The Supreme Court of the United States announced decisions in two cases today:

Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, No. 11-1025: Respondents challenged Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2006 ed., Supp. V), which authorizes the surveillance of individuals who are not United States persons and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, upon approval by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Respondents were United States persons that alleged that their work required them to engage in sensitive communications with individuals they believed to be likely targets of surveillance under § 1881a, and they sought declaratory and injunctive relief holding § 1881a unconstitutional. The District Court found that respondents lacked standing, but the Second Circuit reversed. Today, the Court reversed the Circuit Court, holding that respondents’ theory of future injury is too speculative to be considered “certainly impending”; that in any event, any threatened injury is not fairly traceable to § 1881a; and that to the extent respondents argue they are suffering a present injury because of the costly measures they have taken to protect the confidentiality of their communications, standing cannot be manufactured by making expenditures on a hypothetical harm.

The Court's decision is available here.

Marx v. General Revenue Corp., No. 11-1175: District courts have discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) to award costs to prevailing defendants “[u]nless a federal statute . . . provides otherwise.” After the District Court awarded Respondent-Defendant General Revenue Corp. (GRC) costs in Petitioner-Plaintiff Marx’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCA) suit, Marx unsuccessfully sought to vacate the award, arguing that the FDCA, 15 U.S.C. § 1629k(a)(3), “provides otherwise,” in its provision that “[o]n a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney’s fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.” The Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court in rejecting Marx’s argument. The Court today affirmed, holding that § 1692k(a)(3) does not “provide otherwise,” and thus costs may be awarded to prevailing defendants in FDCPA cases without a finding that the suit was brought in bad faith and for harassment purposes.

The Court's decision is available here.