “anti-shredding provision” of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. §1519, criminalizes anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object” with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation. Here, was the petitioner, a commercial fisherman, deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of the anti-shredding provision where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in Section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose?