The Supreme Court of the United States announced decisions in two cases today:

Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 12 1226: When petitioner Peggy Young, a part-time driver for respondent United Parcel Service (UPS), became pregnant, her doctor advised her that she could not lift more than 20 pounds. UPS requires drivers to be able to lift up to 70 pounds, and told Young she could not work while under a lifting restriction. Young brought a disparate-treatment claim of discrimination under Title VII’s prohibition on pregnancy discrimination. She asserted that she had facts to support her burden that UPS discriminated against its pregnant employees under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, based upon UPS’s accommodation of workers injured on the job, who had disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act or had lost Department of Transportation certifications. The District Court granted summary judgment for UPS, concluding that Young could not make out a prima facie case for discrimination because the others Young had compared herself to were too different to qualify as “similarly situated comparator[s].” The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Today, the Court reversed, holding that the McDonnell Douglas framework is applicable and that Young created a genuine dispute as to whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from hers.

The Court's decision is available here.

Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, No. 13 895: Appellants, including the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and Alabama Democratic Conference (“Conference”), claimed that Alabama’s 2012 redistricting of its State House and Senate districts created a “racial gerrymander” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. A three-judge District Court, after a bench trial, ruled for the State. The Supreme Court today vacated the opinion, holding that the District Court applied incorrect legal standards with respect to four critical determinations by: (1) analyzing racial gerrymandering of the State “as a whole,” rather than as applied to particular districts; (2) concluding sua sponte that the Conference lacked standing; (3) considering an equal population goal as a factor to be weighed against race in determining whether race was a predominant motivating factor; and (4) misconstruing the strict scrutiny inquiry as requiring a covered jurisdiction to maintain a particular numerical minority percentage, when it instead requires the jurisdiction to maintain a minority’s ability to elect a preferred candidate of choice.

The Court's decision is available here.